Essays on Crime, Education, and Employment by Mancino, Maria Antonella
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 
9-5-2018 11:00 AM 
Essays on Crime, Education, and Employment 
Maria Antonella Mancino 
The University of Western Ontario 
Supervisor 
Dr. Salvador Navarro 
The University of Western Ontario 
Graduate Program in Economics 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of 
Philosophy 
© Maria Antonella Mancino 2018 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd 
 Part of the Labor Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mancino, Maria Antonella, "Essays on Crime, Education, and Employment" (2018). Electronic Thesis and 
Dissertation Repository. 5673. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/5673 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca. 
Abstract
My thesis consists of three chapters that are motivated by policy-relevance and contribute to
the study of crime choices among young individuals.
Chapter 2 studies the determinants of youth crime using a dynamic discrete choice model
of crime and education. We allow past education and criminal activities to affect current crime
and educational decisions. We take advantage of a rich panel dataset on serious juvenile of-
fenders, the Pathways to Desistance. Using a series of psychometric tests, we estimate a model
of cognitive and social/emotional skills which feed into the crime and education model. This
allows us to separately identify the roles of state dependence, returns to experience, and het-
erogeneity in driving crime and enrollment decisions among youth. We find small effects of
experience and stronger evidence of state dependence and heterogeneity for crime and school-
ing. We provide evidence that, as a consequence, policies that affect individual heterogeneity
(e.g., social/emotional skills), and those that temporarily keep youth away from crime, can
have important and lasting effects even if criminal experience has already accumulated.
Chapter 3 documents empirical facts about the criminal and legal labour sector for disad-
vantaged young individuals, and investigates the factors driving the transitions between sectors.
I focus on the role of heterogeneity, earnings, human capital, and criminal capital in determin-
ing transitions across the criminal and legal labour sectors. The data I employ comes from the
Pathways to Desistance Study. I find that disadvantaged young individuals face two low-quality
employment alternatives. On the one hand, jobs in the legal labour sector are characterized by
short average duration and low wages. Consistent with their low quality, these jobs present
small returns to legal experience. Activity in the criminal sector presents similar features as
legal jobs and it offers an earnings premium relative to the legal labour sector, which partially
compensates for the inherent risk of the activity. I provide evidence that earnings in the crimi-
nal and legal labour sectors play a significant role on the transitions across sectors. This implies
that choices in the criminal and legal labour sectors are strongly related and, as a result, they
should not be studied in isolation of each other.
Motivated by the findings in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 analyzes the legal employment and crime
choices for disadvantaged youth. The labour market for this population group is usually studied
ignoring the presence of the criminal sector, and yet a large share of them participate in crime.
To study these outcomes jointly and explore how they relate, I build and estimate a two-sector
search model allowing for a rich set of interactions between the two sectors. I estimate the
model using monthly data from the Pathways to Desistance. Search frictions in the legal labour
sector are found to be significant, with these individuals being offered low-quality legal jobs
that are characterized by low earnings and large destruction rates. The criminal sector provides
an attractive alternative to the legal labour sector, offering an earnings premium. Nevertheless,
crime brings a higher probability of incarceration and fewer opportunities in the legal labour
sector. I find that there are sizable interactions across sectors, and that policies in one sector
can have important effects on the other sector. I provide evidence that policies targeting the
legal labour sector (e.g., wage subsidy) can reduce crime and boost legal employment among
disadvantaged youth. Furthermore, a policy that reduces the arrival rate of crime opportunities
(e.g., via increasing the number of police), compared to extending the average sentence length,
i
has the advantage of reducing crime without generating large increases in the incarcerated
population.
Keywords: Crime, Education, Employment, Youth.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
My thesis consists of three chapters that are motivated by policy-relevance and contribute to
the study of crime choices among young individuals. The first chapter, written in co-authorship
with Salvador Navarro and David Rivers, studies the determinants of youth crime and educa-
tion. The second chapter provides a descriptive picture of the labour market for disadvantaged
youth, encompassing both criminal and legal activities. The last chapter explores the interac-
tions between the criminal and legal labour sectors.
All three chapters take advantage of a rich panel dataset on serious juvenile offenders, the
Pathways to Desistance (PDS). The PDS was designed specifically to study questions related
to the evolution of criminal behaviour, taking special care to also measure educational and
employment outcomes. As a result, the dataset contains a rich panel of information about
decisions to participate in crime, have a legal employment, and enroll in school. Each study
participant was followed for a period of seven years after entering the survey which results in
a comprehensive picture of life changes in a wide array of areas over the course of this time.
These features make the PDS data well-suited for understanding the dynamics in crime, legal
employment, and education.
Chapter 2 studies the determinants of youth crime in the context of a joint dynamic discrete
choice model of crime and education, by allowing previous decisions to affect current choices.
Different from the vast majority of papers studying the relationship between crime and educa-
tion, this chapter focuses on serious offenders rather than studying the population at large. For
policy makers interested in reducing overall crime rates, data on these serious offenders, who
contribute significantly to aggregate crime rates, is necessary. Using a series of psychometric
tests designed to measure unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate a model of cognitive and so-
cial/emotional skills which feeds into the crime and education model. Furthermore, we include
a large set of targeted control variables beyond what is typically available. The extremely rich
set of control variables allows us to separate the effects of experience from contemporaneous
effects of education on crime, and from the effects of individual heterogeneity. Furthermore,
we are able to separately account for the effects of state dependence in these decisions (cap-
tured by lagged decisions). Lastly, incorporating these additional measures of observed and
unobserved heterogeneity also represent additional potential instruments for policy makers.
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We find small effects of experience and stronger evidence of state dependence and hetero-
geneity for crime and schooling. In particular, many of the measures less commonly observed
in datasets, such as drug use, involvement in crime by family members, attitudes towards the
future, and social/emotional skills, have some of the largest effects. As a result, policies that
affect individual heterogeneity (e.g., social/emotional skills), and those that temporarily keep
youth away from crime, can have important and lasting effects even if criminal experience has
already accumulated.
Chapter 3 documents empirical facts about the criminal and legal labour sector for disad-
vantaged young individuals and investigates the factors driving the transitions between sectors.
I focus on the role of heterogeneity, earnings, human capital, and criminal capital in deter-
mining transitions across the criminal and legal labour sectors. Given the large fraction of
disadvantaged young individuals engaged in crime, a thorough analysis of the labour sector
should encompass both criminal and legal labour sector activities.
Using data from the PDS, I find that young individuals face two low-quality employment
alternatives. First, jobs in the legal labour sector are characterized by short duration and low
wages, on average. These jobs present small returns to legal experience. Altogether, the find-
ings suggest that legal jobs are of low quality. Activity in the criminal sector presents similar
features as legal jobs and it offers an earnings premium relative to the legal labour sector, which
partially compensates for the inherent risk of the activity. I provide evidence that earnings in
the criminal and legal labour sectors play a significant role on the transitions across sectors.
This implies that choices in the criminal and legal labour sectors are strongly related and, as a
result, they should not be studied in isolation of each other.
Motivated by the strong correlation between activity in the criminal and legal labour sec-
tors, Chapter 4 analyzes the legal employment and crime choices for disadvantaged youth
jointly. To study these outcomes and explore how they relate, I build and estimate a two-sector
search model allowing for a rich set of interactions between the two sectors. The search frame-
work is well-suited to this type of study because it brings together some key features of the
criminal and legal labour sectors documented in Chapter 3, such as the long periods of non-
employment and/or criminal activity, and ties them to frictions and earnings differences in the
criminal and legal labour sectors.
I find that search frictions in the legal labour sector are significant, with young individuals
being offered low-quality legal jobs that are characterized by low earnings and large destruc-
tion rates. In this context where legal jobs are not easily available, the criminal sector provides
an attractive alternative to the legal labour sector, offering a sizable earnings premium. Nev-
ertheless, crime brings a higher probability of incarceration and fewer opportunities in the
legal labour sector. I find that there are important interactions across sectors. For example,
increasing the arrival rate of legal jobs yields a sizable reduction in crime. As a result, policies
in one sector can have important effects on the other sector. I provide evidence that policies
targeting the legal labour sector (e.g., wage subsidy) can reduce crime and boost legal employ-
ment among disadvantaged youth. Furthermore, a policy that reduces the arrival rate of crime
opportunities (e.g., via increasing the number of police), compared to extending the average
sentence length, has the advantage of reducing crime without generating large increases in the
2
incarcerated population.
My thesis aims at understanding the main drivers of the crime choice, as well as which
policies are effective in reducing crime among youth. Overall, the results suggest that policies
that increase education or that improve the quality and the access to the legal labour sector can
have important effects on crime. In the next three chapters, I provide more detailed information
about each of these findings.
3
Chapter 2
Separating State Dependence, Experience,
and Heterogeneity in a Model of Youth
Crime and Education
2.1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that youth account for a large share of crime. In the United States,
1.9 million youth between the ages of 15 and 19 were arrested in 2010, accounting for 19% of
all arrests, despite representing only 7% of the total population.1 Furthermore, numerous stud-
ies have found that criminal activity is highly persistent over time (Blumstein, Farrington, and
Moitra, 1985; Nagin and Paternoster, 1991, 2000). This implies that reducing youth crime can
have not only immediate effects on criminal activity, but also lasting effects as these individuals
transition to adulthood.2
In order to design crime-reducing policies that effectively target youth, it is important to
understand the determinants of youth crime. Recently there has been an increased recognition
in the literature that education may be an important driver of criminal behaviour. Increased ed-
ucational attainment may increase future wages, which increases the return to legitimate work
and raises the opportunity cost of illegal activities (Freeman, 1996; Lochner, 2004). Schooling
may alter people’s preferences, for example by increasing patience or risk aversion (Becker and
Mulligan, 1997; Usher, 1997). By emphasizing social and emotional development, education
can affect psychic or financial rewards from crime (Lochner, 2011a). Schooling can also have
an incapacitation effect (Lochner, 2004; Jacob and Lefgren, 2003), or it can cause increased
criminal activity by increasing the concentration of young people, leading to more violent con-
1These figures are based on data from the U.S. Census and the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.
2In addition to the direct benefits to society of reducing crime, there are also indirect benefits. Research
has found that incarceration negatively affects future earnings of individuals (Grogger, 1995, 1998); (Waldfogel,
1994); (Nagin and Waldfogel, 1995); (Kling, 2006). Moreover, higher levels of crime have been found to reduce
incentives for investment (Zelekha and Bar-Efrat, 2011).
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frontations (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003) or increased drug-related offenses by bringing together
buyers and sellers.3 Schooling can affect social networks, and these networks could influence
criminal behaviour, for example via gang participation (Lochner, 2010).
There are also channels through which crime can affect educational decisions. Having
a criminal record may reduce the probability of obtaining a legitimate job, or may reduce
the expected wage, lowering the returns to education (Hansen, 2011; Kim, 2014). Criminal
experience may also increase the returns to criminal activity, thus lowering the relative returns
to legitimate work and therefore education (Loughran et al., 2013; Munyo, 2015). This could,
in turn, feed back into crime choices.
In this chapter, we study the determinants of youth crime in the context of a joint dynamic
discrete choice model of crime and education, by allowing previous decisions to affect current
choices. Understanding the relationships between crime and education has important policy
implications. To the extent that education and crime interact, this provides additional instru-
ments for policy makers interested in reducing crime and/or increasing educational attainment.
The data we employ comes from the Pathways to Desistance (PDS), a multi-site longi-
tudinal study of serious adolescent offenders as they transition from adolescence into early
adulthood. The Pathways to Desistance was designed specifically to study questions related to
the evolution of criminal behaviour, taking special care to also measure educational decisions
and outcomes. As a result, the dataset contains a rich panel of information about decisions to
participate in crime and enroll in school. This allows us to construct the criminal history of
an individual as well as his educational experience and enrollment decisions over time. Each
study participant was followed for a period of seven years after entering the survey which re-
sults in a comprehensive picture of life changes in a wide array of areas over the course of this
time.4 These features make the Pathways to Desistance data well-suited for understanding the
dynamics in crime and education.
The relationship between crime and education has been studied using a variety of datasets,
including the NLSY79 (Grogger, 1998; Lochner and Moretti, 2004); (Lochner, 2004), the
NLSY97 (Merlo and Wolpin, 2015), the Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study (Imai and Krishna,
2004; Tauchen, Witte, and Griesinger, 1994), the National Youth Survey (Imai, Katayama, and
Krishna, 2006), and the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Mocan and Rees,
2005), among others. A common feature of these datasets is that they study subsets of the
population at large, and include very few serious offenders.
An advantage of studying only serious offenders through the PDS data is that, to the extent
that there is unobserved heterogeneity that leads some individuals to become serious offenders,
we are more likely to be observing individuals who are on a criminal trajectory (Nagin and
Land, 1993; Nagin, Farrington, and Moffitt, 1995). For policy makers interested in reducing
3The literature is inconclusive on the direction of the effect of contemporaneous education on crime. Farrington
et al. (1986), and Witte and Tauchen (1994) find that time spent at school is associated with lower levels of criminal
behaviour. Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen (2006) find that being in school causes a drop in property crime,
but an increase in violent crime. Anderson (2014) finds that enrollment is negatively associated with both property
and violent crime rates.
4We describe the dataset in more detail in Section 2.2.
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overall crime rates, particularly violent crime rates, data on these serious offenders, who con-
tribute significantly to aggregate crime rates, is necessary. While selecting on serious offenders
has its advantages, one limitation is that we cannot necessarily generalize our findings to the
population at large. The data are also less useful for studying the transition to becoming a
serious offender, as we only observe those individuals that have already done so.
Our extremely rich set of control variables allows us to separate the effects of experience
(captured by the accumulation of education and crime) from contemporaneous effects of edu-
cation on crime, and from the effects of individual heterogeneity. Furthermore, we are able to
separately account for the effects of state dependence in these decisions (captured by lagged
decisions). Being able to separate these channels is important for evaluating potential policies
aimed at either reducing crime or increasing educational attainment. For example, if there are
large positive returns to criminal experience, then interventions to reduce crime need to be
taken at early ages before experience accumulates. If instead the returns to experience are low,
but there is a high degree of state dependence, then policies can be impactful at any age, but
need to be repeated as the lagged effects depreciate.
The PDS data includes a much larger set of targeted control variables than is typically
available. In addition to standard socio-economic variables and information about individuals’
families, the dataset also contains a number of additional individual-level variables that are par-
ticularly useful for our analysis. In each year the data contain a measure of each individual’s
perception about their probability of being caught if they commit a crime.5 It also has informa-
tion about drug usage, involvement in crime by family members, and a measure of how each
individual discounts future events, among others.
An additional benefit of this dataset is that individuals are given a series of tests designed
to measure unobserved heterogeneity, namely cognitive and social/emotional skills. Numerous
studies have established that cognitive ability is a strong predictor of schooling attainment and
wages (Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil, 2001; Murnane, Willett, and Levy, 1995), as well as
a range of social behaviours (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994). Recently, an emerging body of
research shows the effects of social/emotional skills (sometimes referred to as “non-cognitive
ability”) on outcomes such as labour market participation, health, and test scores (Heckman,
Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006; Chiteji, 2010; Cobb-Clark and Tan, 2011). Focusing specifically on
crime, Hill et al. (2011) show that programs targeting psychological factors besides cognitive
ability were effective at reducing delinquency. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) show
that both cognitive and non-cognitive skills influence a wide variety of risky activities such
as smoking by age 18, imprisonment, and participation in illegal activities. Research from
criminology and psychology has also found significant correlations between IQ, measures of
personality, and crime/delinquency (Caspi et al., 1994; Agnew et al., 2002).
Incorporating these additional measures of observed and unobserved heterogeneity not only
aids in separately identifying the various channels driving observed crime and education de-
cisions. They also represent additional potential instruments for policy makers. To the extent
5Empirical estimates of crime deterrence based on the perceived certainty or severity of punishment on crime
provide mixed results (Lochner, 2007; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Bachman, Paternoster, and Ward, 1992;
Pogarsky and Piquero, 2003).
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that behavioural problems or drug use affect criminal activity, this provides additional op-
portunities to affect criminal behaviour among youth by reducing drug use and/or improving
social/emotional skills.
As a preview of our results, we find that measures of individual heterogeneity are important
in explaining the patterns of enrollment and crime choices. In particular, many of the measures
less commonly observed in datasets, such as drug use, involvement in crime by family mem-
bers, attitudes towards the future, and social/emotional skills, have some of the largest effects.
We also find evidence of important dynamics. State dependence leads to the strongest effects,
but there is evidence of small returns to experience.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe our data from
the Pathways to Desistance. Section 2.3 contains our joint dynamic discrete choice model of
crime and education. Section 2.4 presents the empirical results from our model, as well as a
number of robustness checks. In Section 2.5, we provide some simulations of our model to
illustrate how the enrollment and criminal behaviour evolve over time and discuss some policy
implications. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data
Our data come from the Pathways to Desistance (PDS) study, a longitudinal investigation of the
transition from adolescence to young adulthood for serious adolescent offenders.6 Participants
in the PDS study are adolescents who were found guilty of a serious criminal offense (almost
entirely felony offenses, but also including misdemeanor weapons offenses) in the juvenile or
adult court systems in Maricopa County, Arizona, or Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, be-
tween November 2000 and January 2003.7 The study follows youth who were at least 14 years
old and under 18 years old at the time of their offense. Individuals had to provide informed
assent or consent to participate in the study.8 Due to resource constraints and a cap of drug
offenses, about one-half of those that met the age and offense requirements were approached
to participate in the study.9 In the end, 1,354 participants enrolled, yielding an enrollment rate
of 67%.
The initial (baseline) survey occurred when individuals first entered the sample. For those
in the juvenile system, the baseline interview was completed within 75 days after their adjudi-
cation, and for those in the adult system within 90 days after their decertification hearing (in
Philadelphia) or arraignment (in Phoenix). There were six semi-annual follow-up interviews,
6For more information on the Pathways to Desistance study see Schubert et al. (2004); Mulvey and Schubert
(2012).
7We follow the terminology from the PDS survey and interchangeably refer to Maricopa County as Phoenix,
given that Phoenix is the main city within the county.
8Parental consent was obtained for all youth younger than 18 at the time of enrollment in the survey.
9The proportion of male youth found guilty of a drug charge was capped at 15% to avoid an overrepresentation
of drug offenders. All female juveniles meeting the age and adjudicated crime requirements and all youths whose
cases were being considered for trial in the adult system were eligible for enrollment, even if the charged crime
was a drug offense.
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followed by four annual follow-up interviews. They were typically conducted in the partic-
ipant’s home, or in a residential facility if the individual was in a jail or juvenile detention
center. In total, the survey covers each individual for eight years. Individuals were paid $50
to participate in the baseline survey, with compensation increasing for the follow-ups to mini-
mize attrition (Monahan et al., 2009). The retention rate, measured as the share of participants
completing a particular interview wave, was above 90% for the first six waves and no less than
83% for the following annual interviews.
One key feature of the PDS data is that it follows individuals making school enrollment
and crime decisions over time. This is a crucial feature for understanding the importance of
dynamics in decisions about both crime and education. A second key feature of this dataset is
that it contains extremely detailed data on individual characteristics that may be important for
predicting both schooling and criminal activity.
The baseline survey contains basic demographic information including age, gender, ethnic-
ity, and location (i.e., Maricopa or Philadelphia County). Additionally, the survey records the
number of siblings, the number of children each individual has, whether individuals live with
both natural parents10, and whether any family members are involved in criminal activities.11
We also observe whether individuals use drugs, as well as their perceived risk to offending
(i.e., the individual-specific perceived probability of getting caught).12 Furthermore, we have
a measure of how much individuals care about the future, through a variable called the Future
Outlook Inventory. This measure is created based on survey questions related to the assessment
and implications of future outcomes and consideration of future consequences. Higher scores
indicate a greater degree of future consideration and planning, and thus are associated with
higher discount factors (lower discount rates).
Information on family criminal activities, number of children, the perceived risk to offend-
ing, drug use, and future outlook inventory is collected again in each follow-up survey. We
supplement this information with data from the Bureau of labour Statistics on local annual un-
employment rates, data on the number of high schools from the National Center of Education
Statistics, and data on the number of people between the ages of 15 and 19 in each county from
the U.S. Census.13
In addition to the detailed information about observable characteristics of each individual,
the PDS data also contains the results from a large number of standard psychometric tests that
were given to each person. These tests are designed to measure characteristics of the individual
that we typically consider to be not directly observable, such as intellectual ability (e.g., IQ)
10Dornbusch et al. (1985) show that family composition during childhood may affect criminal behaviour.
11Both criminal behaviour and enrollment decisions of children can be affected by the criminal involvement of
their parents as the social environment in the family becomes more unstable (Geller et al., 2009).
12The perceived risk is measured in each period by asking individuals how likely it is that they will be caught
and arrested conditional on committing a particular crime. There are seven underlying measures, corresponding
to each of the following crimes: fighting, robbery with a gun, stabbing someone, breaking into a store or home,
stealing clothes from a store, vandalism, and auto theft. Response options ranged from 0 (no chance) to 10
(absolutely certain to be caught). Only the average across these seven responses is reported in the data.
13We use the latter two to compute the number of schools per person of high school age in each county-year
pair, as a measure of the cost of attending school.
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and social/emotional capabilities (e.g., impulse control, self-esteem, and ability to suppress
one’s aggression). We group these tests into those designed to measure cognitive skills and
those designed to measure social/emotional skills. The cognitive tests are given only in the
baseline survey, whereas the social/emotional tests are repeated in the follow-up surveys as
well.
The cognitive measures include the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) test
score, which produces an estimate of general intellectual ability (IQ) based on two compo-
nents: Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning. In addition, we have two batteries of tests related
to cognitive dysfunction: the Stroop Color-Word Test and the Trail-Making Test. The Stroop
Color-Word Test is used to examine the effects of interference on reading ability, and the Trail-
Making test is a measure of general brain function. The Stroop test has three parts, which relate
to interference from colors, words, and both words and colors together. Subjects are asked to
identify colors based on the written name of the color, or the color of the ink the word is printed
in. The Trail-Making test measures general brain development and damage. It consists of two
parts: Part A involves a series of numbers that the participant is required to connect in sequen-
tial order; Part B involves a series of numbers and letters and the participant is required to
alternately connect letters and numbers in sequential order.
We also have several measures of social/emotional skills. First, the Weinberger Adjustment
Inventory (WAI) is an assessment of an individual’s social/emotional adjustment within the
context of external constraints. The test is divided into three areas: impulse control, suppres-
sion of aggression, and consideration of others. Second, the Psychosocial Maturity Inventory
(PSMI) provides measures of self-reliance, identity (i.e., self-esteem and consideration of life
goals), and work orientation (i.e., pride in the successful completion of tasks).14
Finally, the dataset contains information on the enrollment and criminal activity decisions
of each individual. In each survey, individuals are asked whether they have been enrolled
in school during the recall period (either six-months or one year in length). In addition, in
the baseline survey they are asked what is the highest grade that they have completed. We
combine this variable with subsequent enrollment decisions to construct a measure of years of
accumulated education in each year.
The data on criminal activity comes from self-reporting by each individual. The self-
reported offenses (SRO) consist of 24 components, each of which relates to involvement in
a different type of crime, e.g., destroying or damaging property, setting fires, or selling drugs.
For each item, a set of follow-up questions collect more information regarding the reported
offense (e.g., ”how many times have you done this in the past N months?”) and can be used
to identify whether the adolescent reports committing an act within the recall period, the fre-
quency of these acts, as well as whether the act was committed alone or with a group. The
baseline questionnaire also collects information on the subject’s age at the first time he en-
gaged in each criminal activity.
For our analysis we combine these crime components into three categories: (i) violent
crime, which consists of those offenses involving force or threat of force (e.g., robbery and
14In both the WAI and PSMI tests, higher scores indicate more positive behaviour.
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assault), (ii) property crime, which includes burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and
arson; and (iii) drug-related crime (e.g., selling marijuana or other drugs). While violent
crime typically also includes murder and rape, these crimes are not reported in our data due
to confidentiality restrictions.15 Our main results are based on one aggregate category, by
combining all three sub-categories.
Although self-reported crime may suffer from under-reporting, it is the most direct mea-
sure of criminal participation available. It includes all crimes committed by the individual,
and not just those for which the individual was caught. In order to encourage accurate self-
reporting, individual responses are kept confidential, and participants were given a certificate
of confidentiality from the U.S. Department of Justice. Furthermore, in our analysis we only
use information on whether an individual has engaged in a criminal activity, and not the inten-
sity. This does not require that people truthfully report the extent of their criminal activities,
only that they accurately report criminal participation.
While we have data on the criminal activities of each individual once they enter the survey,
we generally do not know their criminal history prior to the initial survey, with the exception
of knowing the age at which each individual first committed each of the crimes.16 In order
to deal with this missing data problem, we impute the years of crime using the following
procedure. We first estimate a probit model for crime using the data on age and the time-
invariant covariates (ethnicity, location, gender, intact family, number of siblings) as regressors.
This gives us an estimate of the probability of crime in each period, conditional on age and
time-invariant characteristics. Combined with the age of first crime variable, we can then
estimate the expected number of years of crime by the time the individual enters the baseline
survey. Experience in subsequent years is then calculated based on this estimate and on the
observed crime decisions.17
We construct four panel datasets, one for each of the three crime measures described above
and one with all crime together. Each panel includes all individuals for whom all the relevant
variables are reported. The panels are constructed using annual data. Individuals are included
in the dataset until at least one of the relevant variables is missing for a given year (i.e., an
unbalanced panel). Under this procedure, we are left with 1,168, 1,188, 1,191 and 1,187 in-
dividuals in the drug-crime, violent, property and overall crime panels, respectively.18 Each
15Not all of the components are mapped into one of our three categories, e.g., example drunk driving and
carrying a gun. In total we use 16 of the 24.
16For some individuals we can infer their entire criminal history, for example those whose first crime triggered
their entry into the survey.
17An alternative to our imputation procedure is, at estimation time, to use the probabilities predicted by our
model in Section 2.3 to integrate the likelihood for each individual against the distribution of unobserved criminal
experience. As a robustness check, we estimated our model using this alternative approach to deal with the
unobserved criminal experience. Specifically, for each individual in our dataset, we simulate S possible paths of
crime and enrollment decisions from age at first crime to age of entry into the survey, by sampling S draws of the
errors in the crime and enrollment equations. For each individual we then calculated S likelihoods, corresponding
to each of the S simulated paths. The individual contribution to our overall likelihood is calculated as the average
(i.e., the Monte Carlo integral) over these paths. The results were very similar to our baseline estimates, and
since this procedure substantially increased the computational burden, we decided not to use it over our simpler
imputation procedure.
18The sample size in the overall crime sample is not necessarily the largest across all four samples. For instance,
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sample includes, at most, eight years for each individual. The attrition rate in the overall crime
sample is on average slightly less than 6% per year.19
Table 2.1: Pathways to Desistance Descriptive Statistics - Mean and Standard Deviation By
Sample
Variable
All Crime Drug-Related Crime Violent Crime Property Crime
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age First Crime* 10.43 1.80 13.89 1.68 10.75 2.00 11.51 2.21
Age First Interview* 16.03 1.14 16.03 1.14 16.03 1.14 16.03 1.14
Phoenix* 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50
Hispanic* 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47
Black* 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49
Other* 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21
Female* 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35
Siblings* 4.09 2.41 4.08 2.41 4.09 2.41 4.09 2.41
Non-Intact Family* 0.85 0.35 0.85 0.35 0.85 0.35 0.85 0.35
Individuals* 1185 1168 1188 1191
Children 0.44 0.82 0.44 0.81 0.45 0.82 0.45 0.82
Family Crime 0.19 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.39
Certainty of Punishment 5.58 2.32 5.59 2.33 5.58 2.32 5.58 2.32
Drug Use 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50
Local Unemployment Rate (%) 5.80 1.56 5.78 1.56 5.81 1.55 5.82 1.55
Future Outlook Inventory 2.59 0.54 2.59 0.54 2.59 0.54 2.59 0.54
Crime Rate 0.54 0.50 0.21 0.41 0.44 0.50 0.29 0.45
Enrollment Rate 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50
Years of Education at Age 19 11.49 1.31 11.48 1.31 11.50 1.31 11.49 1.31
Observations 7376 7210 7424 7422
Notes:
* Indicates variables that do not vary over time. Summary statistics for these variables are calculated using only the baseline survey.
1. The descriptive statistics reported in this table correspond to data from the combined baseline and follow-up surveys. Each observation
is an individual-year pair.
2. The number of observations varies across the four samples since they differ in the number of missing values for each self-reported
crime.
3. The crime and enrollment rates reflect the fraction of observations engaged in crime and enrolled in school, respectively.
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for our four samples. There are several statistics
that we wish to highlight. First, crime rates in the sample (i.e., the fraction of individual-year
pairs in which a crime was committed) are quite high. The violent crime rate is 44%, 29% for
property crime, and 21% for drug related crime. These high crime rates (particularly for violent
crime) come from the fact that all individuals in the dataset have been convicted of a serious
criminal offense at least once, as this is a requirement for entering the dataset. About 14%
an individual can have missing data for violent crime and specifically state no involvement in property and drug
crime. In this case, he is included in the property and drug crime samples as someone who did not commit crime,
but dropped from the violent crime sample. For the overall sample, we do not know whether he committed a crime
or not (since violent crime is missing), so he is dropped from the overall sample as well. In cases in which the
individual has missing data for a certain crime category but expresses criminal engagement in any other specific
crime category, then he is included in the overall sample, since it is clear that he participated in at least one type
of crime.
19Special efforts were made to reduce attrition. Unless the participants explicitly withdrew from the study
or died, interviewers continued to attempt to contact a research participant for future interviews even after one
or more of the previous time-point interviews was missed. In addition, participants were paid on a graduated
payment scale designed to encourage continued participation.
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of the sample is female. There is a large percentage of minorities, with blacks and Hispanics
representing 40% and 34% of the sample, respectively. Drug use is also quite prominent, with
an average of 47%. The average age for the first crime is 10.7 for violent, 11.5 for property,
and 13.9 for drug-dealing crimes, illustrating that many of these adolescents start participating
in criminal activities well before high school, particularly for violent and property crime.
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics for the tests designed to measure cognitive skills.
In our empirical analysis we use the two components of IQ separately: the raw WASI Vo-
cabulary Score and the raw WASI Matrix Reasoning Score. However, for interpretability, we
report information on the distribution of IQ scores here as well. On average, IQ scores in our
sample are substantially below the average score in the general population (100). In fact, al-
most 90% of individuals have a score below 100. For our measures of cognitive impairment,
the Trail-Making scores take one of four values, where the lowest two values indicate either
mild/moderate impairment or moderate/severe impairment. In our sample, 21% have some
level of cognitive impairment according to Trail-Making A, and 38% under Trail-Making B.
The Stroop Test scores take a continuum of values. For each test, scores above 40 are consid-
ered “normal”. For the Color, Word, and Color/Word tests respectively, 52%, 36%, and 21%
had scores below normal.
The raw social/emotional test scores are harder to interpret. In both the WAI and PSMI,
individuals are given a set of questions and asked to indicate the extent to which the statement
is true or false (WAI) on a scale of 1-5, or to what extent they either agree or disagree with
the statement (PSMI) on a scale of 1-4. In both tests, responses are coded such that higher
numbers indicate more positive behaviour. For the section of the WAI measuring impulse
control, 40% of the scores are below 3, indicating undesirable behaviour. For suppression of
aggression and consideration of others, the corresponding percentages are 50% and 18%, With
the PSMI, the percentage of scores consistent with undesirable behaviour (scores below 2.5),
were considerably smaller: 5% (self reliance), 4% (identity), 15% (work orientation).
Figures 2.1-2.3 illustrate some of the key relationships in the data that our model seeks to
explain: in particular, the contemporaneous and dynamic correlations between the education
and crime decisions. Since age is highly correlated with both enrollment and crime decisions,
we illustrate all of these relationships conditioning on age.
Figure 2.1 shows how the probability of committing crime depends on the lagged crime
decision, and how this evolves with age.20 Figure 2.2 shows the same for education. There
are two important relationships to notice in these figures. First, both crime and education
decisions are highly persistent in that individuals who committed crime (enrolled in school)
in the previous period are much more likely to commit crime (enroll in school) in the current
period. Second, there is some evidence of dynamic selection since, as individuals age, this
relationship becomes stronger.
20There is a small number of individuals with lagged crime equal to zero at age 15. Since individuals with
non-missing values of lagged crime at age 15 entered the sample the previous year, and since committing a crime
is what triggers entry into the sample, we would expect all of the people to have lagged crime equal to one.
However, individuals can be considered for the study if they are found guilty of a misdemeanor weapons crime,
which we do not categorize into one of our crime types (violent, property, drug).
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Table 2.2: Pathways to Desistance Descriptive Statistics: Measures of Cognitive Skills
IQ and Components
Percentile Score
IQ Vocabulary Reasoning
1% 55 20 20
5% 62 20 20
10% 67 24 23
25% 76 30 35
50% 85 38 44
75% 94 43 51
90% 102 51 55
95% 106 53 57
99% 115 61 61
Trail-Making
% Sample
Part A
Perfectly Normal 41.36
Normal 37.74
Mild / Moderately Impaired 13.56
Moderately / Severely Impaired 7.33
Part B
Perfectly Normal 34.63
Normal 27.38
Mild / Moderately Impaired 26.37
Moderately / Severely Impaired 11.63
Stroop
% Score < 40
Color 52.06
Word 36.31
Color/Word 20.89
Notes:
1. The descriptive statistics are based on the overall crime sample.
2. The estimate of general intellectual ability (IQ) is based on two subsets: Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning.
3. The Trail-Making test is a measure of general brain function. Part A involves a series of numbers and the
participant is required to connect the numbers in sequential order; Part B involves a series of numbers and letters
and the participant is required to alternately connect letters and numbers in sequential order. The scores take
one of four values, where the lowest two values indicate either mild/moderate impairment or moderate/severe
impairment.
4. The Stroop Color/Word Test is used to examine the effects of interference on reading ability. The test has three
parts, which relate to interference from words, colors, and both words and colors. The tests take a continuum of
values, and for each test scores above 40 are considered normal.
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Figure 2.1: Probability of Crime by Lagged Crime Choice and Age
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category. For each age category we run a probit of crime on lagged
crime. We then predict the probability of engaging in crime by lagged crime and age. The confidence intervals
are generated via bootstrapping.
2. Individuals can be considered for the study if they are found guilty of a misdemeanor weapons crime, which
we do not categorize into one of our crime types (violent, property, drug). As a consequence, there are a small
number of individuals with lagged crime equal to zero at age 15, even though all 15-year-olds entered the survey
in the previous year.
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Figure 2.2: Probability of Education by Lagged Education Choice and Age
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category. For each age category we run a probit of education on
lagged education. We then predict the probability of education by lagged education and age. The confidence
intervals are generated via bootstrapping.
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Figures 2.1 and 2.2 demonstrate strong persistence in crime and education decisions. What
cannot be determined from the figures alone is the cause of this persistence (Heckman, 1981).
This could be generated by persistent differences across individuals that are correlated with
education and crime decisions. For example, it may be that low-skill youth are less likely to
enroll in school and more likely to commit crimes. A second explanation is that there is state
dependence in these decisions. For example, attending school may be easier if the individual
has learned the previous year’s material. A third possibility is that there are returns to previ-
ous experience. It may be the case that individuals become better at committing crimes with
more practice, which increases the future probabilities of committing crimes. In our empirical
analysis we attempt to disentangle all three potential causes for the observed persistence in
decisions.
Figure 2.3: Probability of Crime by Enrollment Status and Age
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category. For each age category we run a probit of crime on
enrollment. We then predict the probability of engaging in crime by enrollment and age. The confidence intervals
are generated via bootstrapping.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the contemporaneous link between youth crime and enrollment, sug-
gesting a negative correlation in the mid teenage years. While this would seem to suggest a
negative effect of enrollment on crime, these results do not control for any heterogeneity (ex-
cept age) across individuals that could also be driving this relationship. In addition, negatively
correlated shocks to the enrollment and crime decisions could also generate this relationship.
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In the next section we present our model, and show how we are able to separately identify these
confounding effects in order to recover the causal effect of enrollment on crime.
2.3 Model
Consider the problem of individuals indexed by i who decide at each age t whether or not to
enroll in school and/or commit crime. The education choice is coded as ei,t = 1 if the person
goes to school in that period and 0 otherwise, and similarly for the crime choice ci,t. The net
utility of getting education in period t is a function of all relevant decision variables including
lagged crime and enrollment decisions, years of crime and years of education up to t (yci,t and
yei,t), and a set of individual-specific characteristics (zei,t,z
c
i,t) corresponding to the enrollment
and crime equations, respectively:
vei,t = z
e
i,tβ
e + ei,t−1κe + yci,tλe + yei,tαe + ηei,t, (2.1)
where ηei,t denotes unobservable individual-specific utility terms. An individual chooses to
enroll in school (ei,t = 1) if and only if vei,t > 0.
Similarly, the crime choice is denoted as ci,t = 1 if a crime is committed and 0 otherwise.
The net utility of crime commission given the enrollment decision, is
vci,t = z
c
i,tβ
c + ei,tγc + ci,t−1pic + yci,tλc + yei,tαc + ηci,t, (2.2)
where ηci,t denotes unobservable individual-specific utility terms. Given the enrollment deci-
sion, the individual chooses to commit crime (ci,t = 1) if and only if vci,t > 0.
Notice that in equations (2.1) and (2.2) above, we allow contemporaneous enrollment to
affect the crime decision, but not the other way around. The reason for this is that if we were
to allow for both types of feedback effects, the resulting model would not be identified due
to the problem of incoherency.21 Therefore, we impose what is referred to in the literature as
the coherency condition, by restricting the contemporaneous effect of crime on education to be
zero.22
Imposing the coherency condition makes our model triangular, which allows us to factor
the likelihood in the following way:23
Pr
(
ci,t, ei,t
)
= Pr
(
ci,t | ei,t) Pr (ei,t) ,
21See Heckman (1978) and Lewbel (2007) for further discussion of the identification problems associated with
dummy endogenous variables in simultaneous equations models.
22We focus on this case because the literature is focused more on the effect of education on crime, as opposed
to the effect of crime on education. Alternatively we could assume that the contemporaneous effect of enrollment
on crime is zero. In Table A.4 in Appendix A.2, we provide results from the model with the contemporaneous
effect in the other direction (crime to enrollment). The results are very similar. In Section 3.5 we discuss how this
assumption affects the short-run and long-run impacts on enrollment and crime decisions through simulations of
our model.
23We keep the conditioning on the remaining variables implicit to ease notation.
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where Pr
(
ci,t = 1 | ei,t) = Pr (vci,t > 0 | ei,t) and Pr (ei,t = 1) = Pr (vei,t > 0), and similarly for the
probabilities of ci,t = 0 and ei,t = 0. If we were to assume that the errors in equations (2.1)
and (2.2) are independent and normally distributed, we could estimate the model parameters
by estimating separate probits. However, the assumption that the residuals are independent is
unlikely to be true, as many of the factors driving enrollment decisions are likely to drive crime
decisions as well. When this is the case, ei,t will be endogenous in the crime equation. In order
to account for this possibility we use four strategies. First, we include a rich set of individual-
level characteristics related to both crime and enrollment decisions, as well as county dummies.
Many of these variables (e.g., family crime, certainty of punishment, number of children) are
not commonly available, and thus would typically end up included in the error terms.
Second, we include the change in the number of schools per student (by county and year), as
a measure of the change in the cost of attending school within each location, in the enrollment
choice equation but not in the crime equation. The idea is that a higher concentration of schools
per student should make it easier (less costly) to attend school. By using the number of schools
per student as an exclusion restriction, it can work as a source of exogenous variation that aids
in identification of the effect of enrollment on crime.24
Third, we factor analyze the residuals by taking advantage of some of the unique features
of our data. As discussed earlier, one key advantage of our data is that it contains measures
of both the cognitive and social/emotional skills of each individual, both of which may be
important in driving both enrollment and crime decisions. Using these test measures, we first
estimate a correlated factors model to isolate estimates of cognitive and social/emotional skills
(see Section 2.3.1 for a description of the factor model we employ). We then include these
measures of skills as regressors in our model, by decomposing the errors in equations (2.1) and
(2.2 as follows:
ηei,t = δ
e,cogθ¯
cog
i + δ
e,emoθ¯emoi + ε
e
i,t
ηci,t = δ
c,cogθ¯
cog
i + δ
c,emoθ¯emoi + ε
c
i,t,
where θ¯cogi and θ¯
emo
i are our estimates of cognitive and social/emotional skills, respectively.
Finally, while we assume that εei,t and ε
c
i,t are i.i.d. across individuals and over time, we
allow them to be correlated with each other. The fact that we are able to observe a wealth of
individual characteristics, which are highly persistent (or fixed) over time, as well as control
for unobserved abilities through our factor estimates, allows us to pull components out of the
error term that would otherwise generate correlation in the errors over time. In particular, we
assume that the errors are jointly normally distributed and estimate the model using a bivariate
probit.
The full model that we estimate is then a bivariate probit on ei,t and ci,t where
24We also tried estimating the model using both 2-year and 4-year college state-level tuition as an exclusion
restriction in the enrollment equation, using tuition data from the Washington Higher Education Coordinating
Board (HECB). The results were very similar.
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ei,t =
1 if vei,t > 00 otherwise
ci,t =
1 if vci,t > 00 otherwise
,
where the latent variables vci,t and v
e
i,t are given by
vei,t = z
e
i,tβ
e + ei,t−1κe + yci,tλe + yei,tαe + δe,cogθ¯
cog
i + δ
e,emoθ¯emoi + ε
e
i,t, (2.3)
vci,t = z
c
i,tβ
c + ci,t−1pic + ei,tγc + yci,tλc + yei,tαc + δc,cogθ¯
cog
i + δ
c,emoθ¯emoi + ε
c
i,t,
and where
(
εei,t
εci,t
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
1 ρ
ρ 1
))
.
2.3.1 Factor Model for Abilities
Let ti and Ti denote the first and last ages for which individual i is observed in the data. Let
Mcogj,i,ti denote one of j = 1, . . . , J cognitive measurements, where the ti in the subscript denotes
that the cognitive tests were given only in the baseline survey. We use 7 elements of a battery
of tests that were taken by participants in the first wave of the survey. There are five continuous
measures: the WASI Matrix Reasoning and Vocabulary scores and the three Stroop scores
(Color, Word and Color/Word); and two Trail-Making scores which are measured on an ordered
discrete scale.
We also include k = 1, . . . ,K tests of social/emotional skills that are repeatedly measured
in each survey, which we denote by Mcogk,i,t. We employ three WAI scores: Impulse Control,
Suppression of Aggression, and Consideration of Others; as well as three elements of the
PSMI: Self Reliance, Identity, and Work Orientation.
For the case of the continuous measures, we write a linear model
Mcogj,i,ti = xi,tiβ
cog
j + θ
cog
i δ
cog
j,ti
+ ξ
cog
j,i,ti
, (2.4)
Memok,i,t = xi,tβ
emo
k,t + θ
emo
i δ
emo
k,t + ξ
emo
k,i,t .
For the discrete Trail-Making measures that take L j values, we let ψ j,`−1 < ψ j,`, ` = 1, ..., L j
with ψ j,0 = −∞, ψ j,L j = ∞; and write an ordered model such that
If Mcogj,i,ti = ` ⇒ ψ j,`−1 < xi,tiβcogj + θcogi δcogj,ti + ξcogj,i,ti ≤ ψ j,`. (2.5)
θ
cog
i , θ
emo
i denote cognitive and social/emotional abilities respectively, δ
cog
j,t , δ
emo
k,t denote load-
ings that measure the effect of these skills, and the “uniquenesses”
{
ξ
cog
j,i,ti
}J
j=1
,
{{
ξemok,i,t
}Ti
t=ti
}K
k=1
cap-
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ture other determinants of the test scores like measurement error. While we assume that θcogi
and θemoi are independent of the uniquenesses, we allow them to be correlated with each other.
Identification of the factor model follows from the analysis in Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman
(2003) and Cooley Fruehwirth, Navarro, and Takahashi (2016). Having obtained estimates of
the parameters of the factor model, we then predict the most likely values for θcogi , θ
emo
i given
the data we observe for each individual i.25 These are the θ¯cogi , θ¯
emo
i we use in equations (2.3).
2.4 Results
Before getting to the main results from our model, we first present the results from our fac-
tor analysis in which we project our measurements of skills onto two factors, one related to
cognitive skills, and one related to social/emotional skills.
2.4.1 Factor Analysis
The results from the estimation of the factor model are presented in Tables 2.3-2.4 and Figure
2.4. We chose the following normalizations. The factor representing cognitive skills is nor-
malized to have a loading of one in the Matrix Reasoning WASI test score, while for the factor
representing social/emotional skills the loading is normalized to one in the first period WAI
Impulse Control measure. Besides being required for identification, these normalizations aid
in the interpretation of the factors. Hence, the factor representing cognitive skills is such that
an increase of one standard deviation in cognitive skills leads to an increase of one standard
deviation in the Matrix Reasoning WASI test, and similarly for the social/emotional factor.
While we only allow the cognitive factor to affect cognitive measures and the social/emotional
factor to affect social/emotional measures, we allow the two factors to be correlated. Our esti-
mates show that there is more variance in social/emotional skills (0.19) than in cognitive skills
(0.08), and the skills are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient around 0.23.
In Figure 2.4 we present a variance decomposition that allows us to get an idea of how
important it is to account for measurement error (i.e., the uniqueness) when employing these
measures. That is, we decompose the variance of the unobservable component of each mea-
surement into the proportion of the variance coming from the skill (i.e., the factor) and the
proportion contributed by the uniqueness.26
In Tables 2.3 and 2.4 we present the estimated parameters of the factor model for the mea-
surement system. There are two interpretations for the coefficients on the covariates included
in the factor model (e.g., gender, race). On the one hand, the coefficients can be interpreted as
measuring differences in test scores that are unrelated to skills. For example, under this inter-
pretation, the distribution of skills for men and women is the same, and hence the coefficient on
25See Appendix A.1 for details on the estimation of the factor model as well as on prediction.
26In order to avoid having a graph for each age, we use the age-averaged proportions in our calculations.
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Table 2.3: Estimated Parameters from Factor Analysis - Cognitive Skills
WASI Stroop Trail-Making
Matrix Vocabulary Word Color Color/Word A B
Constant
Age 14 0.372 -0.166 -0.308 -0.175 -0.138 0.000 0.000
(0.222) (0.206) (0.208) (0.221) (0.218) - -
Age 15 0.245 -0.157 -0.115 0.048 0.102 -0.644 -0.379
(0.198) (0.187) (0.188) (0.193) (0.194) (0.155) (0.171)
Age 16 0.309 -0.070 -0.046 0.199 0.127 -0.910 -0.554
(0.199) (0.185) (0.189) (0.200) (0.188) (0.141) (0.152)
Age 17 0.512 -0.157 -0.069 0.248 0.276 -0.934 -0.677
(0.206) (0.182) (0.195) (0.201) (0.197) (0.143) (0.152)
Age 18 0.546 0.025 0.077 0.397 0.242 -0.858 -0.776
(0.236) (0.215) (0.246) (0.256) (0.224) (0.219) (0.202)
Phoenix 0.332 0.743 0.346 0.141 0.269 -0.387 -0.363
(0.093) (0.086) (0.096) (0.096) (0.090) (0.116) (0.125)
Hispanic -0.412 -0.652 -0.220 -0.254 -0.264 0.326 0.436
(0.104) (0.092) (0.096) (0.094) (0.092) (0.122) (0.131)
Black -0.465 -0.328 -0.250 -0.175 -0.335 0.467 0.429
(0.108) (0.103) (0.111) (0.113) (0.104) (0.141) (0.152)
Other -0.268 -0.456 -0.239 -0.378 -0.422 0.189 0.256
(0.187) (0.180) (0.184) (0.184) (0.185) (0.232) (0.254)
Female -0.023 0.004 0.179 0.090 0.048 -0.101 -0.221
(0.110) (0.096) (0.096) (0.098) (0.095) (0.124) (0.135)
Siblings -0.015 -0.023 -0.016 -0.016 -0.023 -0.024 -0.003
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
FOI -0.068 0.080 0.055 -0.007 0.015 0.018 0.140
(0.066) (0.059) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.078) (0.082)
Cognitive Ability
Age 14 1.000 1.191 2.358 2.594 2.048 -0.328 -0.430
- (0.775) (0.972) (1.146) (0.924) (0.484) (0.610)
Age 15 1.464 1.641 2.048 2.150 1.676 -1.832 -2.548
(0.752) (0.792) (0.928) (0.981) (0.804) (0.950) (1.227)
Age 16 0.862 1.367 2.697 3.078 2.313 -1.465 -2.371
(0.444) (0.660) (1.213) (1.378) (1.043) (0.721) (1.094)
Age 17 1.472 1.199 2.385 2.769 2.596 -1.939 -2.440
(0.686) (0.574) (1.073) (1.240) (1.167) (0.909) (1.134)
Age 18 1.236 1.809 3.552 3.502 2.307 -0.909 -1.783
(0.790) (0.993) (1.663) (1.648) (1.133) (0.819) (0.980)
Variance 0.809 0.659 0.469 0.371 0.539 1.000 1.000
(0.048) (0.035) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025) - -
Cutoff 1 - - - - - -0.964 -0.550
(0.255) (0.287)
Cutoff 2 - - - - - 0.238 0.304
(0.256) (0.288)
Cutoff 3 - - - - - 1.007 1.400
(0.252) (0.292)
Notes:
1. We estimate a two factor model with cognitive and social/emotional measures. The table presents the parameter estimates
for the cognitive measure system. The components of WASI and Stroop are modeled using a linear in parameters specification
of the form: Mcogj,i,ti = xi,tiβ
cog
j + θ
cog
i δ
cog
j,ti
+ ξ
cog
j,i,ti
, where j indexes the measure (column in the table) and i the individual. For
the case of Trail-Making we use an ordered model of the form: Mcogj,i,ti = ` ⇒ 1(ψ j,`−1 < xi,tiβ
cog
j + θ
cog
i δ
cog
j,ti
+ ξ
cog
j,i,ti
< ψ j,`).
2. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Estimated Parameters from Factor Analysis - Social/Emotional Skills
WAI PSMI
Impulse
Control
Suppression
of
Aggression
Consideration
of Others
Self
Reliance Identity
Work
Orientation
Constant
Age 14 -1.221 -0.837 -1.790 -0.704 -0.552 -1.368
(0.115) (0.115) (0.096) (0.116) (0.126) (0.100)
Age 15 -1.093 -0.749 -1.960 -0.673 -0.722 -1.291
(0.090) (0.090) (0.076) (0.102) (0.103) (0.090)
Age 16 -1.032 -0.755 -2.019 -0.501 -0.611 -1.176
(0.079) (0.080) (0.059) (0.099) (0.095) (0.080)
Age 17 -1.000 -0.751 -1.968 -0.390 -0.540 -1.121
(0.077) (0.081) (0.063) (0.095) (0.096) (0.079)
Age 18 -0.920 -0.676 -1.950 -0.302 -0.437 -0.934
(0.082) (0.083) (0.062) (0.101) (0.098) (0.085)
Age 19 -0.880 -0.605 -1.891 -0.211 -0.382 -0.839
(0.087) (0.084) (0.067) (0.105) (0.098) (0.084)
Age 20 -0.818 -0.555 -1.863 -0.091 -0.297 -0.708
(0.085) (0.086) (0.068) (0.108) (0.105) (0.086)
Age 21 -0.800 -0.505 -1.830 -0.097 -0.299 -0.701
(0.085) (0.086) (0.066) (0.103) (0.103) (0.089)
Age 22 -0.731 -0.411 -1.789 -0.035 -0.247 -0.634
(0.085) (0.089) (0.068) (0.108) (0.104) (0.086)
Age 23 -0.689 -0.375 -1.807 0.017 -0.185 -0.616
(0.091) (0.093) (0.076) (0.108) (0.106) (0.091)
Age 24 -0.674 -0.377 -1.837 0.017 -0.169 -0.583
(0.102) (0.106) (0.082) (0.130) (0.138) (0.105)
Age 25 -0.582 -0.438 -1.688 -0.159 -0.447 -0.762
(0.203) (0.200) (0.212) (0.245) (0.244) (0.228)
Phoenix -0.222 0.078 -0.066 -0.166 -0.143 -0.091
(0.041) (0.038) (0.020) (0.049) (0.051) (0.046)
Hispanic 0.126 -0.134 -0.043 -0.326 -0.316 -0.210
(0.041) (0.039) (0.022) (0.050) (0.053) (0.046)
Black 0.327 -0.128 -0.062 0.009 -0.036 -0.052
(0.049) (0.047) (0.024) (0.059) (0.062) (0.055)
Other 0.234 -0.040 -0.012 -0.211 -0.171 -0.052
(0.080) (0.077) (0.045) (0.096) (0.100) (0.055)
Female 0.187 0.135 0.179 0.141 -0.029 -0.052
(0.042) (0.037) (0.022) (0.050) (0.053) (0.055)
Siblings -0.006 0.006 0.008 -0.002 -0.009 -0.052
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.055)
FOI 0.305 0.229 0.735 0.156 0.238 -0.052
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.055)
Behavioral Ability
Age 14 1.000 0.924 0.301 1.107 1.148 1.108
- (0.435) (0.224) (0.343) (0.344) (0.323)
Age 15 0.967 0.880 0.186 1.366 1.309 1.338
(0.313) (0.243) (0.152) (0.366) (0.370) (0.349)
Age 16 0.921 0.854 0.151 1.323 1.388 1.292
(0.263) (0.246) (0.111) (0.364) (0.358) (0.334)
Age 17 1.032 0.948 0.109 1.220 1.257 1.215
(0.277) (0.256) (0.098) (0.316) (0.335) (0.314)
Age 18 1.088 0.997 0.053 1.227 1.181 1.193
(0.292) (0.281) (0.110) (0.323) (0.309) (0.319)
Age 19 1.208 1.095 0.136 1.320 1.362 1.332
(0.328) (0.297) (0.120) (0.358) (0.367) (0.338)
Age 20 1.267 1.148 0.133 1.351 1.429 1.359
(0.344) (0.312) (0.120) (0.360) (0.389) (0.352)
Age 21 1.192 1.110 0.079 1.327 1.413 1.325
(0.316) (0.308) (0.106) (0.352) (0.378) (0.351)
Age 22 1.173 1.109 0.039 1.285 1.350 1.308
(0.308) (0.322) (0.119) (0.349) (0.361) (0.346)
Age 23 1.191 1.008 0.137 1.309 1.276 1.268
(0.329) (0.299) (0.129) (0.358) (0.356) (0.343)
Age 24 1.369 1.229 0.105 1.041 1.068 1.149
(0.388) (0.364) (0.173) (0.334) (0.368) (0.356)
Age 25 1.291 0.954 0.088 1.792 1.698 1.293
(0.632) (0.607) (0.545) (0.804) (0.945) (0.609)
Variance 0.609 0.719 0.805 0.574 0.562 0.521
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Notes:
1. We estimate a two factor model with cognitive and social/emotional measures. The table presents the parameter estimates for the
social/emotional measure system. We use a linear in parameters specification of the form: Memok,i,t = xi,tβ
emo
k,t + θ
emo
i δ
emo
k,t + ξ
emo
k,i,t , where k
indexes the measure (column in the table), i the individual, and t age.
2. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
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Figure 2.4: Fraction of the Variance Explained by Skills
Notes:
1. We estimate a two factor model with cognitive and social/emotional measures. For the cognitive system, the
components of WASI and Stroop are modeled using a linear in parameters specification of the form: Mcogj,i,ti =
xi,tiβ
cog
j + θ
cog
i δ
cog
j,ti
+ ξ
cog
j,i,ti
, where j indexes the measure and i the individual. For the case of Trail-Making we use
an ordered model of the form: Mcogj,i,ti = ` ⇒ 1(ψ j,`−1 < xi,tiβ
cog
j + θ
cog
i δ
cog
j,ti
+ ξ
cog
j,i,ti
< ψ j,`).
2. For the social/emotional measures we use a linear in parameters specification of the form: Memok,i,t = xi,tβ
emo
k,t +
θemoi δ
emo
k,t + ξ
emo
k,i,t , where k indexes the measure, i the individual and t age. The figure presents the average fraction
of the variance explained by skills. For example, the fraction of the variance of test j explained by cognitive skills
is given by: 1Tcog
∑
t
σ2θ,cog(δ
cog
j,t )
2
σ2θ,cog(δ
cog
j,t )
2+σ2ξ,cog, j
, where Tcog is the number of ages for which we observe cognitive scores.
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the WASI Matrix Reasoning test of -0.023 in Table 2.3 would be interpreted as indicating that,
on average, females perform worse on this test than a male of equivalent skills. On the other
hand, they can be viewed as capturing differences in both test-taking and underlying skills.27
Under this interpretation the coefficient on female reflects a combination of differences in skills
and test-taking ability. Without further restrictions we cannot disentangle these two interpreta-
tions. Since we also include these variables in the crime and enrollment equations, this implies
that our estimates of the coefficients on these variables in the crime and enrollment equations
could be interpreted as reflecting combinations of direct effects and indirect effects via differ-
ences in skills. It does not, however, affect the interpretation of the other model parameters or
of the simulations in Section 2.5.
As can be seen from Table 2.3, having more cognitive skills is related with having “better”
scores in all of the cognitive measures we use. The negative sign for the Trail-Making scores
is consistent with the way the scores are recorded where a larger score reflects cognitive im-
pairment. As Figure 2.4 shows, our measure of cognitive skills is more related to the Stroop
measures of cognitive dysfunction than to the WASI-IQ and Trail-Making measures. However,
even for the Stroop measures, cognitive skills can only explain at most 62% of the unobserved
variance.
As documented in Table 2.4, for the case of social/emotional scores, more social/emotional
skills lead to higher scores for all the social/emotional measures we include. There is also a
general pattern consistent with maturation effects, in which the mean scores get better over time
(i.e., the constant terms for each period in the equations) and social/emotional skills become
a stronger determinant of the scores on the tests (i.e., the loadings). Social/emotional skills
explain around 30% of the variance for all measures, except for the WAI-Consideration of
Others where it essentially has no explanatory power. This result suggests that our measure
of social/emotional skills is more related to individual discipline and control than to attitudes
towards other people.
2.4.2 Baseline Model
We now present the results from our baseline specification. In Section 2.4.3, we consider
several alternative specifications to evaluate the robustness of our results. In our baseline spec-
ification, in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals, we include our
estimated cognitive and social/emotional skill estimates as regressors.28 The results from the
baseline bivariate probit are listed in column 1 of Table 2.5, where we report the average
marginal effects of each covariate. We focus on the results for overall crime and discuss the
results for the separate crime categories only when the results vary significantly by type of
27A third possible interpretation is that the coefficients reflect only differences in underlying skills. This inter-
pretation imposes strong restrictions on the sign and magnitude differences across tests that are inconsistent with
our estimates.
28As a robustness check, in Section 2.4.3 we use the set of measurements used to infer the skills as regressors
directly.
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crime.29 The results for drug-related, violent, and property crime separately are contained in
Tables A.5-A.7 in Appendix A.3.
We find that being in Maricopa County (Phoenix), compared to Philadelphia County, is
associated with a higher probability of enrollment in school and a higher probability of com-
mitting crime. Blacks are less likely to engage in criminal activities and more likely to attend
school compared to Whites. At the same time, Hispanics are less likely both to commit crime
and to enroll in education than Whites, although the differences based on ethnicity are small
and not precisely estimated. Females are more likely to attend school (5.8%-points) and less
likely to commit crime (10.1%-points).
Consistent with what one would expect, having a “non-intact” family, is associated with
lower enrollment rates and higher crime rates. Age is negatively associated with enrollment
and crime. The result for enrollment is not surprising given that this dataset covers people
between the ages of 14 and 26. The finding that crime also decreases with age is consistent
with the broader empirical literature on the life-cycle of crime ((Farrington, 1986); (Hirschi
and Gottfredson, 1983).30
Not surprisingly, the effect of the perceived risk of punishment has no effect on education
and has a negative effect on crime, suggesting fairly strong deterrent effects of punishment:
a 10% increase in the perceived probability of being caught generates a 2.2%-point decrease
in the probability of committing crime, which is equivalent to a reduction in the crime rate
of about 4%.31 Each child an individual has decreases the probability of enrollment by about
1.8%-points, but has no effect on crime. Having family members involved in crime has a
large positive effect on crime (14.9%-points), suggesting that the family environment plays
an important role in determining criminal behaviour. Perhaps a bit surprisingly, drug use has
only a very small negative effect on enrollment decisions (0.1%-points). It has a large positive
effect, however, on overall crime (22.4%-points).32
29Note that our results for overall crime should not be interpreted as an average across the crime categories,
as the overall crime category pools all crimes together. However, we find that for most of our results, the overall
crime estimates are consistent with the separate crime categories: violent, property, and drug.
30Drug crime does not seem to decrease with age. Combined with the statistic from Table 2.1 that shows that
people start committing drug crimes at much later ages, this suggests that the age profile for drug crime is different
compared to violent and property crime ((Sampson and Laub, 2003); (Farrington, 1986); (Wilson and Herrnstein,
1985).
31These findings are in line with Lochner (2007), who finds that a 10% increase in the perceived probability of
arrest reduces criminal participation in major thefts by about 3% and in auto theft by more than 8%.
32This result is not solely driven by the effect on drug-related crime. The effects on violent crime (15.9%-points)
and property crime (14.4%-points) are also quite large.
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Table 2.5: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Overall Crime)
Variable Baseline Controls UncorrelatedErrors No Dynamics
Not
Instrumenting
Cognitive and
So-
cial/Emotional
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.049 0.041 0.038 0.030 0.050 0.049 0.051 0.049 0.096 0.044 0.039 0.039
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
Hispanic -0.025 -0.020 -0.025 -0.022 -0.026 -0.032 -0.026 -0.021 -0.013 -0.024
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Black 0.024 -0.030 0.024 -0.029 0.042 -0.046 0.024 -0.030 0.039 -0.029
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Other 0.034 -0.025 0.034 -0.023 0.038 -0.036 0.036 -0.024 0.042 -0.015
(0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030)
Female 0.058 -0.101 0.054 -0.087 0.058 -0.098 0.070 -0.168 0.057 -0.100 0.053 -0.096
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Non-intact Family -0.050 0.031 -0.051 0.028 -0.052 0.040 -0.051 0.030 -0.049 0.031
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Siblings -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.006 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.080 -0.028 -0.083 -0.035 -0.080 -0.036 -0.104 -0.017 -0.082 -0.031 -0.079 -0.026
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007)
Certainty of Punishment 0.003 -0.022 0.003 -0.022 0.005 -0.028 0.003 -0.022 0.002 -0.018
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Children -0.018 0.008 -0.017 0.007 -0.032 0.013 -0.017 0.007 -0.017 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Family Crime 0.002 0.149 0.002 0.150 -0.002 0.175 0.004 0.149 0.001 0.146
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Drug Use -0.001 0.224 -0.001 0.225 -0.009 0.267 -0.000 0.224 -0.001 0.204
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Unemployment Rate 0.021 0.011 0.021 0.010 0.021 0.014 0.023 0.009 0.037 0.012 0.021 0.010
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.019 -0.024 0.019 -0.023 0.024 -0.030 0.017 -0.024 0.022 0.016
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Years of Crime -0.007 0.020 -0.007 0.039 -0.007 0.020 -0.007 0.020 -0.007 0.017
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of Education 0.006 -0.003 0.011 -0.014 0.007 -0.001 0.006 -0.002 0.006 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cognitive Factor 0.036 0.014 0.038 0.017 0.041 0.030 0.036 0.015
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.007 -0.080 0.006 -0.080 0.019 -0.127 0.007 -0.080
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Continued on next page...
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Table 2.5 – continued from previous page.
Variable Baseline Controls UncorrelatedErrors No Dynamics
Not
Instrumenting
Cognitive and
So-
cial/Emotional
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Schools per Young Per-
son
0.322 0.323 0.313 0.319 0.311
(0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071)
Lagged Enrollment 0.189 0.191 0.189 0.190 0.185
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Enrollment 0.088 0.083 0.025 0.202 0.065 0.096
(0.049) (0.053) (0.014) (0.063) (0.051) (0.047)
Lagged Crime 0.158 0.235 0.159 0.159 0.142
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
WASI Reasoning Score -0.002 -0.005
(0.006) (0.007)
WASI Vocabulary Score 0.000 0.001
(0.007) (0.007)
Stroop: Color/Word 0.004 -0.010
(0.007) (0.007)
Stroop: Word 0.009 -0.012
(0.007) (0.008)
Stroop: Color -0.003 0.014
(0.008) (0.008)
Trail-Making: Part B -0.016 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Trail-Making: Part A -0.003 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
WAI - Impulse Response -0.008 -0.030
(0.007) (0.008)
WAI - Suppression of Aggression 0.010 -0.044(0.007) (0.007)
WAI - Consideration of Others 0.002 -0.027(0.006) (0.006)
PSMI - Self Reliance -0.014 0.023
(0.010) (0.011)
PSMI - Identity 0.036 -0.018
(0.010) (0.011)
PSMI - Work Orientation -0.023 -0.011
(0.009) (0.010)
Rho -0.142 -0.137 -0.377 -0.091 -0.157
(0.106) (0.102) (0.144) (0.109) (0.105)
Observations 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190
Continued on next page...
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Table 2.5 – continued from previous page.
Variable Baseline Controls UncorrelatedErrors No Dynamics
Not
Instrumenting
Cognitive and
So-
cial/Emotional
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. The errors in the enrollment and crime equations are allowed to be correlated in every specification, expect for specification (3). Rho denotes the correlation in errors.
3. Every specification includes an exclusion restriction that enters the education equation only (schools per young person) except for the specification in column (5).
4. In column (2) we exclude the cognitive and social/emotional factors and control for just a few variables (location, gender, age, and local unemployment rate). In column (3) the
errors in the enrollment and crime equations are uncorrelated. The specification in column (4) does not account for any dynamics in the crime and education equations (years of
experience and state dependence). The specification in column (5) does not include the exclusion restriction. In the last column we replace our factor estimates of cognitive and
social/emotional skills with the measures used to infer them.
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We also included the unemployment rate to control for local employment conditions. An
increase in the unemployment rate by one percentage point leads to an increase in the probabil-
ity of enrollment of 2.1%-points, or 4%. The effect of unemployment on crime is also positive
but smaller in magnitude (1%-point or 2%). These results suggest that criminal youth respond
to worsening economic conditions by staying in school and, to a lesser extent, increasing crim-
inal activity. Our results are consistent with those of Betts and McFarland (1995) and Dellas
and Sakellaris (2003) who find that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate
leads to an increase in enrollment in college by about 4%. With regards to crime, Raphael and
Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) estimate that a one percent-
age point increase in the unemployment rate generates an increase in crime of between 1 and
5%.
We also included a measure called the Future Outlook Inventory, which measures the de-
gree of future consideration and planning, and proxies for the individual’s discount factor. Low
discount factors is one potential cause of criminal activity ((Davis, 1988); (Mastrobuoni and
Rivers, 2015), as people who care less about the future may be less deterred by the future
consequences of their actions. Similarly, high discount factors are associated with higher in-
vestment rates ((Chen, 2013); (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), such as investing in education.
Our results are consistent with this, as the sign on the effect of Future Outlook Inventory is
negative for crime and positive for education.
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, higher values of our estimates of cognitive and social/emotional
skills are associated with better performance on the tests. Therefore, we should expect them
to be positively associated with education and negatively associated with crime. We find that
higher cognitive skills increase the likelihood of enrollment and higher social/emotional skills
lead to lower crime rates. The results imply that a one standard deviation increase in so-
cial/emotional skills leads to a decrease in the probability of crime of 3.5%-points. Also, a one
standard deviation increase in cognitive skills leads to an increased probability of enrollment
of 1.0%-points, although it is not precisely estimated. The effects of cognitive skills on crime
and social/emotional skills on education are both small and imprecisely estimated.
Initially we expected these effects to be larger (see e.g., (Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil,
2001); (Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006); (Murnane, Willett, and Levy, 1995). However,
there are several reasons for why we would find more moderate effects. First, we are able
to control for a very rich set of observables, many of which are not commonly available in
other datasets. In the absence of data on these individual characteristics, their effects will
be conflated with the effects of skills, biasing estimates of their effects by causing the skill
measures to have to explain more of the variation in enrollment and crime decisions. Second,
because the sample consists of serious juvenile offenders only, the distributions of both types
of skills are compressed relative to the population at large. As a result, a one standard deviation
change is not particularly large in our data.
In addition to controlling for many sources of individual heterogeneity, we also examine
the effect of contemporaneous education on crime. In order to account for the possibility that
enrollment is endogenous, we include the change in the number of schools per student as an
exclusion restriction in the enrollment equation, but not in the crime equation. We find that
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more schools per student is strongly positively related to enrollment, consistent with the idea
that a higher concentration of schools makes it less costly to attend school.
We find that enrollment leads to an increase in overall crime rates (8.8%-points).33 The
effect varies by the type of crime though. For property crime, we find weak evidence that en-
rolling in school decreases crime, with an average marginal effect of 2.3%-points that is not
precisely estimated. This is consistent with the incapacitation effect found by Jacob and Lef-
gren (2003); Luallen (2006); and Anderson (2014), although our effect is smaller in magnitude.
For violent and drug-related crime, we find the opposite effect: enrollment leads to an
increase in crime rates (10.4%-points for violent and 7.7%-points for drug-related). This sug-
gests the presence of positive complementarities between school and drug/violent crime. This
is consistent with the concentration story of Jacob and Lefgren for violent crime–that an in-
creased density of young people leads to more violent interactions. For drug-related crime, one
explanation is that the primary buyers of drugs sold by juveniles are other juveniles, and thus
attending school allows the sellers of drugs to be closer to their clients.
The last row of Table 2.5 reports the correlation in errors of the crime and enrollment equa-
tions. The estimate of -0.142 indicates that the remaining unobserved drivers of crime and
education decisions are negatively correlated with each other, although the correlation is not
precisely estimated. As we show in the next section, failing to account for this negative corre-
lation leads to a downward bias in the estimate of the contemporaneous effect of enrollment on
crime.
Finally, we allow for previous crime and education decisions to affect current decisions
in two ways. First, we allow the lagged decisions to affect the current ones.34 This captures
state dependence, or inertia, in these decisions. Second, we also allow the total accumulated
experience (measured in years) to affect decisions. The rationale for this is that human and
criminal capital accumulated through previous educational or criminal experience could affect
the returns to both school and crime ((Lochner, 2004); (Nagin and Paternoster, 1991); (Nagin,
Farrington, and Moffitt, 1995); (Imai, Katayama, and Krishna, 2006); (Merlo and Wolpin,
2015); (Loughran et al., 2013).
We find strong evidence of state dependence in both the education and crime decisions
((Brame et al., 2005). Enrolling in school the previous period increases the probability of
enrolling in the current period by 18.9%-points. Participating in crime in the previous period
increases the probability of crime by 15.8%-points. We also find some evidence of returns
to experience, although the effects are smaller. The signs of the results are as expected. An
33One potential concern with this result is that not being enrolled is a proxy for being incarcerated, and therefore
this estimate captures the incapacitation effect of prison. This is unlikely here, as in our data the relationship
between enrollment and incarceration goes in the other direction as they are positively correlated. See also Section
2.4.3 in which we discuss the effects of being in jail in more detail.
34For simplicity, in our baseline model we allow for lagged crime to affect current crime and lagged education
to affect current education, but do not allow for lagged cross-equation effects. We also tried estimating a version
allowing for these effects. The coefficients on these additional terms were small and statistically insignificant.
The other estimates were virtually unchanged, with the exception of the effect of contemporaneous enrollment on
crime, which increased slightly.
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additional year of education is positively associated with enrollment decisions and negatively
associated with crime, but the effects are small and not statistically significant. The effect of
criminal experience on crime is positive: an extra year of criminal experience increases the
probability of crime by 2.0%-points. The effect on education is negative, with an extra year of
crime associated with a decrease in the probability of enrollment by 0.7%-points.
Overall our estimates suggest that there are important dynamics in both the crime and
education decisions. While both matter, the effects of state dependence are much larger than
the returns to experience. This distinction is relevant for policy, as understanding how the
pattern of previous decisions drives current decisions is important for determining how and
when to attempt intervention. We discuss this more in Section 2.5 when we illustrate these
effects with various simulations based on our model.
The Effect of Education on Crime
Enrollment Our results regarding the effect of contemporaneous enrollment on crime are
generally consistent with the results of Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen (2006), who
examine the effect of short-duration shocks to school attendance. However, the more direct
comparison is probably to Anderson (2014), as he examines the effect of compulsory school-
ing laws designed to keep youth in school for additional years. Anderson (2014) finds that
compulsory schooling laws decrease violent, property, and drug crime (although the results for
drug crime are not precisely estimated), consistent with crime-reducing effects of enrollment.
One explanation for the differences in our findings is based on the crime measures em-
ployed. Anderson (2014) uses arrests, as opposed to self-reports, as the crime measure. His
measure presumably contains a higher proportion of more severe crimes, and contains propor-
tionately fewer minor offenses such as fighting and drug dealing, as these are less likely to
result in an arrest.35 As discussed in Anderson (2014), it may be that enrollment leads to an
increase in these minor crimes via the concentration story of Jacob and Lefgren, but leads to a
decrease in more serious offenses. When we exclude fighting from our measure of crime, we
find that the contemporaneous effect of enrollment on crime drops by half and is no longer sta-
tistically significant. It shrinks further if we exclude drug offenses, although the point estimate
remains positive. Overall it appears that heterogeneity in the composition of crime severity
captured by arrests versus self-reported crime data may be driving some of the differences in
our results.
Another difference in our crime measures is that we analyze the extensive margin of crime,
whereas aggregate crime measures capture the intensive margin as well. While enrollment
may lead to a reduction in the intensive margin, it may not drive it to zero, particularly for our
sample of serious offenders, resulting in smaller estimated effects on the extensive margin. In
order to examine this, we tried re-estimating our model using continuous measures of crime
intensity. The estimated effects of enrollment were negative overall, but small and statistically
imprecise, suggesting at most a small role for the intensive margin as an explanation for the
35Luallen (2006) also employs arrests as the outcome, while Jacob and Lefgren (2003) use reported incidents.
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differences in our findings. Finally, as discussed in Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2008, 2010),
crime regressions based on aggregate data (which is the case for all three papers discussed
above) can yield very different results than those based on individual-level data.
Educational Attainment Our baseline results suggest that years of schooling have no sig-
nificant effect on crime. An additional year of education decreases the probability of crime by
0.3%-points (0.5%), and the effect is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, several studies
suggest that educational attainment is an important determinant of adult crime. Starting with
the seminal work of Lochner and Moretti (2004), several studies employ changes in compul-
sory schooling laws over time in order to control for the potential endogeneity of education
decisions, using a variety of crime outcome measures. Lochner and Moretti (2004) find that
a one-year increase in schooling leads to increases in annual arrest and incarceration rates of
approximately 18% and 11-25%, using data from the US Census and Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR). Hjalmarsson, Holmlund, and Lindquist (2015) use Swedish data and find that an ad-
ditional year of education reduces the probability of ever being convicted by 6.7% and ever
incarcerated by 15%. Using data from England and Wales, Machin, Marie, and Vujic´ (2011)
report that a 10% increase in age-left-school leads to a 2.1% decrease in annual convictions,
which translates to a 1.3% decrease for an additional year of schooling. These results are based
on measures of arrests, convictions or incarcerations (and at different time intervals), whereas
our results are based on annual self-reported crime measures. One possible reason for why we
do not find strong evidence of an effect of educational attainment on crime may be due to the
crime measures being employed.
The two sets of results most closely related to ours are Lochner and Moretti (2004) and
Merlo and Wolpin (2015), which both employ annual self-reported crime data. Using data on
young men in the NLSY79, Lochner and Moretti (2004) find that an additional year of school
reduces participation in crime by 2 to 3%-points (10%).36 Merlo and Wolpin (2015) estimate
a multinomial discrete-choice VAR model of crime, education, and employment on a sample
of black males from the NLSY97, which allows for lagged effects (state dependence), but not
experience directly. They find that not attending school at age 16 increases an individual’s
crime rate by around 13%.
It is possible that, for our selected sample of serious criminal offenders, educational at-
tainment does not play a relevant role in deterring crime. For example, individuals in our
data may benefit little in terms of labour market opportunities from additional schooling, given
their existing criminal history ((Waldfogel, 1994) and (Kling, 2006). It could also be that after
controlling for a richer set of observables, in particular some that are usually not available in
other datasets, educational attainment is largely unimportant.37 It may also be the case that
the quality of the education received by individuals in our sample is lower, for example due
to some of the education being received while in a locked facility. Finally, it is also possible
36Unlike their analysis for arrests and incarceration, the NLSY79 results of Lochner and Moretti (2004) do not
instrument for educational attainment.
37Tauchen, Witte, and Griesinger (1994) and Witte and Tauchen (1994) find little evidence of an effect of edu-
cational attainment on crime after controlling for previous criminal activity and several individual characteristics.
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that the relevant margin for education is high school graduation, not years of education per se
((Lochner, 2011b).
In order to explore these alternative explanations, we estimate several additional specifi-
cations of our model. We re-estimate our model using a reduced set of controls, specifically
only location, non-intact family, age, the unemployment rate, and IQ. We also drop lagged
effects and criminal experience and assume that errors across equations are uncorrelated. This
roughly corresponds to what the previous literature includes. For both the full and reduced set
of controls, we estimate the model on the full sample, the sample of males only (as most of the
literature focuses on males), and the sample of males using an alternative measure of years of
education for all ages and for those at least 18 years of age. Our alternative measure of years
of education does not include years of education obtained while in a locked residential facility.
The motivation is that education obtained while incarcerated may have smaller crime-reducing
effects. The results are reported in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: The Effect of Educational Attainment on Crime Alternative Specifications
Reduced
Set of
Controls
Full Sample Males Only
Males Only,
Alternative
Measure of
Education
Males Only,
Alternative
Measure of
Education,
Age 18+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Education -0.020 -0.025 -0.028 -0.028
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Full Set of
Controls
Full Sample Males Only
Males Only,
Alternative
Measure of
Education
Males Only,
Alternative
Measure of
Education,
Age 18+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Education -0.003 -0.004 -0.011 -0.010
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 5,190 4,277 4,277 3,574
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. In the first set of results we include only a reduced set of controls (location, non-intact family, age, unemployment rate, and IQ). In the
second set we include the full set of controls from our baseline specification, including lagged decisions, experience, and skills.
3. In columns (3) and (4) we use an alternative measure of years of education that does not include schooling obtained in jail.
As is illustrated in the first set of results, once we drop lags, criminal experience, and the
additional controls, our results are closer to those in the literature.38 The results suggest that an
additional year of education is associated with a decrease in the probability of crime ranging
from 2.0 to 2.8%-points (4-5%), as we restrict the sample to correspond more closely to what
38We also compare to Merlo and Wolpin (2015) by dropping our rich set of controls to more closely match
their setup and simulating long-run effects. Our results for the effect of prior education on crime are larger and
statistically significant, but still smaller, compared to Merlo and Wolpin (2015) (-2% vs. -13%). We do, however,
find very similar long-run effects of prior crime on crime.
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the literature has used. In contrast, the results for the full set of controls are much smaller
in magnitude than those in the literature. There is also a small increase in the absolute value
of the effect when we employ our alternative measure of education, consistent with quality
differences in education obtained while incarcerated.
Unfortunately we do not directly observe high school graduation. As a proxy we estimated
a specification with a dummy for 12 years of educational attainment. We do not report these
results, as the coefficient on the dummy for 12 years of schooling on crime was very small and
insignificant, and the coefficients on the other variables changed very little.
2.4.3 Alternative Specifications
In this section we present results from two sets of alternative specifications to our baseline
model that are designed to illustrate how our modeling choices affect the estimates. In columns
2-6 of Table 2.5 we include simple variants to our baseline identification strategy. In particular,
we estimate versions of the model in which we incorporate only a limited set of control vari-
ables; do not allow for the crime and education equation errors to be correlated (independent
probits instead of a bivariate probit); do not allow for dynamics; do not include the number of
schools per student as an exclusion in the enrollment equation; and use the direct measures of
cognitive and social/emotional skills, as opposed to our estimates of the underlying skills from
the factor model.
The objective for the second set of results is to provide some additional robustness checks to
the baseline model.39 We show that our results are robust to alternative ways to treat decisions
while in jail; excluding drug use as a control; alternative definitions of enrollment; allowing the
effects of prior crime and education decisions, as well as contemporaneous enrollment, to vary
by age; alternative specifications for criminal experience; and switching the contemporaneous
effect from crime to enrollment.
Controls
A key benefit of our data is that we are able to control for a rich set of observable (criminal
involvement of the family, expected probability of punishment, and degree of future considera-
tion, among others) and typically unobservable (cognitive and social/emotional skills) sources
of individual heterogeneity, that are not commonly available in other datasets. Since most of
these variables are highly persistent over time (or fixed), failing to control for them could lead
to estimates of the dynamic effects that are biased upwards in absolute value. In order to see
the possible extent of this bias, we estimate a version of our model in which we include only
a sparse set of individual characteristics and the local unemployment rate. The results are re-
ported in column 2 of Table 2.5. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the estimated
effects of lagged criminal and educational decisions are inflated, particularly their effects on
39We present these results in Tables A.1-A.4 in Appendix A.2 and in Tables A.8-A.13 in Appendix A.3 for the
crime-specific estimates.
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crime. The returns to criminal experience on crime almost double from 2.0 to 3.9%-points, and
the effect of lagged crime increases by roughly 50% from 15.8 to 23.5%-points. The effects
of educational experience on both crime and enrollment also increase and become statistically
significant (from -0.3 to -1.4%-points and from 0.6 to 1.1%-points, respectively).
Uncorrelated Errors
In order to determine the importance of allowing the errors in the crime and education decisions
to be correlated, we re-estimate the model using separate probits for the two equations, rather
than a bivariate probit model. The estimated effects are very similar between the two models,
with the exception of the effect of current enrollment on crime, which drops from 8.8 to 2.5%-
points. In the bivariate probit model, the errors are estimated to be negatively correlated with
each other. When we assume that they are independent (and therefore uncorrelated), the model
has to decrease the direct effect of current enrollment on crime to account for this and fit the
data, leading to a substantial underestimate of the causal effect of enrollment on crime.
No Dynamics
The intuition for the effect of not including dynamics in the model is similar to that for not
including covariates. To the extent that there are important dynamic relationships, excluding
them from the model will lead to the magnification of the effects for the other included vari-
ables. In column 4 of Table 2.5, this is exactly what we see. When we do not allow accumulated
experience and lagged decisions to enter the model, the effects of the individual heterogene-
ity increase in absolute value, overstating their true contribution. For example, the effect of
drug use on crime increases from 22.4 to 26.7%-points. The average marginal effect of so-
cial/emotional skills on crime also increases in magnitude from -8.0 to -12.7%-points. For the
same reason, this also changes the estimates of the contemporaneous effect of enrollment on
crime, more than doubling the estimated effect from 8.8 to 20.2%-points. This highlights the
importance of controlling for the dynamics in the crime and education decisions. Even when
the object of interest is not dynamic, failing to account for dynamics causes biased estimates
of other relationships, including the contemporaneous effects.
Not Instrumenting
As we discuss above in Section 2.3, in order to address the potential endogeneity of enrollment
in the crime equation, we introduce an exclusion restriction by adding the change in the number
of schools per person in the enrollment equation. In column 5 of Table 2.5 we present results in
which we do not include this, in order to illustrate its effect on our estimates. The primary con-
cern was that failing to appropriately control for endogeneity would lead to a biased estimate
of the effect of enrollment on crime, which could in turn generate bias in the other estimates as
well. We find that by not including this variable, the estimate for contemporaneous enrollment
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drops from 8.8 to 6.5%-points. The difference is consistent with the expected bias given the
negative correlation of the errors. This result demonstrates that there is some bias that this ex-
clusion restriction is correcting for. However, the bias is not particularly large, which is likely
due to the fact that our data allow us to control for many sources of observed and unobserved
heterogeneity that would otherwise generate further correlation in the errors of the crime and
enrollment decisions, and exacerbate the endogeneity problem.
Cognitive and Social/Emotional Skills
We also estimate a specification in which we replace our estimates of skills with the measures
used to infer them. This allows us to investigate whether our results are sensitive to our use of
the estimated cognitive and social/emotional skills, and also to better understand how cogni-
tive and social/emotional skills contribute to enrollment and crime decisions. As can be seen in
column 6 of Table 2.5, the estimates on the other variables are very similar to the baseline es-
timates, illustrating that our factor-model-generated measures are effective summaries of these
skills.
A somewhat surprising result is that the two measures that generate the IQ score (Matrix
Reasoning and Vocabulary) have no effect on enrollment decisions. The point estimates are
very small and insignificant. Given that cognitive skills are viewed as one of the primary drivers
of education decisions in the literature, this is particularly surprising. One explanation for our
finding is that the IQ distribution in our dataset is substantially shifted to the left, compared
to the general population. Themedian raw IQ score is only 85 in our data, with only about
10% scoring above the population average of 100. It may be that in this range of IQ scores,
marginal increases in IQ do not have significant effects on the value of education or on the cost
of completing education. In contrast, one of the measures of cognitive impairment does seem
to be related to education decisions. The Trail-Making B test, which involves the sequencing
of number and letters is negatively associated with enrollment. So while IQ scores do not
seem to be significant drivers of enrollment decisions, there is some evidence that cognitive
impairment does. In particular the Trail-Making B test seems to be the cause of the positive
correlation between cognitive skills and enrollment in the baseline specification.
Consistent with the baseline estimates, the tests for cognitive skills are generally uncorre-
lated with crime decisions. The sole exception is for property crime, in which there seems to
be evidence of positive returns to cognitive skills.
We have six measures of social/emotional skills. These measures have a consistent neg-
ative effect on crime (most of which are statistically significant), with the exception of the
PSMI-Self-Reliance measure, which has a positive sign. These results are consistent with
the literature, which finds that a lack of social/emotional skills can be an important driver of
criminal activity. For example, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) suggest that the inability to
exercise self-control (measured as WAI-Impulse Control and WAI-Suppression of Aggression
in our data) can explain a large part of criminal behaviour. The fact that self-reliance, which is
viewed as a positive trait, is associated with a higher probability of committing crime, suggests
that some social/emotional skills may be beneficial for both legitimate and illicit activities.
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Overall the social/emotional measures have small and insignificant effects on enrollment,
consistent with our baseline results. However, two components of the PSMI appear to be impor-
tant for schooling decisions. PSMI-Identity has a positive effect on enrollment, which makes
sense since this measures self-esteem and consideration of life goals. Somewhat surprisingly,
PSMI-Work Orientation has a negative effect on enrollment.
Modeling Choices While in Jail
In our dataset we can distinguish whether individuals attended a community school only, an
institutional school only, both community and institutional schools, or none, during each recall
period. The decision and the incentives to attend institutional schools when an individual is
incarcerated may be different from enrolling in a community-based school when the individual
is free. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between a person who was free during some por-
tion of the recall period, and chose not to go to a community school, and a person who did not
have the choice at all because he was incarcerated throughout the whole period. Furthermore,
we cannot observe whether crime choices during the recall period were made while free or in-
carcerated. In our baseline specification we drop observations in which an individual attended
only an institutional school in a given year.
In order to determine if our results are sensitive to this choice,40 we estimate three other
model specifications. In the first, we set enrollment to zero if an individual did not attend
a community school (i.e., attended an institutional school only, or attended no school). In
the second specification, we add a variable to the model that is an indicator for whether the
individual was incarcerated at the time of the interview, to allow for being in jail to affect
choices. Finally, we add the indicator for jail interacted with years of education, years of crime,
and enrollment to allow the effect of previous experience and contemporaneous enrollment to
vary with whether the individual is in jail. The results of the three specifications are reported
in Table A.1 in Appendix A.2.
In the first specification, the marginal effects for female, punishment, family crime, and
drug use increase in absolute value in the enrollment equation. This is likely to due the fact that
these are strong predictors of crime. When we assume that people who attend only institutional
schools decided not to attend community school (instead of excluding those observations from
the likelihood), we are adding observations in which people are incarcerated and not attending
school. Therefore any variables which predict that people are more (less) likely to commit
crime, will predict that these people are more (less) likely to be incarcerated, and therefore less
(more) likely to enroll in school. This is exactly the pattern that we see for female, punishment,
and family crime.
While drug use is also a strong predictor of crime, the explanation above would cause the
effect of drug use on crime to become more negative (drugs cause more crime, more incarcer-
ation, and thus less school). However, we observe the opposite. The most likely explanation
40See Piquero, Schubert, and Brame (2014), who find that controlling for time spent in prison is important for
interpreting time series patterns in offending.
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here is that it is more difficult to obtain and use drugs while in jail, so adding these observa-
tions (in jail and not attending school) generates a positive correlation between drug use and
enrollment.
The effect of years of education on enrollment also increases and becomes statistically
significant, although the effect is still not that large (2.3%-points). One possible explanation is
that people who are incarcerated have few years of schooling, so by adding these observations
(few years of education and not attending school) we are reinforcing the positive correlation
between experience and education choice. We also observe a small decrease in the effect of
contemporaneous enrollment on crime. This is also likely due to the addition of observations
for individuals who were both not attending school and incarcerated (and therefore likely to
have committed a crime in that period).
When we condition on being in jail, the effect of enrollment on crime decreases slightly, but
overall the results are quite similar to those in the baseline. When we interact the dummy for
being in jail with our measures of education and crime, we find that our main results are largely
unchanged compared to the specification with just the dummy for jail. The only difference
is that we observe some evidence that the returns to previous educational and crime choices
are lower while in jail. The interaction between jail and lagged enrollment and educational
experience in the enrollment equation are negative, and lagged crime interacted with jail is also
negative.
Overall our results with respect to modeling the choices while in jail suggest that our base-
line results are quite robust to alternative modeling decisions. While some of the results related
to individual characteristics are affected in some cases, our main results about the contempora-
neous and dynamic relationships between crime and education are largely unchanged.
Drug Use
Another potential concern relates to the fact that drug use is a choice rather than an exogenous
variable, which may bias some of our results. In particular one might think that education
affects the propensity to use drugs, and that our finding that drug use has a strong positive effect
on crime, and educational attainment does not, masks the indirect effect of education on crime
via drug use. In order to check for this possibility, we estimated a specification of our model
in which we drop drug use. The results are reported in column 1 of Table A.2 in Appendix
A.2. Dropping drug use does not change the effect of education on crime through educational
attainment, suggesting that education does not have much effect on crime either directly or
indirectly through drug use. On the other hand, dropping drug use increases the estimates of
the effects of both skill measures on crime, by about 4%-points each. This suggests that skills
have not only a direct effect (which is what we capture in the baseline estimates), but also an
indirect effect through drug use. The results for the other coefficients are largely unchanged.
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Defining Enrollment
In our baseline model we define an individual as enrolled in school if they are enrolled in
school at the time of the interview, or if they were enrolled prior to coming to their detention
facility. In order to determine if our results are sensitive to this, we re-estimate the model
under an alternative definition of enrollment by defining enrollment as having attended school
for at least nine months in the previous year. (We also adjust years of education and lagged
enrollment accordingly).41 The results are reported in column 2 of Table A.2 in Appendix A.2.
Our main results are largely unchanged.
Age-Varying Coefficients
One potential concern with our baseline specification is that, if the effects of previous and
contemporaneous education and crime decisions vary by age, then any estimated effects, par-
ticularly long-run effects, may be biased. In order to examine whether, and to what extent,
this may be the case, we estimate a version of the model in which we allow the effects of
accumulated experience, lagged decisions, and contemporaneous enrollment to vary by the
age of the individual. In particular, we interact these variables with a dummy for whether the
person is over 19 years old. In column 1 of Table A.3 in Appendix A.2 we find that the esti-
mates vary slightly by age, but the differences are small. The largest change is in the effect of
lagged enrollment on education, in which the marginal effect decreases with age from 22.9 to
17.0%-points, suggesting that the state dependence in educational decisions decreases slightly
as individuals age, which is not surprising. Overall, the results seem to be consistent across
age.
Criminal Experience
In the baseline survey we observe the age at which individuals first engage in crime, but we do
not have a measure of accumulated criminal experience at the time of entry into the survey. In
our baseline model we impute the accumulated years of crime using the procedure described
in Section 2.2. Our estimates suggest a larger role for state dependence compared to returns to
experience. One possible explanation for this result is that experience enters utility in a non-
linear fashion, causing us to not fully capture its impact, whereas lagged crime is a dummy
variable, and therefore already enters the model flexibly.
In columns 2 and 3 of Table A.3 in Appendix A.2, we allow experience to enter quadrat-
ically and as a piecewise-linear function of experience, allowing for different returns for 0-4,
5-9, and 10+ years of criminal experience. When we allow experience to enter quadratically
we find that, consistent with the baseline, criminal experience has a small negative effect on
41We also estimated a version of the model in which we treated enrollment in months as a continuous outcome.
Although the interpretation of the results is slightly different, the results were qualitatively similar to the results
for defining the cutoff to be nine months.
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enrollment and a positive and increasing effect on crime. However, we lose statistical sig-
nificance on all of the associated parameters. In the second specification, the effect of years
of crime on crime is similar to the baseline with no significant variation across the different
experience categories.
Another concern is that our imputation procedure generates a noisy measure of criminal
experience, making it more difficult to tease out the true returns to experience. In column 4
of Table A.3 in Appendix A.2, we use only the observed accumulated experience after entry,
interacted with age of entry dummies, instead of our imputed measure.42 Since observed crim-
inal experience is likely to be positively correlated with the unobserved experience that occurs
prior to entering the survey, we should expect that the coefficients will be inflated, as they will
capture the effect of both the observed and unobserved experience. This upward bias in the
coefficients is likely to be increasing in the age of entry into the survey, since the unobserved
period is longer for people who entered the survey at an older age. This is consistent with our
estimates. Furthermore, even if we ignore the bias in these coefficients, we still find a larger
impact of lagged crime compared to criminal experience. Overall we conclude that our finding
that state dependence has a stronger effect on crime than criminal experience is not driven by
measurement or specification issues related to experience.
The Contemporaneous Effect of Crime on Education
In our baseline model, we estimate the contemporaneous effect of education on crime. As dis-
cussed above, we could have alternatively estimated the contemporaneous effect from crime to
education.43 In Table A.4 in Appendix A.2 we present estimates from this alternative specifi-
cation. The results in the first column show that contemporaneous crime leads to an increase
in enrollment of 9.7%-points, which is similar in magnitude to our estimate of the effect of
enrollment on crime in our baseline specification. The correlation in errors of the crime and
enrollment equations is negative, although not precisely estimated, as was the case in the base-
line. The results for other coefficients are relatively unchanged. In column 2 we include lagged
state arrest rates as an exclusion restriction in the crime equation (to serve as an instrument
for contemporaneous crime in the enrollment equation).44 The coefficient on contemporane-
ous crime increases slightly to about 12%-points, while the other coefficients remain largely
unaffected.
2.5 Model Simulations
In this section we attempt to disentangle the roles of state dependence (i.e., lagged choices),
criminal and human capital (i.e., accumulated years of crime and education), and heterogeneity
42As discussed in footnote 17, our alternative procedure for accounting for unobserved criminal experience also
gives us similar results.
43But not both. See our discussion in Section 2.3.
44Data on state-level arrest rates was obtained from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.
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both in terms of “observables” such as the perceived probability of punishment and “unobserv-
ables” such as skills, in driving the interactions between education and crime. Understanding
the importance of each of these determinants is crucial, as the policy recommendations associ-
ated with them are quite different. For example, if state dependence is important and criminal
activity is very persistent, then preventing someone from committing a crime at an early age
will have important effects on future criminal activity as the persistence will tend to reduce
crime even if nothing else is changed. Furthermore, if being enrolled in school has a large
effect on whether one commits a crime or not, enrollment policies may be an important alterna-
tive to other incapacitation policies like incarceration. If, on the other hand, other determinants
of crime (e.g., skills) are more important, then one should consider policies that foster these
skills.45
For this purpose, we present two types of simulations based on our estimated baseline
model. In the first case, we try to isolate the importance of dynamics by comparing the pre-
dicted paths of enrollment and crime decisions for two identical individuals (with median char-
acteristics), who differ only along one dimension in the initial period (i.e., temporary differ-
ences). In particular, we simulate how these paths differ for an individual that commits a crime
at age 15 from one that does not, and similarly for attending school at age 15. We do the
same for two individuals with perceived probabilities of punishment that differ by 10%-points
at age 15 and are equal in all subsequent periods. In the second set of simulations, we trace
the dynamic effects of permanent differences in variables that measure heterogeneity, specif-
ically differences in cognitive skills, social/emotional skills, and the perceived probability of
punishment (i.e., a permanent 10%-point difference).46
2.5.1 Dynamic Effects of Temporary Differences
We begin by simulating the differences from committing versus not committing a crime at
age 15. Figure 2.5 shows that this has a very small effect on the probability of enrolling over
time. The probability differs by 1.7%-points after 5 periods (from a baseline of 40%), and
then it decreases as a consequence of aging since, after 10 years, almost no one in the data is
enrolled anymore. Figure 2.5 shows that the effects on crime are much larger. Mechanically,
the difference in the probability of committing a crime at age 15 is one. After one year, the
probability of committing a crime is lower by 20%-points, from a baseline of 70%. This effect
is almost entirely a consequence of state dependence (i.e., lagged crime). After that, the effect
45Cunha et al. (2006) provide evidence that very early periods are the most important for skill development. To
the extent that education is still a key driver of skill development for the sample we study (adolescent and early-
adult criminals), policies designed to promote enrollment in later years could provide additional crime-reducing
benefits via skill formation.
46In our model we are assuming that skills are fixed over the age range we study. In this sense, our estimated
effects of education on crime and crime on education are estimates of direct effects, holding skills constant. To the
extent that education or crime also affect skill formation, there is an indirect effect captured by the skill channel.
Ideally one would endogenize the process for skill formation in order to measure this channel directly. However,
such a model would involve additional issues of simultaneity due to complicated feedback effects between enroll-
ment/crime choices and skills. In addition, in our data some of the skill measures are only observed in the baseline
survey, making it difficult to measure how skills evolve over time.
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diminishes over time but, because of the decrease in criminal experience, it does not disappear.
After 10 years, the person who did not commit a crime at age 15 is approximately 6%-points
less likely to commit a crime.
Figure 2.5: No Crime at Age 15 - Effect on Average Probability of Education and Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of
errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially
over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and
enrollment rates.
3. Note that for the second figure, the comparison between two identical individuals who differ only along one
dimension (crime) at age 15 implies that the average difference in the probability of crime between them is equal
to -1 at that age by construction.
Next, we analyze enrollment in school at age 15. In Figure 2.6 we can see that the effect
of education on education is very similar to the effect of crime on crime. Mechanically the
difference in the probability of being enrolled is one at age 15. As a consequence of state
dependence, the probability is around 20%-points higher after a year. It decreases over time,
reaching zero after 10 years. Its effect on crime is small but not insignificant (at least in the
first years). Since enrollment has a positive contemporaneous effect on crime, as we can see
in Figure 2.6, it increases the probability of crime by 8%-points initially. The effect rapidly
decreases, and it reaches zero after 3 years. After that, it becomes slightly negative but very
small as more and more human capital (i.e., years of education) gets accumulated.47
47As we mention in Section 2.3, we also estimated a version of the model in which there is a contemporaneous
effect of crime on enrollment instead of an effect of enrollment on crime. In all of the simulations we describe
in this section the long-run outcomes are very similar between the two model specifications. In a few cases, the
short-run effects are different. In particular, for the case of the difference in committing a crime at age 15, in
the alternative specification there is a short-run negative effect on enrollment that does not appear in our baseline
model. Similarly, for the case of a difference in enrolling in school at age 15, there is no longer a short-run positive
difference in crime. In both cases these differences diminish quickly. Figures for simulations from this alternative
specification that are analogues to Figures 2.5-2.10 are located in Figures A.1-A.6 in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 2.6: Enrolled at Age 15 - Effect on Average Probability of Education and Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of
errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially
over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and
enrollment rates.
3. Note that for the first figure, the comparison between two identical individuals who differ only along one
dimension (enrollment) at age 15 implies that the average difference in the probability of enrollment between
them is equal to -1 at that age by construction.
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The third simulation we present, the effect associated with a 10%-point difference in the
perceived probability of punishment at age 15, is shown in Figure 2.7. The effect on enroll-
ment is negligible. Its effect on crime, on the other hand, is larger. At age 15, it reduces the
probability of committing a crime by almost 2%-points. While the effect decreases rapidly, 10
years later there is a 0.1%-point lower probability of committing a crime.
Figure 2.7: Increase in Certainty of Punishment at Age 15 - Effect on Average Probability of
Education and Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of
errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially
over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and
enrollment rates.
Overall, the initial differences persist somewhat in the short run, and then decrease towards
zero after several years. This is due to the fact that returns to experience are small relative
to the effects of state dependence and individual heterogeneity. This implies that while poli-
cies based on temporary interventions will have only small effects on behaviour many years
after the policy (and thus may have to be repeated to continue the effect), the potential gains
to such policies are not insignificant. Given that crime is highly concentrated among young
people, obtaining immediate and somewhat persistent reductions in crime has the potential to
significantly affect overall crime rates.
2.5.2 Dynamic Effects of Permanent Differences
We next consider the effects that permanent differences in heterogeneity (while holding all
other characteristics at their median values) may have on both the enrollment and crime prob-
abilities. We begin by simulating paths of an individual with cognitive skills at the 25th per-
centile and comparing to one with skills at the 75th percentile in the data. While this may sound
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like a large difference, this is for individuals in our selected data where this distribution is much
more compressed than in the overall population. For example, the 25th and 75th percentiles of
the cognitive skill distribution are associated with IQ scores of 89 and 98 and scores of 39 and
48 on the Stroop Word test, respectively–a modest difference.48 Figure 2.8 shows the effect
on enrollment. Not surprisingly, higher cognitive skills are associated with a larger probability
of being enrolled, but the magnitude of the difference is small: at most 3%-points (after five
years). Cognitive skills are essentially not related to the probability of crime.
Figure 2.8: Cognitive Factor 25th versus 75th Percentile - Effect on Average Probability of
Education and Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of
errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially
over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and
enrollment rates.
Figure 2.9 shows similar results for social/emotional skills. A movement from the 25th to
75th percentile for these skills is equivalent to a one-third of a standard deviation difference in
impulse control, for example. As can be seen from the figures, the effect on enrollment is negli-
gible. A different story arises when we look at the effect on criminal activity. The probability of
committing a crime is lower by 3%-points for the individual with higher social/emotional skills
at age 15, and the effect keeps growing over time. After 10 years the probability of committing
a crime is reduced by 10%-points.
The final simulation is shown in Figure 2.10. In this case we simulate the paths based on
a permanent 10%-point difference in the perceived probability of punishment. After five years
the probability of enrollment is marginally larger, by less than 0.7%-points. The impact on
crime is more significant. At age 15, the probability of crime is almost 2%-points lower for the
48In order for a Word score to be considered ”higher” or ”lower” than another, a 10 point or greater score
difference is required.
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Figure 2.9: Social/Emotional Factor 25th versus 75th Percentile - Effect on Average Probability
of Education and Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of
errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially
over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and
enrollment rates.
individual with the higher perceived probability of punishment and the difference gets larger
over time. After ten years it is almost 5%-points.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we show that distinguishing between the potential sources of persistence in en-
rollment and crime decisions is important both in terms of generating a better understanding of
what drives behaviour, and for the purpose of designing policy. We find that individual hetero-
geneity is strongly related to criminal behaviour. Many of these dimensions of heterogeneity
go beyond what is typically measured in most datasets, such as attitudes about the future (fu-
ture outlook inventory), drug use, family crime, and social/emotional skills. This illustrates the
importance of controlling for a rich set of individual characteristics. Our results also help to
identify which particular sources are most relevant for driving behaviour. In particular, we find
that social/emotional skills are important drivers of criminal behaviour.
While we do not directly simulate potential policies designed to increase enrollment and/or
decrease crime, our model simulations illustrate how policies targeted at altering individual
heterogeneity (e.g., social/emotional skills) would drive changes in education and crime over
time. We find, perhaps unsurprisingly, that permanent or long-run changes generate the largest
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Figure 2.10: Increase in Certainty of Punishment (Permanent) - Effect on Average Probability
of Education and Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of
errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially
over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and
enrollment rates.
effects. However, policies with temporary changes to individual behaviour, such as keeping
people out of crime for one period, can also have lasting effects. For example, a policy that
prevents someone from committing a crime in a given year would generate an effect on crime
in the following year of -18%-points. This implies that there is room for policies designed
to shock individuals out of current bad decisions, and thus break the persistence caused by
this state dependence. To the extent that these types of policies are easier to implement than
permanent changes to individuals, their effect should not be dismissed. The reductions obtained
are considerable and, at least in the case we model here, they are obtained during the ages in
which criminal activities are at their peak.
Our estimated effects of returns to criminal and education experience are precisely esti-
mated, but not particularly large in magnitude. This implies that the observed persistence in
choices does not come primarily through this channel, but via state dependence and individual
heterogeneity instead. This has important policy implications as well. If returns to criminal
experience were high, then individuals who had accumulated a lot of experience might be very
difficult to deter from committing crimes in the future. But since we find these returns to be
low, this suggests that there does not come a point at which it is “too late” to intervene. Even
youth who have amassed a long history of bad decisions can be affected by temporary inter-
ventions to break the state dependence and through changes to individual heterogeneity, such
as reducing drug use or improving social/emotional skills.
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Finally, it is important to stress that we are studying youth who have already committed
somewhat serious criminal offenses. We feel that this is a particularly relevant group to study,
as they represent a large proportion of overall youth crime, particularly serious crime. Further-
more, this is a group that has been studied relatively less intensively in the literature, largely
due to data constraints. However, one implication of this is that our results do not necessarily
generalize to the population at large. The factors that cause these serious offenders to reduce
crime may not be the same as those that prevent people from committing their first crime.
Additionally, what helps to reduce serious crimes such as robbery and assault, may not be as
useful for preventing less serious crimes such as shoplifting.
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Chapter 3
The Labour Market for Disadvantaged
Young Individuals
3.1 Introduction
The school to work transition and the early career path can be a difficult one for young peo-
ple, especially among the low-educated. These disadvantaged individuals tend to have low
employment rates, experience long periods of unemployment before their first job, and face
lower wages than their older counterparts (Wolpin, 1987; Eckstein and Wolpin, 1995; Bowlus,
Kiefer, and Neumann, 2001). A large fraction of these youth are also engaged in crime. The
literature has documented that crime is widespread among young low-educated males in poor
urban areas (Freeman, 2000; Raphael and Sills, 2007). Many make money from illegal activ-
ities, and some even have a career in crime, spending most of their time engaged in criminal
activities. For instance, around 30% of low-educated young males in the United States reported
an income from crime in 1980 (Lochner, 2004). Youth also account for a large share of total
crime. In particular, 1.9 million youth between the ages of 15 and 19 were arrested in 2010,
accounting for 19% of all arrests, despite representing only 7% of the total population.1
In this chapter, I characterize the criminal and legal labour sectors for disadvantaged young
individuals and empirically investigate the factors driving the transitions between sectors. I fo-
cus on the role of heterogeneity, earnings, human capital and criminal capital accumulation in
determining transitions across the criminal and legal labour sectors. Analyzing what the labour
market looks like for disadvantaged young individuals, and how the different alternatives inter-
act with each other (i.e., crime and legal employment), is key to interpreting how individuals
make employment choices. Understanding the mobility patterns across sectors can provide
guidelines for future research aimed at explaining crime and/or legal employment choice. To
the extent that the criminal and legal labour sectors interact with each other, criminal behaviour
should not be studied in isolation of legal employment behaviour.
1This figure is based on data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.
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The data I employ comes from the Pathways to Desistance Study (PDS), a multi-site lon-
gitudinal study of serious adolescent offenders as they transition from adolescence into early
adulthood. The Pathways to Desistance was designed specifically to study questions related to
the evolution of criminal behavior, taking special care to also measure employment in the legal
sector, educational decisions and other outcomes. As a result, the dataset contains a rich panel
of information about decisions to participate in crime and the legal labour sector. The enrolled
youth were between 14 and 18 years old at the time of their committing offense and were found
guilty of a serious offense. Each study participant was followed for a period of seven years past
enrollment which results in a comprehensive picture of life changes in a wide array of areas
over the course of this time.
The PDS is especially well-suited for understanding the labour market for disadvantaged
young individuals. First, it contains a large share of minorities and low-educated individuals. It
also concentrates on young offenders; a group that contributes significantly to aggregate crime
rates and, at the same time, faces important challenges in the legal labour sector. Furthermore,
besides containing comprehensive information regarding legal employment the PDS also has
very detailed information regarding participation in the criminal sector including criminal earn-
ings, types of crimes, and the number of weeks participating in crime in a given month, which
allows me to characterize both employment sectors.
This chapter is related to the literature that analyzes the legal labour sector for disadvan-
taged young individuals (Freeman and Wise, 1982; Freeman, 1991), and the challenges faced
by individuals with criminal histories (Bushway, 2004; Bushway and Sweeten, 2007; Raphael,
2011). It is also related to some recent work that investigates the implications of the legal
labour sector on the criminal sector, and viceversa. Several papers have found a strong asso-
ciation between the inability to obtain legal employment and criminal activity (Raphael and
Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard, 2002; Lochner, 2004; Schnepel, 2016),
as well as low wages and crime (Grogger, 1998; Machin and Meghir, 2004; Kling, 2006). Un-
like most of these studies, this chapter concentrates on a group of individuals who is rarely
studied and who mostly contributes to crime participation. Furthermore, I not only character-
ize the main features of the legal labour sector faced by these young individuals, but I do a
similar analysis on the criminal sector. The extensive data on criminal activity and legal labour
sector participation available in the PDS also allows me to develop a good understanding of the
interactions between the criminal and the legal labour sector.
As a preview of the main results, I find that disadvantaged young individuals face two
low-quality employment alternatives. On the one hand, jobs in the legal labour sector are char-
acterized by short duration and low wages. Consistent with their low quality, these jobs present
small returns to legal labour market experience. Income crime activity presents similar features
as legal jobs: short average duration and small returns to experience. The criminal sector offers
an earnings premium relative to the legal labour sector, which partially compensates for the
inherent risk of the activity. I find that the transitions between these two sectors are related
to cognitive and social/emotional skills and experience in the corresponding sector. This last
fact suggest that even if experience has a small role for earnings it is possibly related to other
aspects of the activities (e.g., availability of opportunities). Lastly, I provide evidence that
earnings in the criminal and legal labour sectors play a significant role on the transitions across
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sectors. These results imply that crime and employment choices among disadvantaged young
individuals are strongly related and should not be studied in isolation of each other.
The rest of the document is organized as follows. Section 3.2 adds more relevant data
details on top of Section 2.2 in Chapter 2. Section 3.3 characterizes the labour market for
disadvantaged individuals and Section 3.4 analyzes the main patterns of mobility between the
criminal and legal labour sectors. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
I use data from the Pathways to Desistance Study (PDS), which was described in detail in
Chapter 2. In this chapter, however, I use the Calendar Data rather than the Annual Data
introduced in Chapter 2.2 The Calendar Data is collected at a monthly level across distinct
domains including academic achievement, criminal activity, legal employment, contacts with
the justice system, among others. The monthly data allow me to construct criminal and legal
employment histories. As a result, this type of data is well-suited for characterizing the criminal
and legal labour sectors, as well as understanding the dynamics across sectors.
Regarding legal employment, the calendars collect information on the number of jobs an
individual holds in a given month, including part-time and under-the-table jobs. For each job,
the survey gathers information on the number of hours worked, number of weeks worked,
hourly wage, and type of job. The survey also keeps track of each job from month-to-month.
The monthly data on criminal activity come from self-reporting by each respondent. In or-
der to encourage accurate self-reporting, responses are kept confidential and participants were
given a certificate of confidentiality from the U.S. Department of Justice. The self-reported
offenses consist of 24 components, each of which relates to involvement in a different type
of crime, and which can be used to identify whether the adolescent commits a criminal act in
a given month.3 In addition, the survey gathers information on weekly earnings from selling
drugs, selling stolen property, stealing merchandise, gambling and prostitution, as well as the
number of weeks worked in these activities in a given month.
The survey also indicates whether individuals were locked in a facility in a given month,
along with the amount of days spent in each facility and the type of institution (e.g., jail, prison,
detention center, Pennsylvania Youth Development Centers, and the Arizona Department of
Juvenile Corrections).
Altogether, I obtain a monthly panel of individuals making choices across the criminal and
legal labour sectors. For the analysis in this chapter, I focus on males who are no longer at-
2While the Annual Data is accessible without restriction, the Calendar Data requires users to request access to
the data and meet specific requirements.
3The 24 self reported offenses are: destroy property, set fire, enter a building to steal, shoplift, buy, sell or
receive stolen property, use credit card illegally, steal a car or motorcycle, sell marijuana or other illegal drugs,
carjack someone, drive drunk or high, pay for sex, force sex upon another person, kill someone, shoot someone,
rob someone with a weapon, beat up someone, engage in a fight, carry a gun, enter a car to steal, and go joyriding.
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tending school, and therefore, are only deciding between unemployment, legal employment,
and crime. As a consequence, I concentrate on a sample of males who do not pursue further
schooling beyond age 19 and explore their behaviour once they have transitioned out of school.
I choose the age threshold of 19 to exclude individuals who are more educated, and that poten-
tially face a different labour market. Moreover, males older than 19, who only obtain schooling
if they are incarcerated or who are enrolled in GED programs, are not excluded from the sam-
ple. Schooling obtained in prison or through GED programs should not significantly boost the
chances of getting a legal job or any other labour market outcome relative to the rest of the
sample (Cameron and Heckman, 1993).
For the analysis, a legal job is defined as an employment relationship in the legal labour
sector that consists of at least 20 hours per week, including under-the-table jobs. At each point
in time, individuals in the data can hold multiple jobs in the legal labour sector. Although this
is rarely seen in the sample, I follow the literature to deal with overlapping jobs. Those legal
jobs that are completely covered by another job are dropped. For legal jobs that partly overlap,
the starting date of the second job is replaced by the stopping date of the first job. For legal
jobs that completely overlap, the job with the higher wage is used. I am then left with the main
source of earnings in the legal labour sector for each individual in each month. To deal with
outliers in monthly legal earnings, earnings in the data are trimmed based on the 1st and 99th
percentile from the Current Population Survey for high school dropouts in the same age range
as in the PDS, for each year in the sample (i.e., 2001 to 2009).
In the criminal sector I focus on income crime, which encompasses any illegal activity
aimed at earning money.4 Income crime includes selling stolen property, selling drugs, stealing
merchandise, gambling, and prostitution. An income crime spell starts when the individual
participates in income crime for at least two weeks in a given month. The spell ends when the
individual participates in income crime for less than two weeks in a given month or if he does
not participate at all. To deal with outliers in monthly criminal earnings, these are trimmed 1%
at the top and bottom of the distribution.5 I deflate earnings in both sectors to the 2000 level
using the US Bureau of labour Statistics CPI.
The final sample consists of 527 males.6 Individuals are included in the sample until at
least one of the relevant variables is missing for a given month.7 Table 3.1 reports descriptive
4In Section 3.4, I explore the role of non-income crime on transitions to income crime, legal employment, and
incarceration.
5Different from the legal labour sector, there is no external study, such as the CPS, that can be used to obtain
reliable bands for criminal earnings.
6The original sample of monthly data starts with 1,265 individuals that complete the first follow-up survey
after the baseline survey. Females are excluded from the sample. Of the 1094 males left, 554 are still going
to school after age 19, and 13 have missing data on participation in the legal labour sector, criminal sector, or
incarceration that does not allow me to determine the state.
7The attrition rate in the sample is on average slightly less than 5.5% per year. One concern is that individuals
who leave the sample early are different from individuals who stay until the end of the survey. As a robustness
check, I estimated a probit model for attrition in the sample and found that it is not related to race, cognitive
and social/emotional skills, education, self-reported criminal activity, the age at which the individual was first
arrested, or the average number of arrests per year prior to the baseline survey. There is, however, some evidence
of selection based on the average number of arrests per year after the baseline survey, although the effect is small.
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statistics for the sample. There are several statistics that I wish to highlight. First, there is a
large percentage of minorities and low-educated individuals. Blacks and Hispanics represent
37.8% and 37.6% of the sample, respectively. The share of individuals with a high school
degree is 24.5%.8 Not surprisingly, the crime rate in the sample (i.e., the fraction of individual-
month pairs in which an income crime is committed) is quite high. The monthly crime rate is
10.6%, with an average annual crime rate of 29.8%. The monthly employment rate is 34.4%,
and 71.5% of the individuals hold a legal job at some point in the sample. Hence, even if the
sample contains disadvantaged young individuals who were found guilty of a serious crime,
most of them do not seem to be fully banned from working in the legal labour sector.9 Lastly,
there is overlap between sectors.10 Around 33.9% of the time, participation in income crime is
accompanied by simultaneous participation in the legal labour sector in the same month.
3.3 Labour Market Facts: Criminal and Legal Labour Sec-
tors
This section aims at characterizing both the criminal and legal labour sectors for disadvantaged
young individuals using the data described in Section 3.2. I start by analyzing the main features
of the legal labour sector, including types of jobs, average duration, and earnings. I then
present a descriptive picture of the criminal sector and compare it to the legal labour sector.
Understanding what the criminal sector and the legal labour sectors look like for disadvantaged
young individuals is key to interpreting how they make unemployment, legal employment, and
crime choices.
Table 3.2 displays the cross-section distribution of legally employed individuals across oc-
cupations. Manual and skilled occupations, such as cutting grass and carpentry, represent
around 62.3% of the jobs. Not surprisingly, a large share of individuals take restaurant jobs
(15.4%). Lastly, less than 15% have clerical, managerial, or administrative positions. Overall,
most of the jobs are low-skilled. This is not surprising since a large portion of employment
opportunities are not accessible for disadvantaged individuals, for example, due to education
requirements. Beyond education, there is evidence that employer hiring preferences may be
further affecting the types of job available to individuals with criminal records (Agan and Starr,
2017; Pager, 2003; Uggen et al., 2014). Firms that restrain from hiring individuals with crim-
inal records tend to be filling positions with more educated people relative to firms that are
willing to hire individuals with criminal past (Raphael, 2011). Furthermore, criminal records
These results are available upon request.
8Relative to the youth population of Philadelphia and Phoenix, the sample contains disproportionately more
blacks and less educated young individuals. Using data from the CPS for year 2001, blacks and high school
graduates represent 60% and 80% of the total youth population in Philadelphia (18 to 25 years old), respectively,
against 70% and 39% in the sample. In Phoenix, Hispanics and high school graduates represent 66% and 73% of
the total youth population, respectively, against 60% and 14% in the sample.
9Bushway and Sweeten (2007) document that ex-felons are barred from up to 800 different occupations across
the United States.
10The overlap between legal and illegal work in the United States was also documented by Freeman (2000)
using data from the NLSY.
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Table 3.1: Pathways to Desistance - Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean
Black* 0.378
(0.485)
Hispanic* 0.376
(0.485)
White* 0.214
(0.411)
Philadelphia* 0.471
(0.500)
Age at Labour Market Entry* 18.899
(1.494)
High School Degree* 0.245
(0.430)
Income Crime Monthly Rate 0.106
(0.308)
Legal Employment Monthly Rate 0.344
(0.475)
Legal Experience 13.476
(15.574)
Income Crime Experience 5.502
(7.980)
Accumulated Criminal Records 5.217
(3.553)
In Probation 0.171
(0.376)
Number of Individuals 527
Notes:
* Indicates variables that do not vary over time. Summary statistics for these
variables are calculated using only the survey at the time individuals stop at-
tending school.
1. Standard deviations are reported below the mean in parenthesis.
2. Income crime and legal experience are measured in months and they ignore
pre-survey experience. Accumulated criminal records are the sum of official
arrests, including arrests that occurred before the survey.
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might be particularly important for firms filling managerial positions or positions where mon-
itoring is imperfect, further reducing the types of jobs available to individuals with evident
criminal past.
Table 3.2: Pathways to Desistance - Distribution of Legal Workers by Type of Job
Type of Job Share
Manual Occupations (e.g., Cutting Grass, Security Guard) 0.319
(0.466)
Skilled Occupations (e.g., Carpentry) 0.304
(0.460)
Restaurant Worker 0.154
(0.361)
Office Work/Clerical/Telemarketing 0.061
(0.238)
Retail/Cashier 0.071
(0.257)
Managerial/Administrative 0.060
(0.237)
Babysitting/Child Care 0.010
(0.099)
Technical/Professional (e.g., Medical Assistant, Newspaper Reporter) 0.012
(0.108)
Other 0.010
(0.099)
Notes:
1. Standard deviations are reported below the mean in parenthesis.
2. The job type categories are those reported in the survey.
Table 3.3 displays the monthly average duration of non-employment (i.e., periods where the
individual is not legally employed, participating in income crime, or incarcerated), legal jobs,
and income crime in the sample. The short duration of legal jobs provides further evidence
that disadvantaged young individuals are mostly employed in low-quality jobs. The average
duration of legal jobs is 7.3 months. Table 3.3 also breaks down the average duration of legal
jobs by hours worked and by type of job. Both full-time and part-time jobs have short average
duration, with full-time jobs lasting only two months longer than part-time jobs, on average.
There is, however, significant variation by type of job. Perhaps not surprisingly, managerial
and administrative jobs display a longer average duration (14.6 months) than restaurant jobs
(5.7 months) and manual occupations (6.3 months). Nevertheless, the duration of legal jobs in
the sample is much shorter than what has been documented in the literature for all youths.11
Table 3.4 presents descriptive statistics on monthly legal earnings (i.e., one observation per
11Using data from the NLSY 1979, Bowlus, Kiefer, and Neumann (2001) document a mean job duration of
26.0 and 19.6 months for white and black young individuals, respectively, in their first jobs.
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Table 3.3: Pathways to Desistance - Average Duration of Non-Employment, Legal Jobs, and
Income Crime
Non-Employment 5.469
(0.168)
Income Crime 4.108
(0.096)
Legal Job 7.261
(0.202)
Average Legal Job Duration By Hours Worked
Part-Time 5.560
(0.216)
Full-Time 7.707
(0.151)
Average Legal Job Duration By Type of Legal Job
Manual Occupations 6.351
(0.191)
Skilled Occupations 9.006
(0.222)
Restaurant Worker 5.720
(0.083)
Office Work/Clerical/Telemarketing 6.207
(0.310)
Retail/Cashier 7.180
(0.213)
Managerial/Administrative 14.643
(0.500)
Babysitting/Child Care 12.333
(0.167)
Technical/Professional 11.286
(0.286)
Notes:
1. Durations are in months and include censored spells.
2. Censoring rates are reported in parenthesis.
3. Non-employment refers to periods where the individual is not legally employed, participat-
ing in income crime or in prison.
4. The job type categories are those reported in the survey.
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month with multiple observations for each legally employed individual). Average earnings
in the legal labour sector amount to $1,438/month. This figure is substantially lower than the
average monthly earnings of young individuals in their first job (Bowlus, Kiefer, and Neumann,
2001), but two times larger than the average monthly earnings of a full-time minimum-wage
worker in Philadelphia and Phoenix in 2001.12 There is, not surprisingly, significant variation
in monthly earnings by type of job. Retail and restaurant jobs display the lowest monthly
earnings, while clerical, managerial, and administrative jobs feature average salaries that are at
least 33% higher than the average earnings in the lowest paying jobs.
Table 3.4: Pathways to Desistance - Average Monthly Legal Earnings
Monthly Legal Earnings 1,438.5
(536.1)
Average Monthly Legal Earnings by Type of Job
Manual Occupations 1,449.3
(531.2)
Skilled Occupations 1,651.1
(472.7)
Restaurant Worker 1,133.9
(497)
Office Work/Clerical/Telemarketing 1,447.6
(490.2)
Retail/Cashier 1,151.0
(453.7)
Managerial/Administrative 1,472.4
(488.8)
Babysitting/Child Care 1,799.7
(720.3)
Technical/Professional 1,657.1
(486.8)
Notes:
1. Standard deviations are reported below the mean in parenthesis.
2. Legal earnings are monthly and are expressed in 2000 US dollars.
3. The job type categories are those reported in the survey.
In Table 3.5, I further analyze earnings in the legal labour sector and explore the existence
of returns to experience. I use the natural logarithm of reported hourly wages in the legal
labour sector as the dependent variable. The wage regressions include individual fixed effects
and controls for age, type of legal job, an indicator for part-time jobs, the accumulated criminal
12Bowlus, Kiefer, and Neumann, 2001 report average weekly earnings of $291 and $255 for whites and blacks,
respectively, in the first jobs of young individuals. Using the year 2000 CPI to adjust the figures, average monthly
earnings amount to $1,651 and $1,447 for whites and blacks, respectively. The 2001 state minimum wage was
$5.15 both in Pennsylvania and Arizona, which corresponds to monthly earnings of $775 for a full-time minimum-
wage job.
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record, and an indicator for current participation in the criminal sector.13 Legal labour market
experience is measured in months and it ignores pre-survey experience. The results provide
evidence of small returns to experience in the legal labour sector. An extra month of legal
labour market experience increases hourly earnings by 0.6%. This is consistent with the fact
that these are low-quality jobs, which I expect to feature small or no returns to experience.
The results also confirm that there is significant dispersion in earnings across occupations,
and that hourly wages in part-time jobs are 5.4% lower than in full-time jobs. Lastly, current
participation in crime and accumulated criminal records play no significant role in earnings.
These variables may still play an important role in the rate at which these individuals find jobs
in the legal labour sector. This is explored in the next section.
The analysis indicates that youth previously involved in serious criminal activities face
low-quality employment opportunities in the legal labour sector: legal jobs that do not last
long, offer low wages, and are disproportionately in low-skilled occupations. I now turn to
the alternative employment sector: the criminal sector. Table 3.6 displays the cross-section
distribution of individuals engaged in income crime across types of crime. Drug-related crimes
are the most prevalent among income crimes, followed by stealing merchandise and selling
stolen property. In more than 70% of the individual-month observations in which an individual
is participating in income crime, he is selling drugs. Individuals spend, on average, 4.1 months
engaged in income crime (Table 3.4). This might seem short. However, the average duration
of income crime is somewhat similar to the average duration of legal jobs suggesting that
employment in the legal labour sector and the criminal sector is not that different. Furthermore,
this indicates that these young individuals participate in the criminal sector for consecutive
months.
Table 3.7 provides descriptive statistics on monthly criminal earnings (i.e., one observation
per month with multiple observations for each individual engaged in income crime). There are
several statistics that I want to stress. First, average earnings in the criminal sector amount to
$3,654/month. There is also large variability in the distribution of criminal earnings relative to
monthly legal earnings. Second, average monthly criminal earnings differ significantly depend-
ing on whether the individual engaged in income crime also has a job in the legal labour sector.
Individuals who participate exclusively in income crime make roughly two times more than in-
dividuals who participate simultaneously in the criminal and legal labour sectors. One possible
explanation is that individuals who have a legal job devote less hours to the criminal sector rel-
ative to individuals who concentrate exclusively on income crime.14 Lastly, there is an evident
earnings premium in the criminal sector, relative to the legal labour sector. Average monthly
earnings in the criminal sector are almost three times higher than the mean reported legal earn-
ings. Not surprisingly, some of the gap is driven by a large right tail, although a comparison
of the median rates also reflects the earnings premium ($1,910/month versus $1,375/month).
This characteristic makes the criminal sector quite attractive, and may partly explain why some
individuals choose to participate in the criminal sector despite the risk of incarceration.
13The accumulated criminal record is the sum of official arrests, including arrests that occurred before the
survey.
14The survey does not collect data on hours devoted to crime in a given day or week.
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Table 3.5: Estimated Parameters from Legal Earnings Regressions
Variable Dependent Variable Ln Hourly Wage(Average Hourly Wage = 9.44)
Age -0.006
(0.007)
Legal Labour Market Experience 0.006***
(0.001)
Job Type: Retail/Cashier 0.084***
(0.018)
Job Type: Babysitting/Child Care 0.430***
(0.058)
Job Type: Skilled Occupations 0.250***
(0.014)
Job Type: Manual Occupations 0.192***
(0.013)
Job Type: Office Work/Clerical/Telemarketing 0.174***
(0.019)
Job Type: Managerial/Administrative 0.255***
(0.019)
Job Type: Technical/Professional 0.387***
(0.036)
Currently Engaged in Income Crime 0.011
(0.012)
Part-Time Job -0.054***
(0.009)
Accumulated Criminal Records 0.006
(0.004)
Constant 1.942***
(0.116)
Number of Observations 8,249
R-squared 0.148
Number of Individuals 399
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in parentheses. *** stands for p-value<0.01,
**stands for p-value<0.05, * stands for p-value<0.1.
2. The excluded category for the type of job dummies is restaurant worker.
3. Experience is measured in months and it ignores pre-survey experience. Accumulated criminal
records are the sum of official arrests, including arrests that occurred before the survey.
4. Hourly wages are expressed in 2000 US dollars.
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Table 3.6: Pathways to Desistance - Distribution of Income Crime by Type of Crime
Type of Crime Share
Sell Drugs 0.723
(0.448)
Steal Merchandise 0.297
(0.457)
Buy/Sell Stolen Goods 0.336
(0.472)
Other 0.063
(0.243)
Notes:
1. Standard deviations are reported below the mean in parenthesis.
2. An individual can be engaged in multiple income crime categories.
3. Other income crime includes gambling and prostitution.
Table 3.7: Pathways to Desistance - Average Monthly Criminal Earnings
Monthly Criminal Earnings 3,653.9
(4585.4)
Monthly Criminal Earnings by Legal Employment Status
No Legal Job 4,112.5
(4767.2)
Legal Job 2,098.7
(3488.5)
Notes:
1. Standard deviations are reported below the mean in parenthesis.
2. Criminal earnings are monthly and are expressed in 2000 US dollars.
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In Table 3.8, I explore the existence of returns to experience in the criminal sector, as well
as the role of gang participation and non-income crime on criminal earnings. I use the natural
logarithm of reported weekly criminal earnings as the dependent variable in the regressions.
The regressions include individual fixed effects and controls for age, number of income crime
types the individual is involved in, an indicator for current participation in the legal labour sec-
tor, and the accumulated criminal record.15 Income crime experience is measured in months
and it ignores pre-survey experience. Indicators for gang and non-income crime involvement
during the income crime spell are also included to evaluate their impact on earnings. The re-
sults in column (1) indicate that there are no returns to experience in income crime. In column
(2), I take a closer look at the role of experience in the criminal sector by also accounting for
experience in non-income crime (e.g., violent crime). While experience in income crime is not
relevant for criminal earnings, the results provide suggestive evidence of returns to experience
in non-income crime. An additional month of non-income crime experience increases weekly
criminal earnings by 1.1%. Current participation in non-income crime and accumulated crim-
inal records are not significantly related to the level of criminal earnings. Lastly, the results
suggest that being part of a gang is negatively correlated with criminal earnings. One potential
explanation is that gangs have a revenue-sharing scheme, in which total gains are shared among
gang members (Chang, Lu, and Wang, 2013; Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000).
Overall, the results indicate that young individuals previously involved in serious crimi-
nal activities face two poor-quality employment alternatives in the criminal and legal labour
sectors, which present small or no returns to experience. How individuals move across sectors
presumably depends on how quickly they get opportunities in either sector. A closer look at the
average duration of non-employment (i.e., the time an individual spends without employment
in either sector) can provide suggestive evidence on this. The figures in Table 3.3 indicate
that non-employment lasts, on average, 5.5 months. This average duration refers to periods
when the individual is not working in either sector. Unemployment duration, as it is usually
measured in the search literature (i.e., the time between legal employment spells), averages 6.6
months. These figures suggest that search frictions may be quite prevalent for disadvantaged
young individuals. In particular, opportunities in the criminal and legal labour sectors may not
be readily available, forcing them to wait until they face an attractive enough employment op-
portunity. In the next section, I further explore what are the key factors behind the transitions
across sectors.
3.4 Transitions between the Criminal and Legal Labour Sec-
tor
In this section, I explore the transitions between non-employment, legal employment and in-
come crime using the data described in Section 3.2. For this purpose, I start by explaining how
the transitions between sectors are determined and then present results from a Mixed Propor-
15The accumulated criminal record is computed as the sum of official arrest records. It includes official arrests
that occurred before the survey.
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Table 3.8: Estimated Parameters from Criminal Earnings Regressions
Variable
Dependent Variable Ln Weekly Wage
(Average Weekly Wage = 1,025.5)
(1) (2)
Age 0.046 0.035
(0.033) (0.034)
Income Crime Experience 0.001 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
Currently Have a Legal Job -0.067 -0.058
(0.052) (0.052)
Currently Engaged in Non-Income Crime 0.055 0.059
(0.048) (0.048)
Belongs to a Gang -0.186* -0.170*
(0.106) (0.106)
Number of Crime-Types is Engaged In -0.018 -0.017
(0.045) (0.045)
Non-Income Crime Experience 0.011*
(0.006)
Constant 5.343*** 5.499***
(0.619) (0.624)
Number of Observations 1,433 1,433
R-squared 0.013 0.013
Number of Individuals 165 165
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in parentheses. *** stands for p-value<0.01, **stands
for p-value<0.05, * stands for p-value<0.1.
2. Experience is measured in months and it ignores pre-survey experience. Accumulated criminal records are
the sum of official arrests, including arrests that occurred before the survey.
3. Weekly wages are expressed in 2000 US dollars.
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tional Hazards Competing Risks Model.
Monthly histories are constructed according to the following rules. Based on the major
activity occurring during a particular month, an individual could be in one of the following
five states: incarcerated, non-employed, employed in the legal labour sector, engaged in in-
come crime, or both legally employed and engaged in income crime (employed/crime). The
individual is incarcerated if he spends more than 15 days in jail, detention, or prison in that
month.16 Otherwise, the individual is non-employed, legally employed, engaged in income
crime, or employed/crime. Non-employment is a residual state. An individual is classified as
non-employed if he is not engaged in income crime, legally employed, or incarcerated in a
given month. Note that this definition is different from the standard definition of unemploy-
ment, in which participation in the criminal sector is ignored. This distinction will be key in
the analysis of transitions across sectors.
The monthly transitions are determined based on the five possible states (i.e., non-employment,
legal employment, income crime, employment/crime, and incarceration). An individual makes
a non-employment-to-legal employment transition if he is non-employed in the current month
and legally employed in the next month. An individual makes a non-employment-to-crime
transition if he is non-employed in the current month and engaged in income crime in the next
month. Lastly, he makes a non-employment-to-incarceration transition if the individual is non-
employed in the current month and incarcerated in the next month.17 Monthly transitions for
individuals legally employed, engaged in income crime, employed/crime, or incarcerated, are
defined analogously.18
Table 3.9 illustrates the monthly transitions. There are particular transitions that I want
to emphasize. First, the probability of engaging in income crime is slightly larger for non-
employed individuals relative to individuals employed in the legal labour sector (3.8% against
3.1%). Second, for individuals currently engaged in income crime, the probability of a transi-
tion into legal employment is lower relative to non-employed individuals (4.5% against 8.2%).
One potential explanation for these differences is that there is a negative effect of legal (crimi-
nal) earnings on the transition to income crime (legal employment). Nevertheless, these results
do not control for any heterogeneity across individuals that could be driving this relationship
(e.g., skills, education). I next attempt to understand the key factors behind these transitions.
16Only in 7.4% of the individual-month observations in which the individual reports to be incarcerated, the stay
is shorter than 15 days.
17Non-employment-to-employment/crime and incarceration-to-employment/crime transitions represent less
than 1% of all transitions corresponding to non-employment and incarceration spells. As a result, they are coded
as missing transitions. Consistent with the data, these transitions are zero probability events in the model described
in Chapter 4,
18One potential concern when using monthly transitions is that an individual may be categorized as em-
ployed/crime on a given month when he is really transitioning either from legal employment to crime, or viceversa.
For example, individual A is participating in the criminal sector in month 1, participating in the legal and criminal
sectors in month 2, and participating only in the legal labour sector in month 3. It is likely that the individual is not
really participating simultaneously in the two sectors in month 2, but it is instead a consequence of data aggrega-
tion. To avoid this miss classification, the legal employment-to-crime/employment-to-crime transitions, where the
middle state holds for exactly one month and the individual works for two weeks or less in the legal labour sector
in that month, are re categorized as legal employment-to-crime transitions directly. Crime-to-employment/crime-
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Table 3.9: Pathways to Desistance - Monthly Transitions
From Non-Employment to From Incarceration to
Non-Employment 0.845 Non-Employment 0.041
(0.362) (0.198)
Legal Employment 0.082 Legal Employment 0.010
(0.274) (0.102)
Income Crime 0.035 Income Crime 0.012
(0.184) (0.107)
Incarceration 0.038 Incarceration 0.937
(0.192) (0.243)
From Legal Employment to From Employment/Crime to
Non-Employment 0.061 Non-Employment 0.009
(0.240) (0.094)
Legal Employment 0.899 Legal Employment 0.180
(0.301) (0.385)
Income Crime 0.007 Income Crime 0.069
(0.084) (0.254)
Incarceration 0.009 Incarceration 0.023
(0.092) (0.149)
Employment/Crime 0.024 Employment/Crime 0.719
(0.152) (0.450)
From Income Crime to
Non-Employment 0.114
(0.318)
Legal Employment 0.016
(0.126)
Income Crime 0.739
(0.440)
Incarceration 0.102
(0.303)
Employment/Crime 0.029
(0.168)
Notes:
1. Standard deviations are reported below the mean in parenthesis.
2. Non-employment-to-employment/crime and incarceration-to-employment/crime transitions represent
less than 1% of all transitions corresponding to non-employment and incarceration spells. As a result,
they are coded as missing transitions.
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3.4.1 Mixed Proportional Hazards Competing Risks Model
I analyze the transitions between sectors using the Mixed Proportional Hazards Competing
Risks Model. Consider an individual in spell s for t months (e.g., a non-employment spell
that lasts t months). All individual differences in the exit rate for destination j (e.g., legal
employment) at time t can be characterized by observed characteristics x and unobserved char-
acteristics v j. This implies that the observed and unobserved characteristics of the individual
shift the hazard rate for destination j in a proportional manner irrespective of the time elapsed
since the start of the spell. For simplicity, I assume that there are two possible destinations
for exit (e.g. j = A, B). The exit rates for destinations A and B conditional on x, vA, and vB
are denoted by θA(t|x, vA, vB) and θB(t|x, vA, vB), respectively. These rates are assumed to have a
Mixed Proportional Hazard specification,
θA(t|x, vA, vB) = λA(t)φA(x)vA
θB(t|x, vA, vB) = λB(t)φB(x)vB
in which λA(t) and λB(t) represent the baseline hazards, vA and vB are unobserved correlated
random variables that are distributed independently of x, and φ j(x) = exp(x′β j) for j = (A, B).
Since I have access to multiple spells of type s for a given individual, I assume that the duration
of each spell of type s is governed by the same probability laws and is affected by the same
unobserved explanatory variables. This implies that the unobservables are fixed across spells
of type s for a given individual. Furthermore, I assume that the intervening spells between any
two spells of type s for a single individual are independent of the unobserved characteristics.
I assume an exponential specification for the baseline hazards and a bivariate distribution
with unrestricted mass point locations for the joint cumulative distribution function of the un-
observables. Furthermore, I assume that x does not vary over the spell. Abbring and Van den
Berg (2003) show that all components of the model are identified. They also extend the identi-
fication analysis to the case with multiple-spell data and show that this type of data allows for
identification under much weaker conditions than does single-spell type of data.
For estimation, I use the spell data summarized in Table 3.10. The data comprise 1,291 non-
employment spells, 1,252 legal job spells, 474 income crime spells, 280 crime/employment
spells, and 621 incarceration spells.19 Tables 3.11-3.13 show the results of the model for non-
employment, income crime, and legal employment spells. Each column explores how different
variables affect the hazard rate of leaving the current state into a particular state (e.g., from
income crime to legal employment). Depending on the current state, there are different transi-
tions the individual can make. For example, non-employed individuals can transition into legal
employment, income crime, or incarceration. Instead, individuals who are currently engaged
to-legal employment transitions are recategorized analogously.
19Note that non-employment-to-employment/crime and incarceration-to-employment/crime transitions repre-
sent less than 1% of all transitions corresponding to non-employment and incarceration spells. As a result, they are
coded as missing transitions. Also, legal employment-to-legal employment transitions and employment/crime-to-
employment/crime transitions entail changes in the employer. Lastly, income crime-to-income crime transitions
are zero probability events by construction.
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Table 3.10: Pathways to Desistance - Spell Data Sample Means
Average Duration Average Duration
Non-Employment 5.469 Incarceration 11.962
(6.509) (13.997)
Legal Employment 6.306 Employment/Crime 3.060
(7.485) (3.305)
Income Crime 3.614
Flow from Non-Employment to Flow from Incarceration to
Legal Employment 0.528 Non-Employment 0.650
(0.499) (0.478)
Income Crime 0.226 Legal Employment 0.166
(0.418) (0.372)
Incarceration 0.246 Income Crime 0.184
(0.431) (0.388)
Flow from Legal Employment to Flow from Employment/Crime to
Non-Employment 0.432 Non-Employment 0.029
(0.496) (0.167)
Legal Employment 0.292 Legal Employment 0.586
(0.455) (0.494)
Income Crime 0.050 Income Crime 0.225
(0.218) (0.419)
Incarceration 0.060 Incarceration 0.074
(0.238) (0.262)
Employment/Crime 0.166 Employment/Crime 0.086
(0.373) (0.281)
Flow from Income Crime to
Non-Employment 0.437
(0.497)
Legal Employment 0.061
(0.24)
Incarceration 0.391
(0.488)
Employment/Crime 0.111
(0.314)
Notes:
1. Standard deviations are reported below the mean in parenthesis.
2. Durations are in months and include censored spells.
3. The transition probabilities sum to one since I only consider completed (i.e., uncensored) spells for the
calculation.
4. Non-employment-to-employment/crime and incarceration-to-employment/crime transitions represent less
than 1% of all transitions corresponding to non-employment and incarceration spells. As a result, they are
coded as missing transitions. Legal employment-to-legal employment transitions and employment/crime-to-
employment/crime transitions entail changes in the employer. Income crime-to-income crime transitions are
zero probability events by construction.
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in income crime can transition into non-employment, legal employment, employment/crime,
or incarceration. The possible transitions for each state are specified in the tables.20 The co-
efficients represent the effect on the log hazard rate. In an attempt to account for individual
heterogeneity, each regression includes controls for age, race, location, an indicator for high
school graduation, legal labour sector experience, and experience in income crime.21 I also
include as regressors the estimated cognitive and social/emotional skill factors from Chapter 2.
Since probation and accumulated criminal records are expected to affect the choice of partici-
pating in income crime and/or taking a legal job, I also add these variables as regressors. Lastly,
I include an indicator for participation in non-income crime to evaluate if it has any effect on
the transitions after accounting for engagement in income crime.22 As I do not normalize the
scale of the unobservables, I exclude a constant from the regressors and one category from each
set of dummies.
I start by analyzing the main drivers behind the transitions into income crime. To this end,
I concentrate on non-employment and legal employment spells. The results in Tables 3.11
and 3.12 indicate that, while cognitive skills are not significantly related to income crime par-
ticipation, social/emotional skills show a strong negative correlation with it. A one standard
deviation increase in social/emotional skills leads to a decrease in the hazard rate of income
crime of 41.6% and 49.2% for non-employed and legally employed individuals, respectively.
These results are consistent with the findings in Chapter 2 for violent, drug-related, and prop-
erty crime.
I also account for the role of experience in income crime. The results suggest that an ad-
ditional month of experience in the criminal sector increases the hazard rate of participating in
income crime 6% to 7%. Whereas the results in Section 3.3 provided no evidence of returns to
experience in income crime, criminal experience significantly affects transitions. This suggests
that experience in income crime might be related to participation in income crime in other di-
mensions. For instance, more criminal experience may increase the frequency of opportunities
in the criminal sector.
Since probation is expected to directly alter the hazard rate of entering income crime, for
example via more more supervision by a probation officer, I also include an indicator variable
for probation status. The results suggest that being in probation reduces the hazard rate of
income crime by 46.4% for non-employed individuals. The effect is also negative for legally
employed individuals, although it is not precisely estimated.
The descriptive analysis of transitions in Table 3.9 suggested that earnings in the legal
20In order to focus on the transitions from legal employment to income crime, the legal employment-to-income
crime and legal employment-to-employment/crime transitions are pulled together for the analysis on legal em-
ployment spells (see Table 3.12). Likewise, in order to focus on the transitions from income crime to legal em-
ployment, the income crime-to-legal employment and income crime-to-employment/crime transitions are pulled
together for the analysis on income crime spells (see Table 3.13).
21For time-varying variables, like age and experience, I take the average over the spell. Experience in income
crime and legal employment are measured in months and they ignore pre-survey experience.
22Accumulated criminal records are the sum of official arrests, including arrests that occurred before the survey.
The role of probation and non-income crime is accounted for by including indicators for whether the individual
participated in non-income crime and was in probation at some point during the spell.
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Table 3.11: Estimated Parameters from Mixed Proportional Hazards Competing Risks Model
- Non-Employment Spells
(1) (2) (3)
Variable LegalEmployment Income Crime Incarceration
Age -0.167*** -0.086 0.055
(0.048) (0.075) (0.049)
Black 0.020 -0.463 0.832**
(0.206) (0.317) (0.359)
Hispanic -0.001 -0.500** 0.496*
(0.159) (0.248) (0.301)
Philadelphia -0.416*** -0.082 -0.649***
(0.162) (0.266) (0.261)
Cognitive Skills 0.396 0.419 0.320
(0.270) (0.404) (0.391)
Social/Emotional Skills 0.314** -0.945*** -0.181
(0.160) (0.268) (0.199)
High School Graduate -0.002 -0.065 0.133
(0.164) (0.261) (0.244)
Legal Labour Market Experience 0.026*** -0.031*** -0.005
(0.007) (0.013) (0.010)
Income Crime Experience -0.002 0.060*** 0.024*
(0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
Accumulated Criminal Records -0.032 0.036 0.152***
(0.021) (0.030) (0.030)
In Probation 0.054 -0.464** -0.085
(0.133) (0.200) (0.196)
Engaged in Non-Income Crime -0.708*** -0.289 -0.188
(0.143) (0.257) (0.180)
Number of Observations 1,055 1,055 1,055
Number of Failures 467 193 217
Notes:
1. The coefficients represent the effect on the log hazard rate. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results
corresponding to the hazard rate of legal employment, income crime, and incarceration, respectively, for non-
employed individuals.
2. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in parentheses. *** stands for p-value<0.01, **
stands for p-value<0.05, * stands for p-value<0.1.
3. Age and experience are averages over spells. Experience is measured in months and it ignores pre-survey
experience. Accumulated criminal records are the sum of official arrests, including arrests that ocurred before
the survey. The cognitive skills and non-cognitive (social/emotional) skills estimates come from the factor
analysis in Chapter 2.
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Table 3.12: Estimated Parameters from Mixed Proportional Hazards Competing Risks Model
- Legal Employment Spells
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Non-Employment
Legal Em-
ployment
Income
Crime Incarceration
Age -0.019 -0.139*** -0.138*** 0.191***
(0.019) (0.027) (0.040) (0.071)
Black -0.167 -0.296 -0.143 0.908
(0.207) (0.304) (0.378) (0.662)
Hispanic -0.137 -0.205 -0.173 0.537
(0.162) (0.239) (0.301) (0.510)
Philadelphia 0.437*** -0.305 0.289 -0.638
(0.170) (0.252) (0.321) (0.659)
Cognitive Skills -0.110 0.006 0.621 0.524
(0.332) (0.401) (0.487) (0.84)
Social/Emotional Skills -0.081 -0.084 -1.117*** 0.327
(0.188) (0.254) (0.387) (0.527)
High School Graduate -0.350** -0.290 -0.040 -0.085
(0.167) (0.220) (0.262) (0.643)
Legal Labour Experience -0.020*** 0.014*** 0.001 -0.034**
(0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017)
Income Crime Experience -0.011 -0.002 0.069*** -0.020
(0.016) (0.018) (0.003) (0.050)
ln(Monthly Legal Earnings) -0.728*** -0.661*** -0.241*** -0.549
(0.088) (0.123) (0.094) (0.375)
Accumulated Criminal Records 0.004 0.019 -0.009 0.124*
(0.027) (0.030) (0.045) (0.071)
Engaged in Non-Income Crime -0.508** -1.038*** -0.310 0.219
(0.226) (0.267) (0.253) (0.598)
In Probation -0.245 0.202 -0.118 1.462***
(0.185) (0.200) (0.216) (0.394)
Number of Observations 1,069 1,069 1,069 1,069
Number of Failures 405 276 204 57
Notes:
1. The coefficients represent the effect on the log hazard rate. Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) present the results
corresponding to the hazard rate of non-employment, legal employment (exclusive participation in the legal
labour sector), crime (with or without employment in the legal labour sector), and incarceration, respectively,
for individuals employed in the legal labour sector exclusively.
2. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in parentheses. *** stands for p-value<0.01, **
stands for p-value<0.05, * stands for p-value<0.1.
3. Age, experience, and earnings are averages over spells. Experience is measured in months and it ignores
pre-survey experience. Accumulated criminal records are the sum of official arrests, including arrests that
ocurred before the survey. The cognitive skills and non-cognitive (social/emotional) skills estimates come
from the factor analysis in Chapter 2.
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labour sector may play an important role in the decision to participate in income crime. The
results in Table 3.12 are consistent with this, as the sign of legal earnings is negative and
significant for the hazard rate of entering income crime from legal employment. In particular,
a 10% increase in monthly legal earnings reduces the hazard rate of entering income crime by
2.4%.
Lastly, since the analysis focuses on income crime, I also included an indicator for par-
ticipation in non-income crime (e.g., violent crime) in the regressions for non-employment
and legal employment spells, to evaluate if this activity plays any role in the transitions of
individuals not currently engaged in income crime. The results indicate that participation in
non-income crime does not affect the transition to income crime. Of particular interest are the
transitions from non-employment and legal employment into incarceration. One could expect,
for example, that non-employed individuals or legally employed individuals who currently par-
ticipate in non-income crime are more prone to be incarcerated than those who do not engage
in these type of crimes. The results suggest that, after accounting for participation in income
crime, engagement in non-income crime does not play a significant role in the transitions to
incarceration.
I now analyze the main factors behind the transition into the legal labour sector. I focus
on non-employment and income crime spells (Tables 3.11 and 3.13). Consistent with what
one would expect, I find that higher cognitive and social/emotional skills increase the hazard
rate of taking a legal job. The results for non-employed individuals imply that a one standard
deviation increase in social/emotional skills leads to an 13.8% increase in the hazard rate of
taking a job in the legal labour sector. The effects of cognitive skills are imprecisely estimated.
I also examine the effect of legal labour market experience on the hazard rate of legal
employment. Despite having a small effect on legal earnings, experience in the legal labour
sector is strongly related to the transition to legal employment. I find that an additional month
of legal labour market experience increases the hazard rate of legal employment by 2.6% for
non-employed individuals. The effect is positive and not precise for the income crime-to-legal
employment transition.
A somewhat surprising result is that the accumulated criminal records play no significant
role on the transitions to the legal labour sector, since criminal records are viewed as a barrier
to legal employment in the literature. One explanation for this finding is that the distribution of
accumulated criminal record is shifted to the right, relative to the general youth population (i.e.,
everybody has been arrested at least once). This suggests that conditional on being arrested
once, an additional arrest has no significant effect on legal employment.
With regards to the effect of criminal earnings on the hazard rate of legal employment, the
results in Table 3.13 indicate that the probability that an income crime spell ends in a legal
job significantly decreases with monthly criminal earnings. Specifically, a 10% increase in
monthly criminal earnings reduces the hazard rate of an income crime-to-legal employment
transition by 5.3%.
Altogether, there are some important messages from the analysis on transitions across sec-
tors. First, I find that individual heterogeneity is strongly related to criminal and legal employ-
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Table 3.13: Estimated Parameters from Mixed Proportional Hazards Competing Risks Model
- Income Crime Spells
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Non-Employment
Legal
Employment Incarceration
Age -0.013 -0.173 0.060
(0.113) (0.216) (0.080)
Black -0.821*** 0.355 -0.309
(0.347) (1.355) (0.361)
Hispanic -0.004 -0.322 -0.298
(0.389) (0.667) (0.322)
Philadelphia 0.439 -0.590 -0.193
(0.380) (1.430) (0.338)
Cognitive Skills 0.878* 0.945 0.280
(0.500) (1.044) (0.475)
Social/Emotional Skills -0.186 -0.483 -0.026
(0.415) (0.704) (0.265)
High School Graduate -0.623 -0.162 0.428
(0.418) (0.580) (0.305)
Legal Labour Market Experience -0.036* 0.039 -0.004
(0.020) (0.029) (0.013)
Income Crime Experience 0.001 -0.015 0.003
(0.017) (0.029) (0.010)
ln(Monthly Criminal Earnings) -0.377*** -0.531*** 0.201***
(0.109) (0.171) (0.086)
Accumulated Criminal Records -0.087* -0.036 0.063**
(0.052) (0.091) (0.030)
Engaged in Non-Income Crime -0.883*** -1.040* -0.289
(0.260) (0.543) (0.221)
In Probation -0.263 0.358 0.163
(0.282) (0.531) (0.225)
Belongs to a Gang -0.212 0.110 0.368
(0.413) (2.102) (0.307)
Number of Observations 238 238 238
Number of Failures 71 32 113
Notes:
1. The coefficients represent the effect on the log hazard rate. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results
corresponding to the hazard rate of non-employment, legal employment (with or without participation in the
criminal sector), and incarceration, respectively, for individuals participating in income crime exclusively.
2. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in parentheses. *** stands for p-value<0.01, **
stands for p-value<0.05, * stands for p-value<0.1.
3. Age, experience, and earnings are averages over spells. Experience is measured in months and it ignores
pre-survey experience. Accumulated criminal records are the sum of official arrests, including arrests that
ocurred before the survey. The cognitive skills and non-cognitive (social/emotional) skills estimates come
from the factor analysis in Chapter 2.
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ment behaviour. In particular, social/emotional skills are important drivers of the hazard rate
of entering income crime, and both cognitive and social/emotional skills are key aspects of
the hazard rate of entering legal employment. Second, while the analysis in Section 3.3 pro-
vided evidence of small returns to experience in the criminal and legal labour sectors, higher
experience in a given sector plays a significant role for transitions to the corresponding sector.
This indicates that experience is potentially less important for these two low-quality activities
relative to high-skilled activities. Nevertheless, experience can still be relevant for other di-
mensions beyond earnings. Lastly, the criminal and legal labour sectors are strongly related.
Overall, higher earnings in a given sector reduce the chances of accepting offers in the alter-
native employment sector. This suggests that income crime choice should not be analyzed
in isolation from the legal employment, and viceversa. Since the criminal sector appears as
an alternative to the legal labour sector, especially for disadvantaged young individuals, an
appropriate approach is to study these two sectors jointly.
3.5 Conclusions
Youth unemployment and youth crime are two phenomenon that are disproportionately con-
centrated among disadvantaged young individuals. In this chapter, I characterize the criminal
and legal labour sectors and empirically investigate the factors driving the transitions between
sectors for a particular disadvantaged population group: young offenders. For this purpose, I
use a unique dataset of young offenders: the Pathways to Desistance. The extensive data avail-
able on legal employment and crime participation allow me to provide a thorough description
of what the labour market looks like for these individuals.
I find that young individuals previously involved in serious criminal activities face two
poor-quality employment alternatives in the criminal and legal labour sectors. Legal jobs fea-
ture low wages, are in disproportionately low-skilled occupations, and do not tend to last.
Income crime activity shows similar characteristics, although this sector offers an earnings
premium to compensate for its risk. Consistent with their low quality, both sectors present
small or no returns to experience.
The transitions across the criminal and legal labour sectors are strongly related to individual
heterogeneity. In particular, I find an important role of social/emotional skills for income crime
choice, and that both cognitive and social/emotional skills are key aspects of the legal employ-
ment choice. I show that, despite not being related to earnings in the corresponding sector,
higher experience in a given sector plays a significant role in transitions. Finally, I document
that the criminal and legal labour sectors are strongly related. For instance, higher criminal
earnings reduce the chances of accepting legal job offers. A similar relation is found between
current legal earnings and the hazard of entering income crime. Overall, this suggests that
legal employment and crime choices should be studied jointly. Among disadvantaged young
individuals, the criminal sector appears as an alternative to the legal labour sector. Therefore,
legal employment or crime choices should not be analyzed without considering the alternative
employment sector.
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Lastly, it is important to stress that I study youth who have already committed somewhat se-
rious criminal offenses. Although this is a particularly relevant group to study, as they represent
a large proportion of youth crime and disproportionately contribute to youth unemployment,
there are some caveats related to focusing on this specific group. One implication is that my
results do not necessarily generalize to the youth population at large. In this sense, some of
the factors that cause these individuals to transition into crime or legal employment may not be
relevant for disadvantaged young individuals who have never participated in crime.
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Chapter 4
A Search Model of Early Employment
Careers and Youth Crime
4.1 Introduction
The school to work transition and the early career path can be a difficult one for young people,
especially among the low-educated. These disadvantaged individuals tend to have low em-
ployment rates, experience long periods of unemployment before their first job, and face lower
wages than their older counterparts (Wolpin, 1987; Eckstein and Wolpin, 1995; Bowlus, Kiefer,
and Neumann, 2001). These circumstances motivate the public sector to assign many resources
to training and education programs (e.g., the Job Corps), wage subsidies, and job search as-
sistance programs (Katz, 1996; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999), with the objective of
improving the labour market outcomes of disadvantaged youth.
One reason why the public sector focuses on reducing unemployment and enhancing wages
among disadvantaged young individuals is to prevent criminal activity.1 The standard economic
model of criminal behaviour predicts that an increase in job availability in the legal labour
sector reduces the amount of time devoted to crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973). Moreover,
the empirical evidence finds a strong association between unemployment and criminal activity
(Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard, 2002; Lochner, 2004), as
well as low wages and crime (Grogger, 1998; Machin and Meghir, 2004; Kling, 2006).
Not surprisingly, a large fraction of the disadvantaged youth are engaged in crime. The
literature has documented that crime is widespread among young low-educated males in poor
urban areas (Freeman, 2000; Raphael and Sills, 2007). Many make money from illegal activ-
ities, and some even have a career in crime, spending most of their time engaged in criminal
activities. Around 30% of low-educated young males in the United States reported an income
from crime in 1980 (Lochner, 2004). The extensive involvement of young men in crime im-
1Another concern in the literature is that unemployment during youth may contribute to unemployment and
low wage rates later in life (Freeman and Wise, 1982).
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poses a cost on the victims of crime and it urges the government to devote significant resources
to crime prevention. In 2003, the United States expenditures on police protection, judicial ac-
tivities, and corrections amounted to a record $185 billion, accounting for 7.2% of all State and
local public expenditures (Hughes, 2006).
The linkages between the criminal and legal labour sectors were also documented in the
Chapter 3. In particular, I showed that the probability of engaging in income crime is slightly
larger for non-employed individuals relative to individuals employed in the legal labour sector.
Second, for individuals currently engaged in income crime, the probability of a transition into
legal employment is lower relative to non-employed individuals. Furthermore, higher criminal
earnings reduce the chances of accepting legal job offers. A similar relation is found between
current legal earnings and the hazard of entering income crime.
Despite the strong links between criminal activity and the legal labour sector, the youth
labour market for disadvantaged individuals has been studied focusing primarily on the legal
labour sector, ignoring the criminal sector. Neglecting this alternative employment sector may
lead to inaccurate predictions of youth behaviour, especially among disadvantaged groups.
Since crime provides an alternative to the legal labour sector, choices in the criminal sector
may have an impact on choices in the legal labour sector, and the other way around. Young
individuals that are making money in the criminal sector, for example, may not be searching
for legal jobs.
Failing to account for the trade-offs between the criminal and legal labour sectors may also
have implications for policy makers interested in boosting legal employment among disadvan-
taged youth. For instance, individuals who have a career in the criminal sector may respond
to a policy that raises earnings in the legal labour sector (e.g., a wage subsidy) in a different
manner than individuals who do not participate in crime, because their outside option is differ-
ent. Active criminals presumably have less incentives to take a legal job, and as a consequence,
what helps to boost youth legal employment at large, may not be as useful for increasing legal
employment for disadvantaged youth who participate in crime.
In this chapter, I characterize both the legal labour sector and the criminal sector for disad-
vantaged youth in the context of a two-sector search model.2 The search framework is well-
suited to this type of study because it brings together some key features, like the long periods
of non-employment and the large fraction of youth making money from crime, and ties them
to frictions and earnings differences in the criminal and legal labour sectors. I model the le-
gal labour sector using a standard setup with on-the-job search (Mortensen, 1986) in order to
capture wage growth across legal job spells. I model participation in the criminal sector as
self-employment since it is uncommon to have an employer in this sector, and I cannot eas-
ily establish a change in careers within the criminal sector as I can in the legal labour sector.
The model includes criminal earnings shocks to capture the earnings dispersion within a crime
spell. The criminal earnings shocks result in a new stream of criminal earnings and the option
2Two-sector search models have been used in the literature to study formal and informal labour sectors (Al-
brecht, Navarro, and Vroman, 2009; Cano-Urbina, 2015), wage-employment and self-employment (Lain, 2016;
Narita, 2012), public and private labour sectors (Albrecht, Robayo-Abril, and Vroman, 2017), and dual labour
markets (Albrecht and Vroman, 1992).
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to exit crime. Consistent with what I documented empirically in Chapter 3, modeling crime
in this way yields spells of criminal activity rather than isolated acts of crime. Lastly, since
disadvantaged youth often participate in the criminal and legal labour sectors at the same time
(Freeman, 2000), I extend the two-sector search model to allow individuals to simultaneously
hold a legal job and participate in crime. While previous search models allow for multiple ac-
tivities at the household level, none, to the best of my knowledge, allow for multiple activities
at the individual level (i.e., multiple job holding).3
The framework closest to mine is that of Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003, 2004).4 In
their setup, unemployed and legally employed individuals receive offers from the legal labour
sector and also encounter crime opportunities. A crime opportunity is a sporadic event that can
end in jail. In their model, the legal labour sector has implications for the choice of whether to
engage in crime, as individuals with higher wages are less likely to commit crimes due to higher
opportunity costs of getting caught and sent to prison. However, there are no direct effects of the
criminal sector on the legal labour sector, since crime is modeled as an instantaneous activity.5
In comparison, my model allows for a much richer set of interactions between the two sectors,
which are key to understanding how disadvantaged young individuals make choices across
sectors. The criminal sector can affect the legal labour sector in two main ways. First, crime
takes time that has to be re-allocated from leisure or legal employment. For large enough
criminal earnings, individuals will quit their legal jobs to focus on the criminal sector. Second,
crime is allowed to affect offer rates, destruction rates, and incarceration rates, to capture, for
example, how criminal activity affects the possibilities of finding or keeping a legal job. In fact,
I find that the arrival rate of legal job offers for individuals participating in crime is roughly
half that of individuals who do not participate in crime.
Estimation of my model requires comprehensive information on participation in the crimi-
nal and legal labour sectors that enables the construction of legal job and crime spells. There-
fore, the data on criminal and legal labour sectors participation needs to be collected as an event
history, allowing me to determine whether an individual was engaged in a particular activity
for a specific period of time. The model further requires detailed information on both criminal
and legal earnings.
To meet these needs, I take advantage of a unique panel dataset, the Pathways to Desistance
Study (PDS). The PDS is a multi-site longitudinal study of young offenders as they transition
from adolescence into early adulthood in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Phoenix, Arizona.
It was designed specifically to study questions related to the evolution of criminal behaviour,
3See for example, Dey and Flinn (2008); Guler, Guvenen, and Violante (2012), and Flabbi and Mabli (2018).
These papers develop a household search model where none, one, or both spouses can be employed.
4Other theoretical models of crime and legal employment that use a search framework include Engelhardt,
Rocheteau, and Rupert (2008), Huang, Laing, and Wang (2004), and Chang, Lu, and Wang (2013). Building
on Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2004, 2003), Engelhardt (2010) provides empirical estimates of the effects of
employment frictions on crime, while Braun (2018) adapts the search model to quantify the effects of changing
the minimum wage. Other models of crime and legal employment that do not use a search framework include
I˙mrohorog˘lu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004); Imai and Krishna (2004); Lochner (2004); Mocan, Billups, and Overland
(2005), and Sickles and Williams (2008). For papers focusing specifically on youth see Munyo (2015) and Merlo
and Wolpin (2015).
5There is still an opportunity cost due to the possibility of getting caught and sent to jail.
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taking special care to also measure employment in the legal labour sector. The survey covers
youth who were found guilty of a serious criminal offense committed between the ages of
14 and 18. These young individuals are a very disadvantaged group, with a large share of
minorities and low-educated individuals. Each participant was followed for a period of seven
years, which results in a comprehensive picture of life changes in a wide array of areas over
the course of this time. The dataset contains a rich panel of information about decisions to
participate in the legal labour sector and the criminal sector, as well as detailed information of
transitions between the two sectors. As a result, the PDS is especially well-suited for estimating
my model and helping to understand the interactions between the criminal and legal labour
sectors.
Most studies that analyze the criminal and the legal labour sector jointly use more common
datasets such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), which samples the pop-
ulation at large.6 Instead, the PDS concentrates on young offenders. One advantage of using
this survey is that I can focus on a group that is rarely studied but contributes significantly to
aggregate crime rates. Another advantage is that I can concentrate on a group of individuals
who are fairly active in both the criminal and legal labour sectors, which helps to develop a
better understanding of the interactions across the two sectors. The PDS also has very detailed
information regarding participation in the criminal sector that allows me to construct complete
spells in the criminal sector, such as earnings data, and the number of weeks participating in
crime in a given month.7
I estimate my model separately for each location using Indirect Inference. As a preview
of my results, I find that individuals in the PDS face considerable search frictions in the legal
labour sector. I estimate that individuals in Philadelphia who do not have a legal job and do
not participate in crime, receive a legal job offer every 14 months, on average, which is twice
as long as is usually estimated in the literature for youth.8 These individuals are offered low-
quality legal jobs that are characterized by short durations, low earnings, and large destruction
rates. The criminal sector offers an earnings premium relative to the legal labour sector, which
makes it an attractive alternative. Nevertheless, crime brings a higher probability of incarcera-
tion and fewer opportunities in the legal labour sector. I find that there are sizable interactions
across sectors, and that policies in one sector can have important effects on the other sector. I
provide evidence that policies targeting the legal labour sector (e.g., wage subsidy) can reduce
crime and boost legal employment among disadvantaged youth. Furthermore, a policy that
reduces the arrival rate of crime opportunities (e.g., via increasing the number of police), com-
6Some papers that use the NLSY79 to study the criminal and legal labour sectors include Lochner (2004);
Engelhardt (2010); Grogger (1998). Merlo and Wolpin (2015) use the NLSY97. Another dataset often used in
the literature is the Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study (Imai and Krishna, 2004; Sickles and Williams, 2008).
7Both the NLSY79 and NLSY97 record detailed data on participation in the legal labour sector. Regarding
crime data, the NLSY79 collects, only at one specific survey, a number of questions about participation in crime
and delinquent activities. While the NLSY97 collects information on crime participation at every survey, the
data do not permit the creation of an event history at a monthly level since the survey gathers information on the
number of times individuals participated in a given criminal activity since the date of last interview (i.e., during
the last year). Being able to construct a monthly event history (or smaller frequency) is necessary to fully capture
the transitions and interactions across sectors.
8For empirical estimates of standard search models of the youth legal labour market see the survey by Eckstein
and Van den Berg (2007).
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pared to extending the average sentence length, has the advantage of reducing crime without
generating large increases in the incarcerated population.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, I develop the model. In
Section 4.3, I present the estimation results from the model. In Section 4.4, I discuss some
policy simulations. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model
The framework is a two-sector search model. The first sector is a standard legal labour sector
(Mortensen, 1986). The second sector is a criminal sector modeled as self-employment. This
is consistent with the nature of crime, where individuals usually work for themselves rather
than for an employer. Following much of the empirical search literature, I adopt a partial
equilibrium framework (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Mortensen, 1986).
The economy is populated by a continuum of homogeneous, risk-neutral, and infinitely-
lived workers, who maximize the discounted stream of expected lifetime utility. Time is con-
tinuous and individuals discount the future with interest rate r. The state variables upon which
workers make decisions include the employment state, legal earnings w, and criminal earnings
y. At each point in time individuals can be non-employed, legally employed, devoted to income
crime, participating in both sectors, or incarcerated. Let the value functions of each state be
represented by Vne, Ve(w), Vc(y), Vec(w, y), and J, respectively.
I extend the two-sector search model to allow for simultaneous participation in both sectors.
To this end, I introduce an intensive margin of labour supply. Hours worked in the criminal
and legal labour sectors are denoted as hc and he, respectively, and l ∈ (0, 1) stands for leisure,
where l = 1 − he − hc. Hours worked in a given sector are equal to 23 and 13 when the activity
is full-time and part-time, respectively. I assume that legal employment and income crime
are full-time activities when the individual is fully devoted to either sector. Therefore, the
individual partly benefits from leisure if he only participates in one sector (l = 13 ). If the
individual participates in both sectors simultaneously, the legal employment and income crime
are full-time and part-time activities, respectively.9 In this case, the individual does not benefit
from leisure (l = 0).
Individuals draw from a legal earnings offer distribution F(w) with mean µw and variance
σ2w. Monthly legal earnings equal the product of w times the hours worked in the legal labour
sector. Legal job offers arrive at rate λ. If an individual accepts the offer, the monthly legal
earnings remain constant for the duration of the job. As is standard in the literature, the model
allows for on-the-job search in the legal labour sector to account for earnings growth across
legal job spells.
9This is consistent with the facts observed in the data used for the empirical analysis: 73% of the individual-
month observations in which the individual is employed in the legal labour sector, he does so on a full time basis.
The survey does not collect data on hours devoted to income crime.
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In addition, individuals take draws from a criminal earnings offer distribution M(y) with
mean µy and variance σ2y . Monthly criminal earnings equal the product of y times the hours
devoted to income crime. The opportunities in the criminal sector arrive at rate η. In order
to capture earnings variation in the criminal sector, the model allows for criminal earnings
shocks in which the individual takes a new draw from M(y).10 If the individual accepts an
income crime opportunity, the monthly criminal earnings remain constant within a spell until a
criminal earnings shock arrives. The individual then chooses whether to exit income crime, or
to continue with the new stream of criminal earnings. Besides the criminal earnings, individuals
that participate in the criminal sector benefit from non-pecuniary benefits from income crime
(αc).11
The model incorporates the possibility of incarceration. An individual can be incarcerated
in any state.12 When incarcerated, the individual waits to be released at a given rate. The model
also allows for the exogenous destruction of legal jobs and income crime.
The arrival rates of legal job offers (λ), income crime opportunities and criminal earnings
shocks (η), incarceration (pi), exogenous separations from income crime (τ), exogenous sep-
arations from legal jobs (δ), and releases from incarceration (κ) are all Poison processes that
depend on the current state. The superscripts in the arrival rates index the current state.
The value of non-employment equals the flow utility of leisure (αl), plus the expected
value of changing labour market status. Non-employed individuals are subject to legal job
offers drawn from F(w) at rate λne. If the individual accepts the offer, he transitions into legal
employment. Individuals also face income crime opportunities drawn from M(y) at rate ηne.
If the individual takes the opportunity, he transitions into income crime. Lastly, the individual
is incarcerated and sent to jail at rate pine. The flow Bellman equation for a non-employed
individual is
(r + λne + ηne + pine)Vne = αl + λne
∫
max
[
Ve(x),Vne
]
dF(x) (4.1)
+ηne
∫
max
[
Vc(x),Vne
]
dM(x) + pineJ.
The value of legal employment equals the corresponding flow utility of leisure (αl) and
legal earnings (w) plus the expected value of receiving a new legal job offer at rate λe, plus
the expected value of receiving an income crime opportunity at rate ηe, plus the expected value
of an exogenous termination at rate δe, plus the expected value of incarceration at rate pie.
Different from non-employed individuals, upon accepting an income crime opportunity, legal
10Allowing for criminal earnings shocks is one way to account for earnings changes in the sector. The model
does not allow for on-the-crime search (i.e., analogous to on-the-job search) in the criminal sector, since it is not
trivial to determine career changes in the data for the criminal sector, where there are no labour contracts, and
there are usually no employers.
11Non-pecuniary benefits in the legal labour sector are normalized to zero.
12The incarceration rate is allowed to be positive for individuals who are not currently participating in income
crime to account for incarcerations that occur as a consequence of past criminal activities or other criminal activ-
ities not described in the model.
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workers must also decide whether to participate only in the criminal sector or to split their
time between the criminal and legal labour sectors.13 Legal workers also face an exogenous
job-destruction rate. In this case, the individual transitions into non-employment. The flow
Bellman equation for a legal worker who works at a firm offering legal earnings w is
(r + λe + ηe + pie + δe)Ve(w) = (1 − he)αl + hew + δeVne + λe
∫
max
[
Ve(x),Ve(w)
]
dF(x) (4.2)
+ηe
∫
max
[
Vc(x),Vec(w, x),Ve(w)
]
dM(x) + pieJ.
The value of income crime equals the corresponding flow utility of leisure (αl), plus pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from income crime (y + αc), plus the expected value of
changing labour market status. Similar to legal workers, they face offers in the legal labour
sector, an exogenous destruction rate, and an incarceration rate. Different from legal workers,
individuals participating in income crime face criminal earnings shocks at rate ηc. In this case,
the current level of criminal earnings is no longer available, and the individual has to choose
between non-employment and the new stream of criminal earnings. The flow Bellman equation
for an individual devoted to income crime with criminal earnings y is
(r + λc + ηc + pic + τc)Vc(y) = (1 − hc)αl + hc(y + αc) + λc
∫
max
[
Ve(x),Vec(x, y),Vc(y)
]
dF(x) (4.3)
+ηc
∫
max
[
Vc(x),Vne
]
dM(x) + τcVne + picJ.
The value of participating simultaneously in the criminal and legal labour sectors equals
the flow utility of legal earnings (w), plus pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from income
crime (y+αc), plus the expected value of receiving a legal job offer at rate λec, plus the expected
value of facing a criminal earnings shock at rate ηec , plus the expected value of an exogenous
termination from income crime and legal jobs at rates τec and δec, respectively, plus the expected
value of incarceration at rate piec. Different from individuals who only participate in income
crime, individuals participating in both sectors do not have leisure time. In addition, they have
four alternatives when they face a criminal earnings shock. Specifically, the individual has to
decide between taking the new stream of criminal earnings, taking the new stream of criminal
earnings and quitting the legal job, keeping the legal job and quitting crime, or exiting to non-
employment. The flow Bellman equation for an individual participating in both sectors with
legal earnings w and criminal earnings y is
13The legal job is full time regardless of whether the worker participates or not in income crime. Note that in
the model, individuals are not allowed to work on a part-time basis in the legal labour sector.
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(r + λec + ηec + piec + δec + τec)Vec(w, y) = hew + hc(y + αc) (4.4)
+λec
∫
max
[
Vec(x, y),Ve(x),Vec(w, y)
]
dF(x)
+ηec
∫
max
[
Vec(w, x),Vc(x),Ve(w),Vne
]
dM(x)
+δec max[Vc(y),Vne] + τec max[Ve(w),Vne] + piecJ.
Lastly, the value of jail equals the flow utility of incarceration (α j) plus the expected value
of being released at rate κ and facing an immediate legal job offer or income crime opportu-
nity with probabilities ρe and ρc, respectively. The flow Bellman equation for an incarcerated
individual is
(r + κ)J = α j + κ
[
(1 − ρe − ρc)Vne + ρe
∫
max[Ve(x),Vne]dF(x) + ρc
∫
max[Vc(x),Vne]dM(x)
]
. (4.5)
4.2.1 Analysis of model properties
Individuals maximize future expected utility and decide whether to accept a legal job and par-
ticipate in income crime by following a set of reservation rules. In this subsection, I define
such reservation rules and discuss the main properties of the model.
I first consider the reservation legal earnings of non-employed individuals, and individuals
participating in income crime. Since Ve(w) is a continuous and increasing function in w and Vne
does not depend on w, a non-employed individual only accepts legal job offers that are at least
as good as the reservation legal earnings denoted by w∗, and determined by Ve(w∗) = Vne.14
An individual engaged in income crime with criminal earnings y only accepts legal job offers
that are at least as good as the reservation legal earnings denoted by w¯(y) and determined by
max {Vec(w¯, y), Ve(w¯)} = Vc(y).15 The reservation legal earnings of non-employed individuals
and individuals participating in income crime are represented in Figure 4.1. The main conclu-
sion that emerges from the figure is the positive dependence between criminal earnings and the
reservation legal earnings for individuals participating in income crime. This implies that, the
higher the criminal earnings, the higher the legal earnings required to accept a legal job offer. It
is therefore important to distinguish between non-employment and income crime for the transi-
tions across sectors. How individuals spend their time (e.g., participate or not in income crime)
has implications for the employment choice in the legal labour sector. In a similar fashion,
I can compare the reservation criminal earnings of non-employed individuals and individuals
employed in the legal labour sector.16
14The non-employment reservation legal earnings (w∗) are also used for other choices: individuals who are
released from jail and immediately receive a legal job offer and individuals participating in both sectors who are
exogenously separated from crime.
15For individuals employed in the legal labour sector or participating in both sectors, the reservation legal
earnings at which they are indifferent between accepting another legal job and staying with the current legal job
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Figure 4.1: Reservation Legal Earnings for Individuals Participating in Income Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the estimates from the baseline model in Table 4.3.
2. The reservation legal earnings curve (solid line) represents the minimum level of legal earnings required to
accept the job offer by individuals participating in income crime.
3. As a benchmark, the reservation legal earnings for unemployed individuals is shown (dotted line).
The set of legal job offers accepted by individuals engaged in income crime can be further
decomposed to account for the other decisions faced by them. Namely, individuals partici-
pating in income crime who accept a legal job offer, can either participate in both sectors or
quit income crime. In Figure 4.2, the reservation legal earnings of individuals participating
in income crime, as well as the reservation legal earnings that determines whether individuals
participate in both sectors or quit income crime (second reservation legal earnings), are shown.
The main conclusion is that individuals will not necessarily quit income crime when accepting
a legal job offer. Individuals accept any offer above the reservation legal earnings, but they only
quit income crime if the offer exceeds the second reservation legal earnings value. The set of
income crime opportunities accepted by individuals employed in the legal labour sector can be
decomposed in a similar way.
is their current level of legal earnings.
16Given that Vc(y) is a continuous and increasing function in y and Vne does not depend on y, an non-employed
individual only accepts income crime opportunities that are at least as good as the reservation criminal earnings
denoted by y∗, and determined by Vc(y∗) = Vne. The non-employment reservation criminal earnings are also used
by individuals who are released from jail that immediately receive an income crime opportunity, individuals par-
ticipating in both sectors who are exogenously separated from the legal labour sector, and individuals participating
in income crime that face a criminal earnings shock.
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Figure 4.2: Decomposition of the Reservation Legal Earnings for Individuals Participating in
Income Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the estimates from the baseline model in Table 4.3.
2. The solid curve represents the minimum level of legal earnings required to accept the job offer. The dashed
curve represents the minimum level of legal earnings required to accept the offer and quit crime.
4.2.2 Estimation
The set of parameters to estimate (θ) includes the mobility parameters (λne, λe, λc, λec, ηne, ηe,
ηc, ηec, δe, δec, τc, τec, pine, pie, pic, piec, κ, ρe, and ρc), the flow utility parameters (αl, αc, and α j),
and the earnings distributions parameters (µw, µy, σw, and σy). The monthly interest rate is set
to 0.4%, yielding a real annual interest rate of 5%.
The model is estimated using the spell data from the Pathways to Desistance described in
Chapter 3. It is estimated separately for each location via Indirect Inference (Gourieroux, Mon-
fort, and Renault, 1993).17 The idea behind this method is to find a set of structural parameters
that minimize the distance between a set of moments from the real data and the data simulated
using the model and the values of the parameters. The moments used for the estimation help
to identify the parameters and capture the main features of the model.
I assume that the legal and criminal earnings distributions are log normal. The parameters
of the earnings distribution F(w) are then identified from the accepted legal earnings informa-
tion. Similarly, the parameters of the criminal earnings distribution M(y) are identified from
data on accepted criminal earnings. Hence, I use the first and second moments of accepted earn-
ings in each sector for the estimation. Since there is considerable missing criminal earnings
17Descriptive statistics by location are reported in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The main features of the criminal
and legal labour sectors documented for the overall sample (e.g., earnings premium in the criminal sector relative
to the legal labour sector) are preserved in both locations.
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information, I add a missing at random process for criminal earnings.18 Specifically, the crime
spell starts with missing earnings with probability p, and the arrival rates nm and m determine
the switching rate from missing to non-missing and from non-missing to missing, respectively.
These parameters are identified by the share of crime spells starting without criminal earnings
information, the duration of missing earnings spells, and the duration of non-missing crimi-
nal earnings spells. Since the missing process is assumed to be random, it does not affect the
identification strategy of the parameters of the criminal earnings distribution.
I follow Kiefer and Neumann (1993) and use the minimum legal earnings and criminal
earnings in the data as the superefficient estimators of the reservation legal earnings and the
reservation criminal earnings for the non-employed, respectively (i.e., w∗ = min(w) and y∗ =
min(y)).19 Based on these values, I can identify the flow utility associated with leisure (αl) and
income crime (αc), using the formula for the reservation earnings for the non-employed.20
The mobility parameters can be identified by durations and transition information. There-
fore, I include moments concerning the durations of each state as well as conditional transi-
tions by state to identify mobility parameters. There are eight sets of mobility parameters in
the model which are allowed to vary by state: job arrival rates (λne, λe, λc, λec), arrival rates
of income crime opportunities and criminal earnings shocks (ηne, ηe, ηc, ηec), income crime
separation rates (τc, τec), job destruction rates (δe, δec), incarceration rates (pine, pie, pic, piec),
jail release rate (κ), and the probabilities of immediate offers after jail (ρe and ρc). The model
dictates that the transition probability between any two states is equal to the corresponding
arrival rate times the probability that the individual chooses to make the transition. Flinn and
Heckman (1982) show that transition information is enough to identify the mobility parame-
ters as long as the earnings offer distribution is assumed to be recoverable. Intuitively, once
we know the distribution of earnings and the minimum earnings accepted by individuals, the
transition probabilities can be used to identify arrival rates. For example, non-employment-
to-legal employment transitions identify the arrival rate of legal jobs for the non-employed.
Likewise, non-employment-to-crime transitions and non-employment-to-jail transitions iden-
tify the arrival rate of income crime opportunities and the incarceration rate, respectively, for
the non-employed. The remaining arrival rates of legal jobs, income crime, incarceration and
the destruction rates are identified analogously, using the corresponding transitions. The arrival
rate of criminal earnings shocks are identified using crime-to-crime transitions in which the av-
erage monthly earnings change by more than 10%. Lastly, the transitions from jail identify the
18Around 43% of the individual-month observations where the individual participates in crime has missing
earnings. An alternative is to treat these observations as periods of participation in income crime but with zero
criminal earnings, instead of missing criminal earnings. As a robustness check, I estimated the model using this
alternative approach to dealing with observations with no reported criminal earnings. Specifically, upon facing a
crime opportunity or a criminal earnings shock, there is a probability that the criminal earnings offered are zero. In
this specification, the minimum criminal earnings accepted are zero. The results were very similar to my baseline
estimates in Section 4.3.
19As is standard in search models, I assume that individuals are not willing to accept negative earnings to
participate in either sector. If this assumption does not hold for this population, I am imposing an upper bound
on αl and αc. The implied minimum monthly earnings are $102 per month in the criminal sector, and $322 per
month in the legal labour sector.
20The reservation legal earnings for the non-employed are determined by Ve(w∗) = Vne. Likewise, the reserva-
tion criminal earnings for the non-employed are determined by Vc(y∗) = Vne.
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release rate, as well as the probabilities of obtaining an immediate offer in either sector.
The flow utility associated with being incarcerated (α j) is identified using two additional
moments. I use the share of months that individuals participate in income crime and the share
of months that individuals participate in both sectors as a share of the total months spent on
income crime. The intuition is that a larger value of α j should make the criminal sector more
attractive, and it would have differential effects on income crime and employment/crime de-
pending on the respective incarceration rates. The flow utility of being incarcerated is sepa-
rately identified from the flow utility of income crime, αc, since a shift in the latter only affects
the criminal sector whereas a shift in α j affects any state, as long as the incarceration rates are
nonzero and they differ for individuals participating in crime depending on their participation
in the legal labour sector. The full list of moments can be seen in Table 4.1.
The estimation procedure works as follows. First, I estimate the parameters of the missing
process for criminal earnings and keep them fixed throughout the indirect inference procedure.
Second, I guess values of all parameters, except for αl and αc. For a given guess of parameters,
I solve for the value functions using fixed point methods and I obtain the implied values of the
flow utility of leisure and income crime (αl and αc) as described above. Next, I simulate data
based on these parameters. For the data simulation, I mimic the sampling scheme of the original
data. In particular, I draw a vector of pseudo-random draws that determine the initial state and
initial survey.21 I also draw a vector of pseudo-random draws that determine the probability
of attrition conditional on the survey (initial and posterior surveys).22 From this simulated
data, I calculate the set of selected moments. The indirect inference estimate of the structural
parameters minimizes the difference between the simulated and the corresponding moments
from the data. Let g represent the vector of moments in the data and let g(θ) represent the
vector of simulated moments given the parameter values θ. The criterion function is then,
Φ(θ) = (g − g(θ))′W−1(g − g(θ))
where W is a weighting matrix. I use a diagonal weighting matrix during estimation, where
each diagonal element is the variance of the corresponding moment. I calculate the matrix W
by bootstrapping 500 samples from the original sample of data and calculating the sample mo-
ments for each bootstrapped sample. I minimize the objective function using Gauss-Newton.
4.3 Results
I now present the results from my baseline specification separately for each location. Before
discussing the parameter estimates, I judge the fit of the model by examining the moments I ex-
21By design, each individual in the PDS completes at most ten surveys. Since the sample used for estimation
concentrates on individuals once they have transitioned out of school, the initial survey in the sample can be any
survey between the first and the tenth.
22Individuals drop out of the sample for two main reasons. First, they are not interviewed again after completing
the tenth survey. Second, they can voluntarily drop out (i.e., attrition). In the simulated data, individuals are not
observed beyond the tenth survey and they face a probability of attrition at any point in time.
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Table 4.1: Model Fit - Data and Estimated Moments by Location
Moment
Philadelphia Phoenix
Data Model Data Model
Earnings
Average Ln(Monthly Legal Earnings) 6.989 6.989 7.084 7.083
Standard Deviation Ln(Monthly Legal Earnings) 0.469 0.470 0.434 0.434
Average Ln(Monthly Criminal Earnings) 7.963 7.967 7.060 7.062
Standard Deviation Ln(Monthly Criminal Earnings) 1.150 1.154 1.290 1.289
Adjusted Durations
Non-Employment Duration 7.503 7.441 5.408 5.398
Legal Employment Duration 6.460 6.393 7.136 7.120
Incarceration Duration 14.353 14.325 12.909 12.849
Income Crime Duration 4.731 4.783 3.392 3.417
Employment/Crime Duration 3.963 3.713 3.603 3.578
Conditional Transitions
Non-Employment to
Legal Employment 0.499 0.495 0.550 0.548
Income Crime 0.256 0.261 0.200 0.203
Incarceration 0.245 0.244 0.250 0.249
Legal Employment (E) to
Non-Employment 0.554 0.559 0.371 0.378
New Legal Job 0.200 0.206 0.335 0.344
Incarceration 0.068 0.048 0.042 0.012
Income Crime 0.049 0.049 0.065 0.067
Employment/Crime 0.129 0.138 0.187 0.199
Income Crime to
Non-Employment 0.342 0.350 0.363 0.382
Legal Employment 0.039 0.009 0.058 0.006
Incarceration 0.333 0.339 0.300 0.314
Income Crime 0.234 0.245 0.158 0.170
Employment/Crime 0.052 0.057 0.121 0.128
Employment/Crime (EC) to
Non-Employment 0.044 0.027 0.020 0.020
Same Legal Job (E) 0.441 0.447 0.518 0.518
Same Legal Job (EC) 0.103 0.108 0.161 0.161
New Legal Job (E or EC) 0.059 0.058 0.047 0.046
Income Crime 0.235 0.235 0.202 0.202
Incarceration 0.118 0.125 0.052 0.053
Incarceration to
Non-Employment 0.753 0.749 0.576 0.575
Legal Employment 0.079 0.080 0.228 0.227
Income Crime 0.168 0.171 0.196 0.198
Additional Moments
Share of Months Income Crime 0.188 0.184 0.161 0.158
Share of Employment/Crime 0.220 0.211 0.448 0.450
Notes:
1. Adjusted durations are in months and are calculated as the sum of durations of censored and uncensored spells, over the number of
uncensored spells. Income crime duration is the duration of income crime spells ignoring crime-to-crime transitions. Likewise, employ-
ment/crime duration equals the duration of employment/crime spells, ignoring employment/crime-to-employment/crime transitions.
3. Conditional transitions refer to spell to spell transitions, for uncensored spells. The transition probabilities sum to one since I only
consider completed (i.e., uncensored) spells for the calculation.
4. Non-employment-to-employment/crime and incarceration-to-employment/crime transitions represent less than 1% of all transitions
corresponding to non-employment and incarceration spells. As a result, they are coded as missing transitions in the data. In the model,
these are zero probability events. Income crime-to-income crime transitions entail at least a 10% change in monthly criminal earnings,
conditional on participating in income crime.
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plicitly target in the estimation procedure. The sample and estimated moments are reported in
Table 4.1 for Philadelphia and Phoenix. The model does a very good job in fitting the first and
second moments of the accepted earnings distributions in the criminal and legal labour sectors
across the two locations.23 The model also fits well average durations and conditional spell
transitions, with only a few modest discrepancies for some of the lower probability transitions,
such as the crime-to-employment transition.24 I also obtain a good fit for the share of months
engaged in income crime.
Figure 4.3: Model Fit - Cumulative Distribution Function - Ln (Monthly Legal Earnings) -
Philadelphia
Notes:
1. The figure is based on the estimates from the baseline model in Table 4.3.
Parameter estimates for the baseline model are presented in Table 4.3 for Philadelphia and
Phoenix.25 I focus on the results for Philadelphia and discuss the results for Phoenix only when
there are important differences in the parameter estimates across locations.
The results reflect the earnings premium in the criminal sector relative to the legal labour
sector.26 However, the variance of earnings in the criminal sector is larger as well. The higher
23In Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, I show that the model fits well the cumulative distribution function of the
logarithm of monthly earnings in the legal labour and criminal sectors, respectively, in the two locations.
24The results in Table 4.2 indicate that the model also fits well the unconditional transitions (month to month
transitions), particularly for non-employment, legal employment, and incarceration.
25As a robustness check, I estimated the model using different trimming percentages for earnings in the criminal
sector (e.g., 1% or 5% in the top and bottom of the distribution). The results are shown in Tables C.1 and
C.2 in Appendix C. Most of the parameters remain practically unchanged, except for the parameters of the
criminal earnings distribution, and the flow utility of jail and crime, given that the minimum, average, and standard
deviation of accepted criminal earnings used to identify them are directly affected.
26The parameters from the missing process for criminal earnings indicate that 53% of the income crime spells
start with missing earnings information. The switching rates from missing to nonmissing and from nonmissing to
missing are estimated at 0.36 and 0.20, respectively.
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Table 4.2: Additional Data and Estimated Moments - Unconditional Transitions by Location
Moment
Philadelphia Phoenix
Data Model Data Model
Non-Employment to
Same Spell 0.870 0.855 0.816 0.817
Legal Employment 0.065 0.072 0.101 0.101
Income Crime 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.045
Incarceration 0.032 0.038 0.046 0.037
Legal Employment to
Same Spell 0.848 0.840 0.863 0.859
Non-Employment 0.084 0.089 0.051 0.054
Legal Employment 0.030 0.033 0.046 0.048
Incarceration 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009
Income Crime 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.002
Employment/Crime 0.020 0.022 0.026 0.028
Income Crime to
Same Spell 0.709 0.748 0.642 0.691
Non-Employment 0.099 0.088 0.130 0.119
Legal Employment 0.011 0.001 0.021 0.000
Incarceration 0.097 0.086 0.108 0.099
Income Crime 0.068 0.061 0.056 0.053
Employment/Crime 0.015 0.015 0.043 0.039
Employment/Crime to
Same Spell 0.706 0.733 0.658 0.710
Non-Employment 0.013 0.006 0.007 0.005
Legal Employment 0.147 0.120 0.193 0.149
Income Crime 0.035 0.034 0.018 0.015
Incarceration 0.069 0.063 0.069 0.059
Employment/Crime 0.030 0.044 0.055 0.060
Incarceration to
Same Spell 0.928 0.910 0.943 0.908
Non-Employment 0.054 0.067 0.033 0.053
Legal Employment 0.006 0.007 0.013 0.021
Income Crime 0.012 0.015 0.011 0.018
Notes:
1. Unconditional transitions refer to month-to-month transitions, including censored and uncensored
spells.
2. Non-employment-to-employment/crime and incarceration-to-employment/crime transitions repre-
sent less than 1% of all transitions corresponding to non-employment and incarceration spells. As a
result, they are coded as missing transitions in the data. In the model, these are zero probability events.
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Table 4.3: Parameter Estimates by Location
Parameter Philadelphia Phoenix
Legal Earnings Distribution: Mean 7.281 7.339
(0.037) (0.024)
Legal Earnings Distribution: Variance 0.240 0.200
(0.025) (0.015)
Criminal Earnings Distribution: Mean 8.327 7.234
(0.183) (0.301)
Criminal Earnings Distribution: Variance 1.401 2.114
(0.283) (0.636)
Incarceration: Release Rate 0.075 0.081
(0.006) (0.008)
Non-Employment: Job Arrival Rate 0.069 0.102
(0.007) (0.008)
Non-Employment: Crime Arrival Rate 0.037 0.040
(0.005) (0.007)
Non-Employment: Incarceration Rate 0.034 0.046
(0.004) (0.005)
Legal Employment: Job Arrival Rate 0.082 0.141
(0.015) (0.013)
Legal Employment: Crime Arrival Rate 0.031 0.031
(0.008) (0.006)
Legal Employment: Job Destruction Rate 0.089 0.054
(0.009) (0.004)
Legal Employment: Incarceration Rate 0.008 0.010
(0.002) (0.002)
Income Crime: Job Arrival Rate 0.027 0.054
(0.010) (0.012)
Income Crime: Earnings Shock Rate 0.123 0.113
(0.021) (0.025)
Income Crime: Destruction Rate 0.101 0.132
(0.013) (0.025)
Income Crime: Incarceration Rate 0.095 0.109
(0.011) (0.014)
Employment/Crime: Job Arrival Rate 0.061 0.047
(0.036) (0.015)
Employment/Crime: Crime Earnings Shock Rate 0.063 0.102
(0.031) (0.019)
Employment/Crime: Crime Destruction Rate 0.130 0.172
(0.038) (0.034)
Employment/Crime: Incarceration Rate 0.039 0.018
(0.014) (0.006)
Employment/Crime: Job Destruction Rate 0.074 0.071
(0.027) (0.010)
Incarceration: Job Offer Probability 0.086 0.234
(0.022) (0.036)
Incarceration: Crime Opportunity Probability 0.165 0.208
(0.029) (0.048)
Flow Utility of Incarceration 172.2 373.6
(261.7) (317.4)
Flow Utility of Leisure 956.1 1433.8
(431.8) (326.0)
Flow Utility of Crime 674.6 1539.3
(1005.6) (581.1)
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in parenthesis. These are computed by bootstrap with
100 replications.
2. Arrival rates are monthly.
3. The flow utility of crime equals (αc ∗ 2/3), which is the non-pecuniary value of crime obtained by an
individual who is only participating in income crime.
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Figure 4.4: Model Fit - Cumulative Distribution Function - Ln (Monthly Legal Earnings) -
Phoenix
Notes:
1. The figure is based on the estimates from the baseline model in Table 4.3.
average offer makes the criminal sector more attractive relative to the legal labour sector, but
the higher variance makes the offer distribution much more dispersed, increasing the likelihood
of facing a low income draw that may be below the reservation value. While there are not
essential differences in the distribution of legal earnings across locations, the distribution of
criminal earnings in Philadelphia has first-order dominance over the distribution of criminal
earnings in Phoenix. The gap between average earnings offered in the criminal sector and the
legal labour sector is consequently larger in Philadelphia than in Phoenix.
Besides earnings, I also find that the non-pecuniary benefits from crime are large relative to
the non-pecuniary benefits from legal jobs, which are normalized to zero. The estimated value
of non-pecuniary benefits from crime are $674 per month. Nevertheless, it is not precisely
estimated.
Regarding the arrival rates of legal jobs, I find that it takes on average 14.5 months for
non-employed individuals to receive an offer. The estimated arrival rate for non-employed
individuals is twice as long as is usually estimated in the literature for similar demographic
groups, suggesting that search frictions may be more prevalent for young serious offenders
relative to the rest of the population.27 One explanation is that serious offenders face certain
employment restrictions in the legal labour sector, which directly limits their possibilities.28
27Using the NLSY79, Engelhardt (2010) concentrates on individuals with and without criminal records and
estimates that they receive offers every 6.7 and 1.8 months, respectively when they are unemployed.
28Bushway and Sweeten (2007) document that ex-felons are barred from up to 800 different occupations across
the United States.
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Figure 4.5: Model Fit - Cumulative Distribution Function - Ln (Monthly Criminal Earnings) -
Philadelphia
Notes:
1. The figure is based on the estimates from the baseline model in Table 4.3.
Another possibility is that firms restrain from hiring individuals with a criminal past.29
The arrival rate of legal job offers for legally employed individuals is larger, although not
significantly different, than that of non-employed individuals. This is different from the stan-
dard search literature, where the job arrival rate of employed individuals is usually smaller
than that of unemployed individuals. This suggests that participating in the legal labour sector
may provide further opportunities to increase earnings through changing jobs within the legal
labour sector. It is possible that for individuals with a criminal history, having a legal job is a
good signal to get further offers, relative to being non-employed.
Individuals also receive legal job offers when they are participating in the criminal sector. I
find that the arrival rate of legal job offers for individuals who are currently engaged in income
crime is roughly half as large as the arrival rate for non-employed individuals, and one third
as large as the arrival rate for individuals employed exclusively in the legal labour sector. The
arrival rate of legal job offers for individuals participating in both sectors is also significantly
smaller than that of individuals participating only in the legal labour sector.30 One interpre-
tation is that individuals participating in income crime have less time available and/or less
incentives to search for jobs in the legal labour sector. Since in the model one way to receive
higher earnings is by moving to another job in the legal labour sector, the overall lower arrival
29See the review by Schmitt and Warner (2011) for evidence on employers disfavoring applicants with records.
One major obstacle that offenders face when trying to find legal employment is the question about their criminal
history that often appears on applications for legal jobs (Agan and Starr, 2017; Pager, 2003; Uggen et al., 2014).
30This differential arrival rate is one distinctive feature of the model. Differently, in the model developed by
Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003, 2004), crime has no direct implications on the job search intensity.
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Figure 4.6: Model Fit - Cumulative Distribution Function - Ln (Monthly Criminal Earnings) -
Phoenix
Notes:
1. The figure is based on the estimates from the baseline model in Table 4.3.
rates of legal jobs when participating in income crime partly deter people from participating
in income crime. Furthermore, the larger arrival rate of legal job offers for individuals that
already have a legal job further encourages participation in the legal labour sector.
Phoenix has, on average, larger arrival rates of legal jobs than Philadelphia. For example,
it takes on average 9.8 months for non-employed individuals to receive a legal job offer in
Phoenix, 4.7 months less than in Philadelphia. Only the arrival rate of legal jobs for individuals
participating in the two sectors is larger in Philadelphia than in Phoenix, but these estimates
have large standard errors.
Besides the high prevalence of search frictions, the legal labour sector for young offenders is
also characterized by large destruction rates relative to estimates for a more general population
(Eckstein and Van den Berg, 2007). The estimated destruction rate of legal jobs is 0.09 and
0.07 for individuals who participate and do not participate in income crime, respectively, in
Philadelphia. The estimated job destruction rates are also large in Phoenix, although they are
smaller than in Philadelphia. In Phoenix, the estimated destruction rate of legal jobs is 0.05 and
0.07 for individuals who participate and do not participate in income crime, respectively. One
explanation for the large destruction rates is that the legal jobs available to previous offenders
are of low quality and do not tend to last (e.g., temporary legal jobs). Another possibility is
that individuals with a criminal background are fired more often than average workers because
of bad behaviour. The large destruction rates in the legal labour sector can also be explained by
the inability to exercise self-control, which at the same time can explain a large part of criminal
behaviour (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). Individuals also face large destruction rates in the
criminal sector. The estimated destruction rates in the criminal sector are, on average, twice as
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large as those in the legal labour sector, making the criminal sector inferior to the legal labour
sector in this aspect.
Income crime opportunities are also subject to frictions. The estimated arrival rate of in-
come crime opportunities is significantly smaller than the arrival rate of legal jobs for non-
employed individuals. Income crime opportunities arrive at a lower rate for individuals partic-
ipating in the legal labour sector, but the arrival rates are not significantly different from each
other. Lastly, individuals participating in income crime face criminal earnings shocks approxi-
mately every eight months, indicating that the criminal sector is quite volatile despite the high
average earnings offered.
The criminal sector features high incarceration rates, making the criminal sector less at-
tractive than legal employment. Not surprisingly, the incarceration rate for individuals who
participate simultaneously in the criminal and legal labour sectors is significantly lower, rel-
ative to individuals fully devoted to the criminal sector.31 When incarcerated, inmates have
an expected incarceration time of 13.3 months. Individuals face an 8.6% probability of hav-
ing a legal job offer immediately after being released, which reduces the cost of jail. These
immediate offers may be rationalized by placement programs post-incarceration. Released in-
dividuals also face a 16.5% probability of getting an immediate income crime opportunity after
jail. Consistent with the relative differences in the job arrival rates across locations commented
above, individuals in Phoenix face a larger probability of a legal job offer post-jail (23.4%).
Lastly, the flow utility of leisure is estimated at $956 per month. The flow utility of jail is $172
per month, although it is not precisely estimated.
All in all, the results show that disadvantaged young individuals face two poor-quality
employment alternatives. On the one hand, the legal labour sector in the two locations is char-
acterized by low arrival rates, low wages, and high destruction rates. The low arrival rates of
legal job offers delay the transition from non-employment or crime to the legal labour sector,
and generate long periods without legal earnings. The legal jobs offered to these individuals
do not last long, generating quick transitions back to non-employment. On the other hand,
the criminal sector appears as an alternative, both to non-employment and legal employment.
The criminal sector offers an evident earnings premium relative to the legal labour sector, and
has large non-pecuniary benefits. Nonetheless, like the legal labour sector, the criminal sector
is characterized by low arrival rates and large destruction rates. In addition, the risk of being
incarcerated and sent to jail reduces the value of crime. Lastly, there are a few important dif-
ferences in the point estimates across locations. Search frictions in the legal labour sector are
overall more prevalent in Philadelphia than in Phoenix, presenting lower job arrival rates and
larger job destruction rates. Furthermore, the criminal earnings premium is larger in Philadel-
phia than in Phoenix, making the criminal sector even more attractive than the legal labour
sector in this aspect. These estimated differences are used in the next section to illustrate how
the criminal and legal labour sectors interact with each other.
31The incarceration rate for legally employed individuals is small and significantly different from that of indi-
viduals participating in crime (exclusively or not). The incarceration rate for non-employed individuals is smaller,
but not significantly different, from that of individuals participating in crime and legal employment. As was
mentioned in footnote 16, this does not seem to be driven by participation in non-income crimes.
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4.4 Counterfactuals
In this section, I attempt to disentangle the roles of some features of the legal labour sector
(e.g., job arrival rate) and the criminal sector (e.g., incarceration rate), in driving crime and
legal employment choices. Understanding the role of these factors can shed light on alternative
instruments available to policy makers interested in boosting legal employment or reducing
youth crime. To that end, I present two sets of simulations. I start by illustrating the interactions
between the criminal and legal labour sectors in Subsection 4.4.1. I then perform a policy
analysis which shows that, as a result of the trade-offs between sectors, policies in one sector
have important implications in the other sector. For instance, youth crime can be reduced both
via policies targeting the criminal sector and policies that improve outcomes in the legal labour
sector.
4.4.1 Interactions across sectors
In this subsection, I illustrate how the criminal and legal labour sectors interact with each
other. I focus on the role of earnings and frictions in determining transitions between non-
employment, crime, legal employment, and jail. Distinguishing the role of each of these factors
is important since their implications are potentially different. For instance, both a reduction in
average earnings offered in the criminal sector and an increase in the arrival rate of legal job
offers result in a larger legal employment rate. However, they have opposite effects on the share
of non-employed individuals. Furthermore, the size of the effects may differ across factors.
For this purpose, I take advantage of the existing differences between Philadelphia and
Phoenix regarding the characteristics of the criminal and legal labour sectors: arrival rates of
legal jobs, destruction rates of legal jobs, and the earnings gap between the criminal and legal
labour sectors. I use the parameter estimates from Philadelphia, and modify a specific set of
parameters using the estimates from Phoenix. In other words, I make Philadelphia look like
Phoenix in a specific dimension, and discuss its implications on crime, legal employment, non-
employment, and the incarcerated population. I start by simulating an increase in the arrival
rate of legal jobs and a reduction in the destruction rate of legal jobs. I then concentrate on the
criminal sector by simulating a change in the distribution of criminal earnings.
The simulations are performed as follows. Given alternative values for some of the param-
eters, I compute new value functions using fixed point methods. I then simulate the path of
a sample of individuals, for whom the initial distribution across states equals the steady state
distribution in the baseline model. Lastly, I compare the distribution across states and average
earnings at the new steady state with those from the steady state in the baseline model.
The results are presented in Table 4.4. The first column of the table shows the average
monthly distribution of the population across different states of the model at the steady state,
using the baseline parameter estimates for Philadelphia. The next columns show the changes
in the predicted outcomes under alternative values of the parameters relative to the baseline
parameter estimates. For this exercise, the monthly crime rate is defined as the sum of the share
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of individuals participating in income crime, regardless of their legal employment status. The
monthly legal employment rate is defined as the sum of the share of individuals participating
in legal employment, regardless of whether they participate in income crime.
In columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 4.4, I show how non-employment, legal employment, crime,
and the incarcerated population in Philadelphia are affected when changing some characteris-
tics of the legal labour sector. I first simulate an increase in the arrival rates of legal jobs (λu, λe,
λc, λec) using the parameter estimates for Phoenix. This is equivalent to increasing the arrival
rate of legal jobs by 44%, on average, or reducing by six months the average time elapsed until
a legal job offer arrives.32 Column 2 shows that facilitating access to legal jobs in Philadel-
phia results in a large increase in legal employment (7.8 percentage points or 31.0%). Because
individuals find legal jobs at a faster rate, they spend, on average, less time non-employed,
and the monthly crime rate goes down, but by only 0.4 percentage points (3.0%).33 The shift
in crime is modest, because the share of individuals participating simultaneously in the two
sectors actually increases. Individuals participating in income crime benefit from the smaller
search frictions, but they do not necessarily quit crime upon accepting the legal job. Average
accepted earnings in the legal labour sector increase, and legal jobs have a smaller average
durations due to the possibility of climbing up the ladder through job-to-job transitions.
Second, I simulate an increase of the average time before the legal job gets exogenously
destroyed using the estimated job destruction rates in Phoenix. This is equivalent to an average
reduction of 30% in the destruction rates of legal jobs (δe, δec) in Philadelphia. The results
are shown in column 3. The effects are similar to the previous simulation, generating a big
increase in legal employment (8.3 percentage points or 32.8%) and a small reduction in crime
(1.1 percentage points or 8.8%). One difference is that the average legal job duration increases,
because reducing the job destruction rate directly reduces the flow of individuals from legal
jobs to non-employment.
Next, I combine the last two simulations by simulating jointly an increase in the arrival rate
and a reduction in the destruction rate of legal jobs. In other words, both the quality and the
access to the legal labour sector in Philadelphia improve. The results in Column 4 show that
there are complementarities in terms of crime reduction and legal employment boost when the
two set of parameters are modified. These changes generate an increase in legal employment
of 17.1 percentage points (90.0%) and a 1.9 percentage point reduction in crime (16.0%),
exceeding the sum of the effects from the individual simulations in columns 2 and 3. Overall,
increasing the arrival rate of legal jobs and reducing the job destruction rate have large effects
on legal employment and a more modest, but non-negligible, effect on crime.
32Job placement programs are one example of policies that can reduce frictions in the legal labour sector,
particularly for individuals with a criminal background (Wilson et al., 1999; Uggen, 2000).
33This result is consistent with prior empirical research that documents a reduction in criminal activity among
previous offenders who face more legal employment opportunities (Uggen, 2000; Schnepel, 2016; Heller, 2014).
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Table 4.4: Changes in the Parameter Estimates in Philadelphia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline
Philadelphia
Arrival rate of
jobs in Phoenix
Destruction
rate of jobs in
Phoenix
Legal labour
sector
(2)+(3)
Criminal
earnings
distribution
parameters in
Phoenix
Changes in %-points
Non-Employment 33.96 -4.29 -4.39 -8.92 3.90
[33.38;34.48] [-4.95;-3.61] [-5.03;-3.76] [-9.56;-8.21] [3.23;4.61]
Legal Employment (E + EC) 25.25 7.84 8.28 17.11 3.40
[24.68;25.87] [6.97;8.65] [7.54;9.03] [16.3;17.9] [2.71;4.09]
Crime (C + EC) 12.04 -0.35 -1.06 -1.91 -4.65
[11.69;12.4] [-0.82;-0.1] [-1.52;-0.64] [-2.39;-1.41] [-5.11;-4.23]
Incarceration 31.36 -2.32 -2.63 -5.41 -3.26
[30.7;31.99] [-3.11;-1.51] [-3.37;-1.89] [-6.21;-4.6] [-3.95;-2.55]
Notes:
1. The first column shows the predicted outcomes of the model at the steady state using the baseline parameter estimates for Philadelphia from Table 11. In
the next columns, I simulate changes in a specific set of parameters in Philadelphia. In column (2), I use the estimated arrival rates of legal jobs in Phoenix.
In column (3), I use the estimated destruction rates of legal jobs in Phoenix. In column (4), I change both the arrival rate and destruction rate of legal jobs
in Philadelphia using the parameter estimates for Phoenix. In column (5), I change the estimated parameters of the criminal earnings distribution using
the parameter estimates for Phoenix. See Table 11 for the parameter estimates for Phoenix. In each scenario, the rest of the parameters estimates remain
unchanged.
2. The figures in columns (2) to (5) represent the changes in the predicted outcomes in Philadelphia. All the changes are expressed in percentage points.
3. The numbers in brackets are the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals using 100 replications.
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Next, I show how outcomes are affected by shifting parameters in the criminal sector. I
focus specifically on the criminal earnings premium. Average earnings offered in the criminal
sector in Philadelphia are more than four times larger than average earnings offered in the legal
labour sector. The criminal sector in Phoenix also offers an earnings premium, although it is
smaller: average earnings offered in the criminal sector are just two times larger than those
offered in the legal labour sector. Overall, the distribution of criminal earnings in Philadel-
phia has first-order dominance over the criminal earnings distribution in Phoenix, and there are
not important differences in the distribution of legal earnings across locations. In column 5,
I simulate a reduction in earnings offered in the criminal sector in Philadelphia by using the
estimates of the criminal earnings distribution for Phoenix. Reducing the criminal earning pre-
mium has a large effect on crime, with a reduction in the monthly crime rate of 4.7 percentage
points (38.6%). It also generates a 3.4 percentage point increase in legal employment (13.5%).
Unlike the rest of the simulations, the share of non-employed individuals increases. Due to the
reduction in the criminal earnings premium, the relative value of the criminal sector decreases
and, as a result, a larger share of individuals is now waiting in non-employment to get an at-
tractive job offer in the legal labour sector rather than taking an opportunity in the criminal
sector.
Overall, the results stress that there are sizable interactions between the criminal and legal
labour sectors. I show that reducing the search frictions in the legal labour sector can both
increase legal employment and reduce youth crime. The results also suggest that there is room
for improvement in legal employment through changes in the criminal sector (e.g., reduction
in criminal earnings premium).
4.4.2 Policy Simulations
In this section, I simulate the effect of three policies that target a one percentage point reduction
in the monthly crime rate in Philadelphia.34 While two are traditional policies that target the
criminal sector, one policy targets the legal labour sector instead. As was suggested in Section
4.4.1, because of the sizable interactions across sectors, affecting the legal labour sector can
also generate reductions in youth crime. Targeting the legal labour sector also has different
implications on non-employment, legal employment, and jail, relative to policies that focus on
the criminal sector.
I start by simulating a policy that extends the average sentence length. Second, I simulate
an increase in the number of police. Lastly, I simulate the introduction of a wage subsidy in the
legal labour sector. For each policy, the average monthly crime rate at the steady state using
the corresponding values of the parameters is compared against the monthly crime rate at the
steady state when using the baseline parameter estimates. For this exercise, I use the parameter
estimates for Philadelphia.
I perform a back-of-the-envelope cost analysis to compare the efficiency of the policies.
34the monthly crime rate is defined as the sum of the share of individuals participating in income crime, regard-
less of their legal employment status.
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The net cost of a policy includes the change in benefits paid to individuals who do not have
a legal job (i.e., non-employed individuals and individuals participating exclusively in income
crime) like welfare programs, the change in income taxes collected from legal workers, the
change in prison expenditures, the change in costs due to income crime, and any direct costs
specific to each policy. I assume that the benefits paid to individuals without legal jobs amount
to $600 per month.35 To determine the prison expenditures, I use the average annual cost per
inmate in Pennsylvania (Stephan, 2001). I assume a tax rate on legal earnings of 13.8%, which
is approximately equal to the sum of the federal tax rate for low earnings and the state tax
rate on income in Pennsylvania. To determine the cost of crime, I first calculate the unit cost
of a crime, by type of income crime. For each type of income crime, I obtain the monthly
cost by multiplying the average number of that type of crime committed in a given month in
the PDS and the corresponding cost of crime.36 The total monthly cost of income crime is
then calculated as the the sum of the monthly cost of each type of crime. I use the estimates
of the intangible costs of drug-related crimes from Rajkumar and French (1997). For non
drug-related income crimes, I use the victim costs and property losses in Miller, Cohen, and
Wiersema (1996).37 The total estimated monthly cost of crime amounts to $1,541 per month
per individual exclusively engaged in income crime.38 The results provide a rough estimate of
the cost of each policy, which permits comparisons across them. The results of the policies are
summarized in Table 4.5).
The literature has found strong linkages between longer sentence lengths and lower crime
rates (Durlauf and Nagin, 2010). I now simulate an extension of the average sentence length
by lowering the release rate (κ). In order to achieve a one percentage point reduction in the
monthly crime rate in Philadelphia, the release rate has to be 17.5% smaller, which is equiv-
alent to extending the average sentence length by roughly 3 months.39 As it is shown in the
second column of Table 4.5, this produces a large increase in the incarcerated population (3.6
percentage points or 11.0%). The share of non-employed individuals goes down, while legal
employment stays relatively flat. I further decompose the total effect on crime into an incapac-
itation effect and a deterrence effect. The former captures the effect of keeping the individuals
off the streets, whereas the latter reflects the discouraging effect of a harsher punishment. I
distinguish between these two effects by separately calculating the probability of being out of
prison, and the probability of incarceration conditional on not being already in prison. I find
that incapacitation represents 43.4% of the total effect of the harsher sentence length on crime,
35The underlying assumption is that αl is composed of 50% benefits paid to non-employed individuals and that
the rest is the utility of leisure (Engelhardt, Rocheteau, and Rupert, 2008).
36The average monthly frequency of income crime in PDS is 2.7 burglaries, 2.2 larcenies, 0.4 motor vehicle
thefts, 18.7 drug-related crimes, and 0.3 robberies. The victim cost and property loss per crime amounts to
$624 for burglary, $154 for larceny, $1,060 for motor vehicle theft, and $1,680 for robbery (Miller, Cohen, and
Wiersema, 1996). The intangible cost of a drug-related crime is estimated at $3 (Rajkumar and French, 1997).
All the amounts are expressed in 2000 dollars.
37The victim cost is an estimate of productivity and wage losses, medical costs, and quality of life reductions. I
assume that the total cost of a single crime comprises the victim cost and 20% of the property loss, since property
losses are usually considered a partial transfer from the victim to the criminal.
38The monthly cost of income crime is assumed to be half of it if the individual participates simultaneously in
the criminal and legal labour sector.
39The elasticity of crime with respect to the average sentence length is -0.35, which is within the range typically
found in the literature (Levitt, 2004).
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which partly explains the large increase in the incarcerated population. The distinction be-
tween incapacitation and deterrence is key to determining the cost associated with changes in
the sentence length (Kessler and Levitt, 1999; Durlauf and Nagin, 2010). The net annual cost
of this policy amounts to $748 per individual in the model.
I next simulate an increase in the number of police, which has been largely recognized
in the literature as an effective tool to reduce crime.40 Increasing the number of police can
have two main effects: increase the incarceration rate and/or reduce the arrival rate of crime
opportunities.41 I simulate these two effects separately, assuming in each case that the desired
reduction in crime is obtained entirely by affecting either the incarceration rate or the arrival
rate of crime opportunities. Since police does not enter explicitly in the model, I use the
elasticity of crime with respect to the number of police reported by Levitt (2004) to calculate
the necessary change in the number of police officers. I then use the mean annual wage of
police officers in Pennsylvania (Bureau of labour Statistics) to assess the direct cost of the
policy.
I start by simulating a proportional increase in the incarceration rates (pine, pie, pic, piec) via
an increase the number of police in Philadelphia. In order to obtain a one percentage point
reduction in crime, the incarceration rates in Philadelphia have to increase by 13.1%. As it
is shown in Column 3, increasing the incarceration rates yields a large increase in the share
of individuals incarcerated. One difference of this policy, relative to extending the average
sentence length, is that 34.3% of the total effect on crime comes through incapacitation. The
incapacitation effect explains less of the total effect, and as a result, this policy generates a
smaller increase in incarcerated population. The net annual cost of this policy is consequently
smaller than a policy that extends the average sentence length; it amounts to $471 per individual
in the model.
I next simulate a proportional reduction in the arrival rates of income crime opportunities
(ηne, ηe) via an increase in the number of police. In this case, I assume that the effect of having
more police comes exclusively through the arrival rate of crime opportunities, and that it has no
effect on the incarceration rates. The results in Column 4 show that the arrival rates of income
crime opportunities have to decrease by 10.7%, on average, to achieve the desired reduction
in crime. The greater search frictions in the criminal sector do not generate an increase in the
incarcerated population, like traditional policies targeting the criminal sector do (e.g., higher
incarceration rate or longer sentence length). The implications on the share of non-employed
and legally employed individuals are also different. They both increase, although none of
these effects is precisely estimated. The net annual cost of the policy amounts to $-218 per
individual in the model. Even if by construction the direct cost of the policy (i.e. cost of extra
police officers) is the same as the increase in the incarceration rate, the different implications on
the incarcerated population, non-employment, and legal employment explain the much smaller
cost.
40Some papers that review the literature on the effect of police on crime include Cameron (1988); Nagin (1998);
Levitt (2004), among others.
41This issue relates to the literature considering different policing strategies like the adoption of “hot spots”
policing, “problem-oriented” policing, among other strategies (Braga, 2001, 2005; Braga, Papachristos, and
Hureau, 2014).
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Table 4.5: Alternative Policies to Achieve a 1 Percentage Point Decrease in the Monthly Crime Rate in Philadelphia
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Longer Average
Sentence Length
Higher
Incarceration Rate
Fewer Crime
Opportunities Wage Subsidy
Change in the corresponding parameter estimate -17.41% 13.09% -10.65% 619.52
[-20.73;-14.30] [10.37;15.33] [-13.39;-8.16] [504.80;746.35]
Annual Net Cost per individual (2000 USD) 748.62 471.62 -218.79 1327.44
[545.55;929.11] [329.38;598.21] [-360.96;-89.25] [969.80;1686.47]
Change in share non-employed (%-points) -1.94 -0.77 0.72 0.35
[-2.88;-0.84] [-1.56;0.02] [-0.05;1.50] [-0.46;1.14]
Change in share legally employed (%-points) -0.77 -0.21 0.74 2.78
[-1.58;0.07] [-0.98;0.59] [-0.02;1.52] [1.58;3.65]
Change in share incarcerated (%-points) 3.63 1.91 -0.70 -1.41
[2.08;4.80] [0.93;2.91] [-1.59;-0.16] [-2.34;0.37]
Notes:
1. In each row, I simulate alternative policies that achieve a one percentage point decrease in the monthly crime rate in Philadelphia. The crime rate is defined
as the sum of the share of individuals participating in crime and employment/crime. In column (1), I simulate an extension on the average sentence length,
which is achieved through a reduction in the release rate. In column (2), I simulate an increase in the incarceration rate through an increase in the number
of police. In column (3), I simulate a reduction in the arrival rate of crime opportunities, through an increase in the number of police. For the simulations in
columns (2) and (3), the appropriate changes in the incarceration rates and the arrival rates of crime opportunities are calculated within the model to match the
elasticity of crime rate with respect to the number of police reported in Levitt (2004). In the last column, I simulate the introduction of a wage subsidy paid to
legal workers on a monthly basis.
2. In the first row, I show the necessary change in the corresponding parameter (e.g. release rate). In the second row, I show the annual net cost of the policy
per individual. The net cost of a policy includes the direct cost of the policy, minus the reduction in benefits paid to non-employed individuals, minus the
increase in income taxes collected from legal workers, plus the reduction in prison expenditures, plus the change in the total cost of crime. All figures are in
2000 US dollars. The last three rows show the changes in the predicted outcomes relative to the baseline predicted outcomes of the model at the steady state
using the parameter estimates from Table 11.
3. The direct cost per individual accounts for the specific cost of the policy. For the wage subsidy, the direct cost is equal to the total amount paid to workers
on behalf of the wage subsidies. The direct cost of increasing the incarceration rate and reducing the arrival rate of crime opportunities is the cost of the extra
police officers.
4. The numbers in brackets are the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals using 100 replications.
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Lastly, I simulate an increase in legal earnings by introducing a wage subsidy. Besides
their use for boosting legal employment (Phelps, 1994; Katz, 1996), wage subsidies have been
proposed in the literature as a means of reducing criminal activity (Engelhardt, Rocheteau, and
Rupert, 2008; Lochner, 2004). In order to achieve the desired reduction in crime, the govern-
ment should pay a wage subsidy of $619 per month to legal workers in Philadelphia. As it is
shown in column 5, the wage subsidy yields a large increase in legal employment (2.8 percent-
age points or 10.0%) and it does not generate an increase in the incarcerated population. Also,
the share of non-employed individuals stays relatively flat. The net annual cost of this policy
is $1,327 per individual in the model. Thus, the wage subsidy is more costly than policies
targeting the criminal sector, mainly because of the high search frictions that characterize the
legal labour sector in Philadelphia.
All things considered, I find that both the criminal sector and the legal labour sector pro-
vide tools to policy makers interested in reducing youth crime. Each policy has different im-
plications on legal employment outcomes, non-employment, and the incarcerated population,
which is ultimately reflected in the cost of each policy. Notably, usual interventions in the
criminal sector, like increasing the apprehension rate, have sizable effects on crime; however,
this is mainly achieved through a large increase in the population incarcerated. Instead, policies
targeting the legal labour sector can reduce crime and generate a boost in legal employment
without generating increases in the incarcerated population.
4.5 Conclusions
The school to work transition and the early career path can be difficult for disadvantaged youth.
Their labour market is usually studied ignoring the presence of the criminal sector, and yet a
large share of them participate in crime. In this chapter, I characterize the criminal and legal
labour sectors for disadvantaged youth, and show that there are important interactions between
youth crime and youth legal employment. I do so in the context of a two-sector search model,
which allows for a rich set of interactions across sectors. On the one hand, individuals with
higher earnings in the legal labour sector are less likely to participate in income crime due to
the higher opportunity cost of being caught and sent to jail. On the other hand, individuals
participating in income crime have less time to devote to either leisure or employment in the
legal labour sector. They also have different legal job arrival and destruction rates, which are
possibly additional sources of interaction between the two sectors. The model also accounts
for simultaneous participation in the two sectors.
I estimate the model using a unique panel dataset on young serious offenders. I find that
search frictions are quite important for this disadvantaged population. In particular, it takes
them more than a year to receive a legal job offer when they are not participating in the criminal
or legal labour sector. Legal jobs are characterized by short average durations, low earnings,
and high destruction rates. The criminal sector is an attractive alternative for these individuals.
I find that it offers an earnings premium relative to the legal labour sector but, not surprisingly,
there is a high probability of incarceration and fewer opportunities in the legal labour sector. I
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find that there are sizable interactions across sectors, and that policies in one sector can have
effects on the other sector. I provide evidence that a wage subsidy that targets the legal labour
sector can reduce crime and boost legal employment among disadvantaged youth. A policy
that reduces the arrival rate of crime opportunities, compared to policies usually discussed in
the literature like extending the average sentence length, has the advantage of reducing crime
without generating large increases in the incarcerated population.
Lastly, it is important to stress that I study youth who have already committed somewhat
serious criminal offenses. This is a particularly relevant group to study, as they represent a large
proportion of youth crime, particularly serious crime. Furthermore, this is a group that has been
studied relatively less intensively in the literature, largely due to data constraints. However, one
implication of this is that my results do not necessarily generalize to the population at large.
In this sense, the factors that cause these young offenders to reduce crime may not be the
same as those that prevent people from committing their first crime. Additionally, what helps
to boost legal employment among young offenders, may not be as useful for increasing legal
employment for individuals with no criminal history.
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Appendix A
Chapter 2 Appendices
A.1 Factor Model for Skills
Identification of the measurement/skills model of equations (2.4) and (2.5) follows from the
analysis in Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cooley Fruehwirth, Navarro, and
Takahashi (2016). The argument roughly follows from first (conditionally) demeaning the
measurements, which recovers the β′s. The loadings (i.e., the δ’s) are then identified by taking
covariances between different cognitive measures and between different social/emotional mea-
sures. The marginal distributions of θcogi and
{
ξ
cog
j,i,ti
}J
j=1
, as well as those of θemoi and
{{
ξemok,i,t
}Ti
t=ti
}K
k=1
are non-parametrically identified from a theorem of Kotlarski (1967) using deconvolution ar-
guments. The correlation between θcogi and θ
emo
i follows directly from the covariance between
cognitive and social/emotional measures.
The distributions of the unobservables in the measurement systems are non-parametrically
identified from the argument above. However, for estimation purposes, we impose distribu-
tional assumptions. In particular, we assume that ξcogj,i,ti ∼ N
(
0, σ2ξ,cog, j
)
, ξemok,i,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2ξ,emo,k
)
,
and
(
θ
cog
i
θemoi
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ2θ,cog ρσθ,cogσθ,emo
σ2θ,emo
))
.
Given these distributional assumptions, the factor model is estimated by maximum likelihood.
Let Mcogj,i,ti = Mcogj,i,ti − xi,tiβcogj − θcogi δcogj,ti , ψ˜ j,` = ψ j,` − xi,tiβcogj − θcogi δcogj,ti , and Memok,i,t = Memok,i,t −
xi,tβemok,t −θemoi δemok,t . We define the conditional (on θcogi , θemoi ) likelihood for the vector of individual
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observed test scores, Mi, to be
f
(
Mi|xi, θcogi , θemoi ; β, ψ, δ, σ, ρ
)
=
J1∏
j=1
φ
(
Mcogj,i,ti |xi, θcogi ;σ2ξ,cog, j
)
×
Ti∏
t=ti
K∏
k=1
φ
(
Memok,i,t |xi, θemoi ;σ2ξ,emo,k
)
×
J∏
j=J1+1
L j∏
`=1
 Φ
(
ψ˜ j,`|xi, θcogi ; βcogj , δcogj
)
−Φ
(
ψ˜ j,`−1|xi, θcogi ; βcogj , δcogj
)  11 (M j,i = `) ,
where J1 denotes the number of continuous cognitive tests, J−J1 is the number of discrete tests,
φ
(
|;σ2
)
is the pdf of a mean zero normal with variance σ2, and Φ () is the cdf of a standard
normal. The contribution to the likelihood of observation i is thus given by
f (Mi|xi; β, ψ, δ, σ, ρ) =∫ ∫
f
(
Mi|xi, θcogi , θemoi ; β, ψ, δ, σ, ρ
)
ϕ
(
θ
cog
i , θ
emo
i ;σ
2
θ,cog, σ
2
θ,emo, ρ
)
dθcogi dθ
emo
i ,
where ϕ (; a, b, c) is the pdf of a mean zero bivariate normal with variances given by a, b and
correlation coefficient c.
Having obtained estimates of the parameters of the factor model, we then predict the most
likely values for θcogi , θ
emo
i given the data we observe for each individual i. Prediction follows by
applying Bayes’ Rule to recover the distribution of θcogi , θ
emo
i conditional on the data and then
using it to obtain the expected value of θcogi , θ
emo
i over that distribution. That is, we calculate(
θ¯
cog
i
θ¯emoi
)
=
∫ ∫ (
θ
cog
i
θemoi
)
f
(
θ
cog
i , θ
emo
i |Mi, xi; βˆ, ψˆ, δˆ, σˆ, ρˆ
)
dθcogi dθ
emo
i
=
∫ ∫ (
θ
cog
i
θemoi
) f (Mi|xi, θcogi , θemoi ; βˆ, ψˆ, δˆ, σˆ, ρˆ)ϕ (θcogi , θemoi ; σˆ2θ,cog, σˆ2θ,emo, ρˆ)
f
(
Mi|xi; βˆ, ψˆ, δˆ, σˆ, ρˆ
) dθcogi dθemoi .
A.2 Additional Results
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Table A.1: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Overall Crime) -
Robustness Checks 1
Variable Choices While in Jail Choices While in Jail Choices While in Jail
(1) (2) (3)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.071 0.047 0.057 0.039 0.055 0.037
(0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Hispanic -0.035 -0.025 -0.005 -0.033 -0.005 -0.033
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Black 0.000 -0.033 0.042 -0.042 0.039 -0.043
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Other 0.009 -0.020 0.032 -0.026 0.031 -0.027
(0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
Female 0.118 -0.096 0.019 -0.070 0.018 -0.067
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Non-intact Family -0.058 0.023 -0.030 0.015 -0.030 0.014
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Siblings -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.070 -0.034 -0.074 -0.035 -0.074 -0.035
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Certainty of Punishment 0.006 -0.019 -0.001 -0.017 -0.001 -0.017
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Children -0.016 0.008 -0.015 0.011 -0.013 0.012
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Family Crime -0.033 0.144 0.009 0.131 0.007 0.132
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Drug Use 0.044 0.226 -0.040 0.233 -0.041 0.231
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Unemployment Rate 0.020 0.013 0.023 0.011 0.023 0.011
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.019 -0.029 0.016 -0.027 0.016 -0.027
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Years of Crime -0.007 0.021 -0.005 0.020 -0.005 0.022
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of Education 0.023 -0.002 -0.007 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Schools per Young Person 0.169 0.316 0.317
(0.072) (0.067) (0.067)
Lagged Enrollment 0.174 0.198 0.223
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Enrollment 0.055
(0.016)
Continued on next page...
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page.
Variable Choices While in Jail Choices While in Jail Choices While in Jail
(1) (2) (3)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Lagged Crime 0.157 0.149 0.162
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Cognitive Factor 0.033 0.006 0.002 0.017 -0.001 0.018
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.019 -0.076 -0.012 -0.072 -0.013 -0.071
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Jail 0.100 0.119 0.357 0.163
(0.012) (0.013) (0.078) (0.092)
Enrollment (alternative) 0.055 0.061
(0.047) (0.046)
Years of Crime Jail 0.003 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Years of Education Jail -0.020 0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
Lagged Enrollment Jail -0.089
(0.023)
Lagged Crime Jail -0.052
(0.026)
Enrollment Jail -0.032
(0.026)
Rho -0.068 -0.074 -0.067
(0.033) (0.100) (0.100)
Observations 6,189 6,189 6,189 6,189 6,189 6,189
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. In column (1) enrollment is set to zero if an individual did not attend a community school. In column (2), we condition on
whether the individual is interviewed in jail, and in column (3) we interact the jail dummy with years of education, years of crime, and
enrollment to allow the effect of previous experience and contemporaneous enrollment to vary with whether the individual is in jail.
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Table A.2: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Ed-
ucation (Overall Crime) - Robustness Checks 2
Variable Excluding Drug Use Enrollment Based onAttendance
(1) (2)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.049 0.038 0.017 0.045
(0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019)
Hispanic -0.025 -0.025 -0.021 -0.018
(0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016)
Black 0.024 -0.041 0.002 -0.027
(0.017) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018)
Other 0.034 -0.042 -0.022 -0.022
(0.027) (0.031) (0.022) (0.030)
Female 0.058 -0.097 0.008 -0.095
(0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016)
Non-intact Family -0.050 0.028 -0.004 0.027
(0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016)
Siblings -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Age -0.080 -0.034 -0.046 -0.036
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005)
Certainty of Punishment 0.003 -0.025 0.005 -0.022
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Children -0.018 0.002 -0.025 0.010
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Family Crime 0.002 0.176 0.010 0.145
(0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015)
Drug Use -0.045 0.230
(0.009) (0.011)
Unemployment Rate 0.021 0.012 0.018 0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.019 -0.038 0.017 -0.025
(0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012)
Years of Crime -0.007 0.028 -0.005 0.021
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Years of Education 0.006 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Schools per Young Person 0.321 0.121
(0.071) (0.063)
Lagged Enrollment 0.189
(0.012)
Enrollment 0.079
Continued on next page...
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page.
Variable Excluding Drug Use Enrollment Based onAttendance
(1) (2)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
(0.052)
Lagged Crime 0.194 0.156
(0.013) (0.013)
Cognitive Factor 0.037 0.058 -0.001 0.018
(0.023) (0.025) (0.018) (0.024)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.007 -0.122 0.009 -0.084
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015)
Years of Education (alternative) 0.016 0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Lagged Enrollment (alternative) 0.084
(0.010)
Enrolment (alternative) 0.098
(0.056)
Rho -0.115 -0.228
(0.104) (0.124)
Observations 5,190 5,190 5,097 5,097
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. In column (1) we do not include drug use as an independent regressor. In column (2), enrollment is
redefined as attending school for at least nine months in a year.
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Table A.3: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Overall Crime) -
Robustness Checks 3
Variable Age-VaryingCoefficients
Years of Crime:
Quadratic
Years of Crime:
Piecewise-linear
Years of Crime:
Observed
Experience Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.051 0.042 0.048 0.040 0.048 0.042 0.053 0.038
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Hispanic -0.025 -0.021 -0.025 -0.019 -0.025 -0.019 -0.024 -0.025
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Black 0.023 -0.030 0.025 -0.029 0.024 -0.030 0.018 -0.026
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Other 0.035 -0.024 0.035 -0.023 0.032 -0.024 0.016 -0.011
(0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030)
Female 0.059 -0.099 0.058 -0.101 0.058 -0.100 0.061 -0.118
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Non-intact Family -0.052 0.029 -0.050 0.030 -0.051 0.030 -0.043 0.027
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Siblings -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Age -0.087 -0.028 -0.080 -0.029 -0.081 -0.029 -0.088 -0.036
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Certainty of Punishment 0.003 -0.022 0.003 -0.022 0.003 -0.022 0.003 -0.022
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Children -0.017 0.007 -0.018 0.008 -0.018 0.008 -0.021 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Family Crime 0.002 0.149 0.002 0.148 0.003 0.149 -0.001 0.150
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Drug Use -0.000 0.224 -0.001 0.224 -0.001 0.224 -0.002 0.223
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Unemployment Rate 0.021 0.011 0.021 0.011 0.021 0.011 0.022 0.011
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.020 -0.023 0.019 -0.023 0.019 -0.024 0.023 -0.021
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Years of Crime -0.015 0.008
(0.010) (0.010)
Years of Education 0.006 -0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.014 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Schools per Young Person 0.318 0.323 0.325 0.254
(0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070)
Lagged Enrollment 0.189 0.190 0.166
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Continued on next page...
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Table A.3 – continued from previous page.
Variable Age-VaryingCoefficients
Years of Crime:
Quadratic
Years of Crime:
Piecewise-linear
Years of Crime:
Observed
Experience Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Enrollment 0.087 0.081 0.112
(0.049) (0.049) (0.055)
Lagged Crime 0.156 0.158 0.131
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Cognitive Factor 0.036 0.016 0.035 0.012 0.036 0.014 0.038 0.013
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.006 -0.080 0.007 -0.081 0.006 -0.080 0.009 -0.082
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Years of Crime Age1 -0.006 0.022
(0.004) (0.004)
Years of Crime Age2 -0.007 0.020
(0.003) (0.003)
Years of Education Age1 0.002 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Years of Education Age2 0.009 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005)
Lagged Enrollment Age1 0.229
(0.020)
Lagged Enrollment Age2 0.170
(0.016)
Enrollment Age1 0.065
(0.050)
Enrollment Age2 0.046
(0.057)
Lagged Crime Age1 0.156
(0.019)
Lagged Crime Age2 0.160
(0.017)
Years of Crime Squared 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Years of Crime: 0 to 4 -0.017 0.023
(0.008) (0.008)
Years of Crime: 5 to 9 -0.012 0.021
(0.004) (0.004)
Years of Crime: 10 or more -0.008 0.021
(0.003) (0.003)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 14 -0.051 0.027
(0.006) (0.007)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 15 -0.026 0.043
Continued on next page...
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Table A.3 – continued from previous page.
Variable Age-VaryingCoefficients
Years of Crime:
Quadratic
Years of Crime:
Piecewise-linear
Years of Crime:
Observed
Experience Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
(0.005) (0.006)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 16 -0.022 0.042
(0.006) (0.006)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 17 0.002 0.053
(0.006) (0.007)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 18 0.001 0.062
(0.012) (0.012)
Rho -0.074 -0.142 -0.127 -0.195
(0.111) (0.107) (0.106) (0.122)
Observations 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. In column (1) the coefficients are allowed to vary by age. Age1 is a dummy for ages 14 to 19, and Age2 is a dummy for ages 20 and above.
In column (2) we use a quadratic function in criminal experience. In column (3) we use a piecewise-linear function of criminal experience: 0
to 4, 5 to 9, 10 or more. In column (4) we use the criminal experience observed in the sample only, interacted with age of entry dummies.
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Table A.4: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Ed-
ucation (Overall Crime) - Robustness Checks 4
Variable
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime on
Education – Not
Instrumenting
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime on
Education
(1) (2)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.043 0.051 0.041 -0.062
(0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.062)
Hispanic -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Black 0.027 -0.028 0.027 -0.028
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Other 0.035 -0.025 0.035 -0.028
(0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030)
Female 0.067 -0.098 0.069 -0.097
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Non-intact Family -0.053 0.026 -0.054 0.026
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Siblings -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Age -0.074 -0.040 -0.072 -0.036
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Certainty of Punishment 0.005 -0.022 0.006 -0.021
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Children -0.018 0.006 -0.018 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Family Crime -0.014 0.149 -0.018 0.148
(0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
Drug Use -0.029 0.225 -0.035 0.225
(0.020) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010)
Unemployment Rate 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.022
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.021 -0.022 0.022 -0.022
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Years of Crime -0.010 0.020 -0.011 0.020
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of Education 0.007 -0.001 0.007 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Schools per Young Person 0.301 0.296
(0.071) (0.071)
Lagged Enrollment 0.187 0.186
(0.012) (0.012)
Continued on next page...
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Table A.4 – continued from previous page.
Variable
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime on
Education – Not
Instrumenting
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime on
Education
(1) (2)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Lagged Crime 0.160 0.159
(0.012) (0.012)
Cognitive Factor 0.036 0.016 0.036 0.017
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.015 -0.079 0.017 -0.078
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Crime 0.097 0.120
(0.058) (0.056)
Lagged State Arrest Rate -1.815
(0.950)
Rho -0.244 -0.186
(0.138) (0.141)
Observations 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. In column (1) we change the direction of the contemporaneous effect; we estimate the con-
temporaneous effect of crime on education. In column (2) we add the lagged state arrest rate as
an exclusion in the crime equation.
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Figure A.1: No Crime at Age 15 - Effect on Average Probability of Education and Crime -
Alternative Contemporaneous Effect
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of
errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially
over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and
enrollment rates.
3. Note that for the second figure, the comparison between two identical individuals who differ only along one
dimension (crime) implies that the average difference in the probability of crime between them is equal to -1 at
age 15 by construction.
A.3 Results for Violent Crime, Drug-Related Crime, and Prop-
erty Crime Samples
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Figure A.2: Enrolled at Age 15 - Effect on Average Probability of Education and Crime -
Alternative Contemporaneous Effect
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of
errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially
over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and
enrollment rates.
3. Note that for the first figure, the comparison between two identical individuals who differ only along one
dimension (enrollment) at age 15 implies that the average difference in the probability of enrollment between
them is equal to -1 at that age by construction.
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Figure A.3: Increase in Certainty of Punishment at Age 15 - Effect on Average Probability of
Education and Crime - Alternative Contemporaneous Effect
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of
errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially
over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and
enrollment rates.
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Figure A.4: Cognitive Factor 25th versus 75th Percentile - Effect on Average Probability of
Education and Crime - Alternative Contemporaneous Effect
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of
errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially
over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and
enrollment rates.
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Figure A.5: Social/Emotional Factor 25th versus 75th Percentile - Effect on Average Probabil-
ity of Education and Crime - Alternative Contemporaneous Effect
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of
errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially
over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and
enrollment rates.
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Figure A.6: Increase in Certainty of Punishment (Permanent) - Effect on Average Probability
of Education and Crime - Alternative Contemporaneous Effect
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of
errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially
over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and
enrollment rates.
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Table A.5: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Drug-Related Crime)
Variable Baseline Controls UncorrelatedErrors No Dynamics
Not
Instrumenting
Cognitive and
So-
cial/Emotional
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.046 -0.014 0.035 -0.017 0.047 -0.005 0.047 -0.005 0.093 -0.012 0.033 -0.014
(0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016)
Hispanic -0.025 -0.022 -0.023 -0.024 -0.030 -0.028 -0.025 -0.022 -0.011 -0.027
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
Black 0.026 -0.007 0.027 -0.004 0.045 -0.022 0.026 -0.006 0.043 -0.012
(0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014)
Other 0.034 -0.015 0.036 -0.011 0.039 -0.022 0.036 -0.014 0.042 -0.010
(0.027) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025)
Female 0.060 -0.103 0.056 -0.099 0.059 -0.100 0.067 -0.142 0.060 -0.103 0.053 -0.099
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Non-intact Family -0.053 0.033 -0.053 0.029 -0.055 0.038 -0.054 0.032 -0.051 0.033
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Siblings -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.081 -0.000 -0.084 -0.009 -0.081 -0.010 -0.104 0.009 -0.083 -0.002 -0.080 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Certainty of Punishment 0.003 -0.010 0.003 -0.010 0.005 -0.015 0.003 -0.010 0.003 -0.008
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Children -0.016 0.009 -0.016 0.007 -0.033 0.019 -0.016 0.008 -0.016 0.007
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Family Crime 0.001 0.084 0.001 0.085 -0.005 0.107 0.003 0.084 -0.000 0.082
(0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010)
Drug Use 0.006 0.213 0.005 0.214 -0.005 0.255 0.007 0.213 0.006 0.203
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Unemployment Rate 0.020 0.002 0.021 0.002 0.021 0.006 0.022 0.001 0.037 0.003 0.021 0.001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.018 -0.008 0.019 -0.006 0.022 -0.008 0.016 -0.008 0.024 0.007
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
Years of Crime -0.011 0.022 -0.012 0.040 -0.011 0.021 -0.011 0.022 -0.011 0.020
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Years of Education 0.007 -0.008 0.011 -0.011 0.007 -0.006 0.006 -0.008 0.006 -0.009
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Cognitive Factor 0.049 0.022 0.048 0.026 0.061 0.034 0.048 0.023
(0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.024) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.006 -0.028 0.006 -0.028 0.014 -0.049 0.006 -0.028
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011)
Continued on next page...
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Table A.5 – continued from previous page.
Variable Baseline Controls UncorrelatedErrors No Dynamics
Not
Instrumenting
Cognitive and
So-
cial/Emotional
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Schools per Young Per-
son
0.326 0.324 0.312 0.323 0.312
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.071)
Lagged Enrollment 0.191 0.194 0.192 0.192 0.186
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Enrollment 0.077 0.063 0.000 0.154 0.062 0.088
(0.036) (0.038) (0.011) (0.039) (0.038) (0.034)
Lagged Crime 0.097 0.149 0.098 0.098 0.092
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
WASI Reasoning Score -0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.005)
WASI Vocabulary Score 0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006)
Stroop: Color/Word 0.005 -0.007
(0.007) (0.005)
Stroop: Word 0.010 -0.004
(0.007) (0.006)
Stroop: Color -0.004 0.016
(0.008) (0.006)
Trail-Making: Part B -0.018 0.004
(0.007) (0.005)
Trail-Making: Part A -0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.005)
WAI - Impulse Response -0.008 -0.008
(0.008) (0.006)
WAI - Suppression of Aggression 0.011 -0.025(0.007) (0.006)
WAI - Consideration of Others 0.000 -0.012(0.006) (0.005)
PSMI - Self Reliance -0.013 0.020
(0.010) (0.008)
PSMI - Identity 0.036 -0.029
(0.010) (0.008)
PSMI - Work Orientation -0.026 0.010
(0.009) (0.007)
Rho -0.289 -0.198 -0.548 -0.230 -0.320
(0.130) (0.109) (0.140) (0.137) (0.129)
Observations 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074
Continued on next page...
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Table A.5 – continued from previous page.
Variable Baseline Controls UncorrelatedErrors No Dynamics
Not
Instrumenting
Cognitive and
So-
cial/Emotional
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. The errors in the enrollment and crime equations are allowed to be correlated in every specification, expect for specification (3). Rho denotes the correlation in errors.
3. Every specification includes an exclusion restriction that enters the education equation only (Schools per Young Person) except for the specification in column (5).
4. In column (2) we exclude the cognitive and social/emotional factors and control for just a few variables (location, gender, age, and local unemployment rate). In column (3) the
errors in the enrollment and crime equations are uncorrelated. The specification in column (4) does not account for any dynamics in the crime and education equation (years of
experience and state dependence). The specification in column (5) does not include the exclusion restriction. In the last column we replace our factor estimates of cognitive and
social/emotional skills with the measures used to infer them.
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Table A.6: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Violent Crime)
Variable Baseline Controls UncorrelatedErrors No Dynamics
Not
Instrumenting
Cognitive and
So-
cial/Emotional
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.044 0.037 0.032 0.036 0.045 0.045 0.049 0.032 0.092 0.040 0.035 0.043
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
Hispanic -0.023 -0.018 -0.023 -0.020 -0.027 -0.021 -0.024 -0.019 -0.010 -0.026
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Black 0.027 -0.032 0.027 -0.030 0.043 -0.040 0.027 -0.031 0.043 -0.032
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Other 0.038 -0.015 0.037 -0.013 0.040 -0.011 0.039 -0.014 0.046 -0.007
(0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030)
Female 0.056 -0.079 0.052 -0.071 0.056 -0.076 0.070 -0.148 0.055 -0.078 0.051 -0.075
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
Non-intact Family -0.048 0.014 -0.048 0.010 -0.051 0.021 -0.049 0.013 -0.046 0.015
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Siblings -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.006 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Age -0.080 -0.030 -0.084 -0.032 -0.080 -0.039 -0.104 -0.019 -0.082 -0.032 -0.079 -0.029
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007)
Certainty of Punishment 0.003 -0.019 0.003 -0.019 0.005 -0.024 0.003 -0.019 0.002 -0.016
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Children -0.017 0.008 -0.017 0.007 -0.032 0.010 -0.017 0.008 -0.017 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Family Crime 0.005 0.130 0.005 0.132 -0.001 0.154 0.006 0.130 0.004 0.126
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Drug Use -0.004 0.159 -0.004 0.159 -0.013 0.190 -0.004 0.159 -0.004 0.138
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Unemployment Rate 0.021 0.005 0.021 0.004 0.021 0.009 0.022 0.004 0.037 0.006 0.021 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.018 -0.024 0.017 -0.024 0.025 -0.028 0.016 -0.024 0.022 0.012
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Years of Crime -0.007 0.021 -0.008 0.033 -0.007 0.021 -0.007 0.021 -0.007 0.017
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Years of Education 0.007 0.001 0.012 -0.010 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.006 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cognitive Factor 0.043 0.030 0.045 0.034 0.048 0.054 0.042 0.032
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.007 -0.074 0.008 -0.074 0.018 -0.111 0.008 -0.074
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Continued on next page...
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Table A.6 – continued from previous page.
Variable Baseline Controls UncorrelatedErrors No Dynamics
Not
Instrumenting
Cognitive and
So-
cial/Emotional
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Schools per Young Per-
son
0.332 0.334 0.322 0.326 0.319
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.073) (0.071)
Lagged Enrollment 0.189 0.191 0.190 0.190 0.185
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Enrollment 0.104 0.101 0.033 0.199 0.083 0.106
(0.048) (0.051) (0.014) (0.061) (0.051) (0.047)
Lagged Crime 0.142 0.188 0.144 0.143 0.125
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
WASI Reasoning Score 0.000 -0.005
(0.006) (0.007)
WASI Vocabulary Score -0.002 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
Stroop: Color/Word 0.004 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
Stroop: Word 0.010 -0.003
(0.007) (0.008)
Stroop: Color -0.002 0.008
(0.008) (0.008)
Trail-Making: Part B -0.016 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Trail-Making: Part A -0.003 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007)
WAI - Impulse Response -0.009 -0.025
(0.007) (0.008)
WAI - Suppression of Aggression 0.011 -0.059(0.007) (0.007)
WAI - Consideration of Others 0.001 -0.027(0.006) (0.006)
PSMI - Self Reliance -0.014 0.013
(0.010) (0.011)
PSMI - Identity 0.035 -0.008
(0.010) (0.011)
PSMI - Work Orientation -0.022 0.004
(0.009) (0.009)
Rho -0.156 -0.157 -0.348 -0.109 -0.159
(0.104) (0.102) (0.137) (0.108) (0.104)
Observations 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232
Continued on next page...
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Table A.6 – continued from previous page.
Variable Baseline Controls UncorrelatedErrors No Dynamics
Not
Instrumenting
Cognitive and
So-
cial/Emotional
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. The errors in the enrollment and crime equations are allowed to be correlated in every specification, expect for specification (3). Rho denotes the correlation in errors.
3. Every specification includes an exclusion restriction that enters the education equation only (Schools per Young Person) except for the specification in column (5).
4. In column (2) we exclude the cognitive and social/emotional factors and control for just a few variables (location, gender, age, and local unemployment rate). In column (3) the
errors in the enrollment and crime equations are uncorrelated. The specification in column (4) does not account for any dynamics in the crime and education equation (years of
experience and state dependence). The specification in column (5) does not include the exclusion restriction. In the last column we replace our factor estimates of cognitive and
social/emotional skills with the measures used to infer them.
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Table A.7: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Property Crime)
Variable Baseline Controls UncorrelatedErrors No Dynamics
Not
Instrumenting
Cognitive and
So-
cial/Emotional
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.054 0.062 0.046 0.029 0.054 0.059 0.053 0.124 0.102 0.063 0.046 0.046
(0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017)
Hispanic -0.024 -0.012 -0.024 -0.012 -0.028 -0.037 -0.025 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Black 0.024 -0.006 0.024 -0.006 0.044 -0.029 0.024 -0.005 0.039 -0.001
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016)
Other 0.035 0.015 0.035 0.015 0.040 -0.005 0.036 0.016 0.042 0.021
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Female 0.066 -0.024 0.062 -0.029 0.067 -0.026 0.069 -0.056 0.066 -0.024 0.060 -0.021
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Non-intact Family -0.048 0.007 -0.048 0.008 -0.050 0.008 -0.049 0.007 -0.046 0.005
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Siblings -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.082 -0.027 -0.086 -0.030 -0.082 -0.024 -0.104 -0.028 -0.084 -0.029 -0.081 -0.025
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Certainty of Punishment 0.004 -0.016 0.004 -0.016 0.005 -0.022 0.003 -0.016 0.003 -0.013
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Children -0.017 0.001 -0.018 0.001 -0.032 0.003 -0.017 0.001 -0.017 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Family Crime 0.001 0.095 0.001 0.095 -0.001 0.122 0.003 0.095 0.001 0.090
(0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
Drug Use -0.007 0.144 -0.006 0.144 -0.012 0.181 -0.006 0.144 -0.005 0.126
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
Unemployment Rate 0.021 0.010 0.022 0.008 0.021 0.009 0.024 0.012 0.038 0.010 0.022 0.008
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.017 -0.032 0.017 -0.033 0.023 -0.040 0.015 -0.032 0.022 0.003
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Years of Crime -0.003 0.018 -0.004 0.030 -0.003 0.018 -0.003 0.018 -0.003 0.015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of Education 0.007 0.006 0.012 -0.001 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cognitive Factor 0.041 0.020 0.040 0.019 0.052 0.047 0.040 0.020
(0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.007 -0.068 0.007 -0.068 0.017 -0.127 0.007 -0.068
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Continued on next page...
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Table A.7 – continued from previous page.
Variable Baseline Controls UncorrelatedErrors No Dynamics
Not
Instrumenting
Cognitive and
So-
cial/Emotional
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Schools per Young Per-
son
0.327 0.328 0.329 0.310 0.314
(0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.074) (0.071)
Lagged Enrollment 0.190 0.192 0.191 0.191 0.186
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Enrollment -0.022 -0.019 -0.003 -0.017 -0.035 -0.011
(0.040) (0.041) (0.012) (0.077) (0.042) (0.040)
Lagged Crime 0.144 0.196 0.144 0.144 0.132
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
WASI Reasoning Score 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
WASI Vocabulary Score -0.003 0.013
(0.007) (0.006)
Stroop: Color/Word 0.003 -0.011
(0.007) (0.006)
Stroop: Word 0.008 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006)
Stroop: Color -0.001 0.005
(0.008) (0.007)
Trail-Making: Part B -0.016 -0.007
(0.007) (0.006)
Trail-Making: Part A -0.004 0.000
(0.007) (0.006)
WAI - Impulse Response -0.007 -0.030
(0.007) (0.006)
WAI - Suppression of Aggression 0.013 -0.029(0.007) (0.006)
WAI - Consideration of Others 0.001 -0.022(0.006) (0.005)
PSMI - Self Reliance -0.013 0.012
(0.010) (0.009)
PSMI - Identity 0.035 -0.012
(0.010) (0.009)
PSMI - Work Orientation -0.024 -0.015
(0.009) (0.008)
Rho 0.061 0.014 0.039 0.100 0.041
(0.118) (0.107) (0.202) (0.123) (0.119)
Observations 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232
Continued on next page...
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Table A.7 – continued from previous page.
Variable Baseline Controls UncorrelatedErrors No Dynamics
Not
Instrumenting
Cognitive and
So-
cial/Emotional
Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. The errors in the enrollment and crime equations are allowed to be correlated in every specification, expect for specification (3). Rho denotes the correlation in errors.
3. Every specification includes an exclusion restriction that enters the education equation only (Schools per Young Person) except for the specification in column (5).
4. In column (2) we exclude the cognitive and social/emotional factors and control for just a few variables (location, gender, age, and local unemployment rate). In column (3) the
errors in the enrollment and crime equations are uncorrelated. The specification in column (4) does not account for any dynamics in the crime and education equation (years of
experience and state dependence). The specification in column (5) does not include the exclusion restriction. In the last column we replace our factor estimates of cognitive and
social/emotional skills with the measures used to infer them.
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Table A.8: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Drug-Related Crime) - Robustness
Checks 1 and 2
Variable Excluding DrugUse
Choices While in
Jail (1)
Choices While in
Jail (2)
Choices While in
Jail (3)
Enrollment Based
on Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.046 -0.013 0.067 0.001 0.052 -0.005 0.051 -0.007 0.014 -0.005
(0.021) (0.016) (0.021) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015)
Hispanic -0.024 -0.030 -0.032 -0.014 -0.005 -0.019 -0.005 -0.019 -0.020 -0.023
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Black 0.026 -0.020 -0.003 0.002 0.045 -0.006 0.043 -0.008 0.001 -0.007
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Other 0.033 -0.036 0.012 -0.007 0.033 -0.009 0.032 -0.009 -0.022 -0.012
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025)
Female 0.060 -0.103 0.114 -0.092 0.023 -0.078 0.024 -0.076 0.013 -0.100
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014)
Non-intact Family -0.053 0.035 -0.062 0.021 -0.033 0.019 -0.033 0.019 -0.007 0.030
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Siblings -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.081 -0.006 -0.069 -0.010 -0.076 -0.004 -0.075 -0.005 -0.048 -0.013
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Certainty of Punishment 0.003 -0.013 0.007 -0.008 -0.000 -0.007 -0.000 -0.007 0.006 -0.010
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Children -0.017 0.004 -0.013 0.010 -0.015 0.013 -0.013 0.013 -0.024 0.012
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Family Crime 0.002 0.108 -0.029 0.078 0.005 0.069 0.004 0.069 0.009 0.083
(0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Drug Use 0.056 0.228 -0.038 0.235 -0.039 0.235 -0.044 0.217
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Unemployment Rate 0.020 0.002 0.020 0.007 0.022 0.004 0.022 0.004 0.018 0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.018 -0.023 0.019 -0.009 0.015 -0.007 0.015 -0.008 0.017 -0.006
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Years of Crime -0.010 0.033 -0.021 0.023 -0.002 0.021 -0.003 0.023 -0.003 0.021
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of Education 0.007 -0.006 0.022 -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Schools per Young Person 0.325 0.146 0.322 0.324 0.141
(0.072) (0.072) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065)
Lagged Enrollment 0.191 0.179 0.199 0.223
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Enrollment 0.069 -0.002
Continued on next page...
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Table A.8 – continued from previous page.
Variable Excluding DrugUse
Choices While in
Jail (1)
Choices While in
Jail (2)
Choices While in
Jail (3)
Enrollment Based
on Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
(0.038) (0.012)
Lagged Crime 0.130 0.088 0.085 0.098 0.098
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Cognitive Factor 0.050 0.060 0.042 0.016 0.007 0.025 0.005 0.024 0.004 0.030
(0.023) (0.019) (0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.005 -0.066 0.014 -0.026 -0.011 -0.025 -0.012 -0.025 0.012 -0.031
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Jail 0.104 0.063 0.367 0.068
(0.012) (0.010) (0.076) (0.065)
Enrollment (alternative) 0.042 0.038
(0.035) (0.035)
Years of Crime Jail 0.004 -0.006
(0.007) (0.006)
Years of Education Jail -0.019 0.002
(0.007) (0.005)
Lagged Enrollment Jail -0.088
(0.023)
Lagged Crime Jail -0.034
(0.020)
Enrollment Jail -0.001
(0.019)
Years of Education (alternative) 0.017 -0.002(0.004) (0.003)
Lagged Enrollment (alternative) 0.086(0.010)
Enrolment (alternative) -0.005
(0.048)
Rho -0.214 0.030 -0.166 -0.152 -0.051
(0.117) (0.041) (0.121) (0.121) (0.165)
Observations 5,074 5,074 6,042 6,042 6,042 6,042 6,042 6,042 4,987 4,987
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. In column (1) we do not include drug use as an independent regressor. In column (2), enrollment is set to zero if an individual did not attend a community school.
In column (3), we condition on whether the individual is interviewed in jail, and in column (4) we interact the jail dummy with years of education, years of crime,
and enrollment to allow the effect of previous experience and contemporaneous enrollment to vary with whether the individual is in jail. In column (5) enrollment is
redefined as attending school for at least nine months.
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Table A.9: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Drug-Related Crime) - Robustness Checks
3 and 4
Variable Age-VaryingCoefficients
Years of
Crime:
Quadratic
Years of
Crime:
Piecewise-
linear
Years of
Crime:
Observed
Experience
Only
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime
on Education –
No Instrument
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime
on Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.048 -0.012 0.045 -0.012 0.045 -0.012 0.045 -0.011 0.045 -0.063 0.045 -0.003
(0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.047) (0.021) (0.015)
Hispanic -0.024 -0.021 -0.024 -0.022 -0.024 -0.022 -0.024 -0.024 -0.019 -0.023 -0.019 -0.023
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
Black 0.025 -0.007 0.026 -0.006 0.025 -0.006 0.023 -0.011 0.026 -0.005 0.026 -0.004
(0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
Other 0.036 -0.014 0.034 -0.015 0.033 -0.014 0.027 -0.011 0.035 -0.015 0.035 -0.014
(0.027) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Female 0.062 -0.101 0.060 -0.104 0.060 -0.103 0.058 -0.108 0.070 -0.100 0.070 -0.100
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Non-intact Family -0.054 0.033 -0.053 0.033 -0.053 0.033 -0.051 0.034 -0.057 0.028 -0.057 0.028
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Siblings -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.088 -0.001 -0.081 -0.000 -0.081 -0.000 -0.084 -0.006 -0.078 -0.008 -0.078 -0.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Certainty of Punishment 0.003 -0.010 0.003 -0.010 0.003 -0.010 0.003 -0.011 0.005 -0.010 0.005 -0.010
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Children -0.016 0.009 -0.016 0.009 -0.016 0.009 -0.019 0.007 -0.018 0.008 -0.018 0.007
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Family Crime 0.002 0.083 0.001 0.084 0.000 0.085 0.001 0.083 -0.019 0.084 -0.018 0.084
(0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010)
Drug Use 0.007 0.212 0.006 0.213 0.006 0.213 0.008 0.216 -0.028 0.214 -0.026 0.214
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010)
Unemployment Rate 0.020 0.003 0.020 0.002 0.020 0.002 0.021 0.004 0.019 0.010 0.019 0.007
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.020 -0.008 0.018 -0.008 0.018 -0.008 0.021 -0.005 0.020 -0.007 0.020 -0.007
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Years of Crime -0.017 0.029 -0.016 0.021 -0.016 0.021
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Years of Education 0.007 -0.008 0.007 -0.008 0.010 -0.007 0.008 -0.007 0.008 -0.007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Schools per Young Person 0.332 0.328 0.327 0.297 0.304 0.307
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071)
Lagged Enrollment 0.191 0.191 0.182 0.188 0.189
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Enrollment 0.077 0.075 0.057
(0.035) (0.036) (0.040)
Lagged Crime 0.096 0.096 0.089 0.096 0.096
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Cognitive Factor 0.047 0.020 0.049 0.023 0.049 0.023 0.048 0.022 0.043 0.024 0.044 0.024
(0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.004 -0.029 0.005 -0.028 0.006 -0.028 0.007 -0.025 0.009 -0.024 0.009 -0.025
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
Years of Crime Age1 -0.016 0.027
(0.006) (0.005)
Years of Crime Age2 -0.008 0.019
(0.004) (0.004)
Continued on next page...
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Table A.9 – continued from previous page.
Variable Age-VaryingCoefficients
Years of
Crime:
Quadratic
Years of
Crime:
Piecewise-
linear
Years of
Crime:
Observed
Experience
Only
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime
on Education –
No Instrument
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime
on Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Years of Education Age1 0.004 -0.008
(0.005) (0.004)
Years of Education Age2 0.009 -0.008
(0.004) (0.003)
Lagged Enrollment Age1 0.228
(0.020)
Lagged Enrollment Age2 0.172
(0.016)
Enrollment Age1 0.080
(0.036)
Enrollment Age2 0.089
(0.045)
Lagged Crime Age1 0.072
(0.015)
Lagged Crime Age2 0.123
(0.015)
Years of Crime Squared 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Years of Crime: 0 to 4 -0.013 0.024
(0.004) (0.004)
Years of Crime: 5 to 9 -0.006 0.019
(0.005) (0.003)
Years of Crime: 10 or more -0.088 0.119
(32.524) (23.080)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 14 -0.063 0.019
(0.013) (0.009)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 15 -0.035 0.023
(0.011) (0.008)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 16 -0.023 0.029
(0.008) (0.006)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 17 -0.000 0.046
(0.009) (0.006)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 18 -0.003 0.029
(0.019) (0.011)
Crime 0.147 0.137
(0.058) (0.062)
Lagged State Arrest Rate -0.962
(0.727)
Rho -0.311 -0.287 -0.281 -0.225 -0.353 -0.379
(0.142) (0.130) (0.131) (0.145) (0.162) (0.155)
Observations 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5074 5074 5074 5074
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. In column (1), coefficients are allowed to vary by age. Age1 is a dummy for ages 14 to 19, and Age2 is a dummy for ages 20 and above. In column (2) we use a
quadratic function in criminal experience. In column (3) we use a piecewise-linear function of criminal experience: 0 to 4, 5 to 9, more than 10. In column (4) we use the
criminal experience observed in the sample only, interacted with age of entry dummies. In column (5) we change the direction of the contemporaneous effect; we estimate the
contemporaneous effect of crime on education. In column (6) we add the lagged state arrest rate as an exclusion in the crime equation.
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Table A.10: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Violent Crime) - Robustness Checks
1 and 2
Variable Excluding DrugUse
Choices While in
Jail (1)
Choices While in
Jail (2)
Choices While in
Jail (3)
Enrollment Based
on Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.044 0.038 0.065 0.041 0.054 0.036 0.052 0.035 0.012 0.041
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Hispanic -0.023 -0.023 -0.033 -0.021 -0.005 -0.025 -0.005 -0.026 -0.018 -0.015
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016)
Black 0.027 -0.039 0.003 -0.035 0.043 -0.041 0.040 -0.041 0.007 -0.027
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018)
Other 0.038 -0.028 0.011 -0.005 0.034 -0.007 0.032 -0.007 -0.019 -0.010
(0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.022) (0.030)
Female 0.056 -0.079 0.116 -0.078 0.017 -0.059 0.018 -0.057 0.002 -0.070
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017)
Non-intact Family -0.048 0.011 -0.055 0.010 -0.028 0.005 -0.029 0.004 -0.003 0.010
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016)
Siblings -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Age -0.080 -0.033 -0.071 -0.036 -0.074 -0.038 -0.074 -0.039 -0.045 -0.036
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Certainty of Punishment 0.003 -0.022 0.007 -0.017 -0.001 -0.015 -0.001 -0.015 0.006 -0.019
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Children -0.017 0.004 -0.015 0.008 -0.015 0.011 -0.014 0.010 -0.024 0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Family Crime 0.004 0.150 -0.032 0.136 0.011 0.126 0.010 0.127 0.012 0.127
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015)
Drug Use 0.041 0.160 -0.043 0.164 -0.044 0.164 -0.042 0.165
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Unemployment Rate 0.021 0.006 0.019 0.007 0.023 0.007 0.023 0.006 0.017 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.018 -0.034 0.018 -0.031 0.015 -0.029 0.015 -0.028 0.017 -0.025
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012)
Years of Crime -0.007 0.026 -0.007 0.022 -0.005 0.020 -0.005 0.020 -0.007 0.022
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Years of Education 0.007 0.001 0.023 0.001 -0.007 0.004 -0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Schools per Young Person 0.331 0.183 0.324 0.325 0.127
(0.071) (0.072) (0.067) (0.067) (0.063)
Lagged Enrollment 0.189 0.173 0.199 0.224
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Enrollment 0.099 0.071
Continued on next page...
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Table A.10 – continued from previous page.
Variable Excluding DrugUse
Choices While in
Jail (1)
Choices While in
Jail (2)
Choices While in
Jail (3)
Enrollment Based
on Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
(0.050) (0.016)
Lagged Crime 0.156 0.147 0.144 0.159 0.141
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012)
Cognitive Factor 0.043 0.061 0.038 0.019 0.008 0.029 0.005 0.030 0.006 0.035
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.024)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.008 -0.106 0.020 -0.071 -0.011 -0.068 -0.012 -0.067 0.008 -0.075
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015)
Jail 0.100 0.091 0.375 0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.077) (0.089)
Enrollment (alternative) 0.056 0.048
(0.047) (0.047)
Years of Crime Jail 0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Years of Education Jail -0.020 0.009
(0.006) (0.007)
Lagged Enrollment Jail -0.088
(0.023)
Lagged Crime Jail -0.049
(0.025)
Enrollment Jail 0.019
(0.026)
Years of Education (alternative) 0.015 0.006(0.004) (0.004)
Lagged Enrollment (alternative) 0.085(0.010)
Enrolment (alternative) 0.128
(0.062)
Rho -0.141 -0.083 -0.040 -0.037 -0.272
(0.103) (0.032) (0.098) (0.098) (0.138)
Observations 5,232 5,232 6,236 6,236 6,236 6,236 6,236 6,236 5,139 5,139
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. In column (1) we do not include drug use as an independent regressor. In column (2), enrollment is set to zero if an individual did not attend a community school.
In column (3), we condition on whether the individual is interviewed in jail, and in column (4) we interact the jail dummy with years of education, years of crime,
and enrollment to allow the effect of previous experience and contemporaneous enrollment to vary with whether the individual is in jail. In column (5) enrollment is
redefined as attending school for at least nine months.
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Table A.11: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Violent Crime) - Robustness Checks 3 and
4
Variable Age-VaryingCoefficients
Years of
Crime:
Quadratic
Years of
Crime:
Piecewise-
linear
Years of
Crime:
Observed
Experience
Only
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime
on Education –
No Instrument
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime
on Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.047 0.038 0.045 0.036 0.041 0.036 0.047 0.024 0.031 -0.048 0.031 0.048
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.062) (0.021) (0.019)
Hispanic -0.023 -0.019 -0.023 -0.017 -0.021 -0.017 -0.022 -0.020 -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 -0.021
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Black 0.026 -0.031 0.027 -0.031 0.030 -0.031 0.021 -0.025 0.032 -0.029 0.032 -0.029
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Other 0.038 -0.013 0.038 -0.014 0.040 -0.012 0.019 0.003 0.035 -0.019 0.036 -0.017
(0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031)
Female 0.057 -0.077 0.056 -0.079 0.054 -0.078 0.063 -0.101 0.068 -0.075 0.067 -0.076
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
Non-intact Family -0.049 0.012 -0.048 0.014 -0.047 0.014 -0.044 0.017 -0.048 0.009 -0.048 0.009
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Siblings -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Age -0.087 -0.031 -0.080 -0.030 -0.081 -0.030 -0.089 -0.034 -0.066 -0.041 -0.068 -0.044
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Certainty of Punishment 0.003 -0.019 0.003 -0.019 0.003 -0.020 0.003 -0.020 0.007 -0.019 0.007 -0.019
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Children -0.017 0.007 -0.017 0.008 -0.018 0.008 -0.020 0.008 -0.018 0.006 -0.018 0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Family Crime 0.005 0.131 0.005 0.130 0.005 0.129 0.001 0.130 -0.029 0.130 -0.026 0.131
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
Drug Use -0.004 0.159 -0.004 0.159 -0.005 0.159 -0.007 0.161 -0.042 0.160 -0.039 0.160
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
Unemployment Rate 0.021 0.006 0.021 0.005 0.020 0.004 0.022 0.004 0.018 0.016 0.018 0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.019 -0.023 0.018 -0.024 0.018 -0.024 0.022 -0.023 0.022 -0.021 0.021 -0.021
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Years of Crime -0.004 0.016 -0.012 0.021 -0.012 0.020
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of Education 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.013 -0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Schools per Young Person 0.327 0.332 0.336 0.280 0.287 0.295
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Lagged Enrollment 0.189 0.189 0.169 0.180 0.182
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Enrollment 0.103 0.109 0.139
(0.048) (0.048) (0.054)
Lagged Crime 0.141 0.140 0.110 0.141 0.142
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Cognitive Factor 0.042 0.033 0.043 0.030 0.042 0.029 0.041 0.029 0.036 0.034 0.037 0.033
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.006 -0.074 0.007 -0.074 0.007 -0.073 0.012 -0.073 0.024 -0.070 0.023 -0.071
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Years of Crime Age1 -0.007 0.020
(0.003) (0.004)
Years of Crime Age2 -0.007 0.022
(0.003) (0.003)
Continued on next page...
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Table A.11 – continued from previous page.
Variable Age-VaryingCoefficients
Years of
Crime:
Quadratic
Years of
Crime:
Piecewise-
linear
Years of
Crime:
Observed
Experience
Only
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime
on Education –
No Instrument
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime
on Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Years of Education Age1 0.002 0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Years of Education Age2 0.009 0.002
(0.004) (0.005)
Lagged Enrollment Age1 0.229
(0.020)
Lagged Enrollment Age2 0.172
(0.016)
Enrollment Age1 0.080
(0.050)
Enrollment Age2 0.044
(0.058)
Lagged Crime Age1 0.140
(0.018)
Lagged Crime Age2 0.146
(0.018)
Years of Crime Squared -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Years of Crime: 0 to 4 -0.015 0.031
(0.006) (0.007)
Years of Crime: 5 to 9 -0.011 0.023
(0.003) (0.004)
Years of Crime: 10 or more -0.005 0.025
(0.003) (0.003)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 14 -0.048 0.031
(0.007) (0.007)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 15 -0.024 0.048
(0.006) (0.006)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 16 -0.020 0.044
(0.006) (0.006)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 17 0.009 0.056
(0.006) (0.008)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 18 0.006 0.071
(0.013) (0.013)
Crime 0.202 0.188
(0.051) (0.054)
Lagged State Arrest Rate -1.550
(0.943)
Rho -0.070 -0.155 -0.169 -0.237 -0.402 -0.442
(0.109) (0.104) (0.104) (0.120) (0.146) (0.141)
Observations 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5232 5232 5232 5232 5232 5232
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. In column (1), coefficients are allowed to vary by age. Age1 is a dummy for ages 14 to 19, and Age2 is a dummy for ages 20 and above. In column (2) we use a
quadratic function in criminal experience. In column (3) we use a piecewise-linear function of criminal experience: 0 to 4, 5 to 9, more than 10. In column (4) we use the
criminal experience observed in the sample only, interacted with age of entry dummies. In column (5) we change the direction of the contemporaneous effect; we estimate the
contemporaneous effect of crime on education. In column (6) we add the lagged state arrest rate as an exclusion in the crime equation.
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Table A.12: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Property Crime) - Robustness
Checks 1 and 2
Variable Excluding DrugUse
Choices While in
Jail (1)
Choices While in
Jail (2)
Choices While in
Jail (3)
Enrollment Based
on Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.055 0.059 0.076 0.076 0.061 0.076 0.060 0.076 0.018 0.060
(0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
Hispanic -0.023 -0.014 -0.034 -0.024 -0.005 -0.026 -0.005 -0.026 -0.021 -0.014
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Black 0.024 -0.010 -0.002 -0.017 0.043 -0.019 0.040 -0.019 0.002 -0.004
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
Other 0.036 0.008 0.010 -0.010 0.034 -0.008 0.031 -0.009 -0.024 0.012
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025)
Female 0.067 -0.027 0.126 -0.023 0.024 -0.012 0.025 -0.011 0.012 -0.026
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014)
Non-intact Family -0.048 0.007 -0.056 0.003 -0.028 0.000 -0.028 -0.001 -0.003 0.009
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Siblings -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.082 -0.030 -0.072 -0.026 -0.075 -0.029 -0.075 -0.029 -0.047 -0.027
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Certainty of Punishment 0.004 -0.017 0.007 -0.013 -0.000 -0.013 -0.000 -0.013 0.006 -0.015
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Children -0.017 -0.004 -0.016 0.002 -0.016 0.003 -0.014 0.002 -0.023 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Family Crime 0.000 0.112 -0.035 0.090 0.008 0.085 0.007 0.087 0.010 0.096
(0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Drug Use 0.040 0.154 -0.044 0.155 -0.045 0.154 -0.043 0.139
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Unemployment Rate 0.021 0.010 0.020 0.012 0.023 0.013 0.024 0.013 0.017 0.010
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.018 -0.040 0.018 -0.037 0.014 -0.036 0.014 -0.036 0.016 -0.033
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Years of Crime -0.004 0.022 -0.004 0.018 -0.002 0.018 -0.002 0.019 -0.004 0.018
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of Education 0.007 0.007 0.023 0.006 -0.007 0.007 -0.002 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Schools per Young Person 0.326 0.177 0.322 0.322 0.132
(0.071) (0.072) (0.067) (0.067) (0.064)
Lagged Enrollment 0.191 0.175 0.199 0.223
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Enrollment -0.029 -0.007
Continued on next page...
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Table A.12 – continued from previous page.
Variable Excluding DrugUse
Choices While in
Jail (1)
Choices While in
Jail (2)
Choices While in
Jail (3)
Enrollment Based
on Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
(0.040) (0.013)
Lagged Crime 0.163 0.142 0.140 0.156 0.145
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Cognitive Factor 0.040 0.049 0.035 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.003 0.013 0.004 0.014
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.008 -0.092 0.017 -0.065 -0.011 -0.064 -0.012 -0.064 0.009 -0.065
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Jail 0.100 0.045 0.388 0.061
(0.012) (0.011) (0.077) (0.074)
Enrollment (alternative) -0.024 -0.035
(0.038) (0.038)
Years of Crime Jail -0.002 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Years of Education Jail -0.020 0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
Lagged Enrollment Jail -0.086
(0.023)
Lagged Crime Jail -0.050
(0.020)
Enrollment Jail 0.019
(0.021)
Years of Education (alternative) 0.015 0.005(0.004) (0.004)
Lagged Enrollment (alternative) 0.090(0.010)
Enrolment (alternative) -0.074
(0.049)
Rho 0.067 0.006 0.044 0.055 0.172
(0.110) (0.036) (0.107) (0.107) (0.147)
Observations 5,232 5,232 6,231 6,231 6,231 6,231 6,231 6,231 5,141 5,141
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. In column (1) we do not include drug use as an independent regressor. In column (2), enrollment is set to zero if an individual did not attend a community school.
In column (3), we condition on whether the individual is interviewed in jail, and in column (4) we interact the jail dummy with years of education, years of crime,
and enrollment to allow the effect of previous experience and contemporaneous enrollment to vary with whether the individual is in jail. In column (5) enrollment is
redefined as attending school for at least nine months.
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Table A.13: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Property Crime) - Robustness Checks 3 and
4
Variable Age-VaryingCoefficients
Years of
Crime:
Quadratic
Years of
Crime:
Piecewise-
linear
Years of
Crime:
Observed
Experience
Only
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime
on Education –
No Instrument
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime
on Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Phoenix 0.057 0.064 0.054 0.062 0.053 0.063 0.064 0.072 0.049 0.050 0.049 0.059
(0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.054) (0.022) (0.016)
Hispanic -0.023 -0.012 -0.023 -0.013 -0.023 -0.013 -0.026 -0.020 -0.023 -0.011 -0.023 -0.011
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Black 0.024 -0.005 0.025 -0.006 0.025 -0.005 0.020 -0.013 0.024 -0.006 0.024 -0.006
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
Other 0.036 0.016 0.037 0.014 0.036 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.034 0.014 0.034 0.014
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Female 0.068 -0.022 0.067 -0.025 0.067 -0.025 0.068 -0.041 0.067 -0.027 0.067 -0.027
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Non-intact Family -0.049 0.007 -0.048 0.007 -0.048 0.007 -0.041 0.008 -0.049 0.008 -0.049 0.008
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Siblings -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.090 -0.026 -0.083 -0.027 -0.082 -0.027 -0.089 -0.030 -0.080 -0.024 -0.080 -0.024
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Certainty of Punishment 0.003 -0.015 0.004 -0.016 0.004 -0.016 0.003 -0.015 0.004 -0.016 0.004 -0.016
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Children -0.017 0.000 -0.018 0.001 -0.017 0.001 -0.020 0.001 -0.018 0.001 -0.018 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Family Crime 0.002 0.095 0.002 0.095 0.002 0.094 0.001 0.097 -0.008 0.094 -0.007 0.094
(0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011)
Drug Use -0.006 0.143 -0.007 0.144 -0.006 0.143 -0.005 0.145 -0.016 0.144 -0.016 0.144
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009)
Unemployment Rate 0.022 0.011 0.021 0.010 0.021 0.010 0.022 0.010 0.021 0.009 0.021 0.009
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.019 -0.033 0.018 -0.032 0.017 -0.032 0.020 -0.030 0.019 -0.033 0.019 -0.033
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Years of Crime -0.011 0.025 -0.005 0.018 -0.005 0.018
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Years of Education 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Schools per Young Person 0.328 0.330 0.329 0.276 0.323 0.323
(0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Lagged Enrollment 0.190 0.190 0.175 0.191 0.191
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Enrollment -0.022 -0.020 -0.002
(0.040) (0.040) (0.044)
Lagged Crime 0.144 0.144 0.126 0.144 0.144
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Cognitive Factor 0.040 0.022 0.040 0.021 0.039 0.022 0.037 0.030 0.039 0.018 0.039 0.018
(0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.005 -0.068 0.007 -0.068 0.007 -0.068 0.003 -0.076 0.012 -0.067 0.012 -0.067
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Years of Crime Age1 -0.004 0.024
(0.003) (0.003)
Years of Crime Age2 -0.003 0.014
(0.003) (0.003)
Continued on next page...
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Table A.13 – continued from previous page.
Variable Age-VaryingCoefficients
Years of
Crime:
Quadratic
Years of
Crime:
Piecewise-
linear
Years of
Crime:
Observed
Experience
Only
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime
on Education –
No Instrument
Contemporaneous
Effect of Crime
on Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime Educ. Crime
Years of Education Age1 0.003 0.005
(0.005) (0.004)
Years of Education Age2 0.010 0.007
(0.004) (0.004)
Lagged Enrollment Age1 0.229
(0.020)
Lagged Enrollment Age2 0.172
(0.016)
Enrollment Age1 -0.035
(0.041)
Enrollment Age2 -0.050
(0.046)
Lagged Crime Age1 0.130
(0.014)
Lagged Crime Age2 0.157
(0.016)
Years of Crime Squared 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Years of Crime: 0 to 4 -0.008 0.024
(0.004) (0.005)
Years of Crime: 5 to 9 -0.004 0.020
(0.002) (0.003)
Years of Crime: 10 or more 0.000 0.016
(0.005) (0.003)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 14 -0.055 0.020
(0.009) (0.007)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 15 -0.033 0.039
(0.007) (0.006)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 16 -0.022 0.036
(0.007) (0.006)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 17 0.008 0.040
(0.007) (0.006)
Years of Crime Age of Entry 18 0.021 0.050
(0.016) (0.012)
Crime 0.058 0.057
(0.051) (0.051)
Lagged State Arrest Rate -0.137
(0.829)
Rho 0.122 0.061 0.055 0.012 -0.130 -0.133
(0.121) (0.118) (0.118) (0.127) (0.121) (0.122)
Observations 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5232 5232 5232 5232
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses.
2. In column (1), coefficients are allowed to vary by age. Age1 is a dummy for ages 14 to 19, and Age2 is a dummy for ages 20 and above. In column (2) we use a
quadratic function in criminal experience. In column (3) we use a piecewise-linear function of criminal experience: 0 to 4, 5 to 9, more than 10. In column (4) we use the
criminal experience observed in the sample only, interacted with age of entry dummies. In column (5) we change the direction of the contemporaneous effect; we estimate the
contemporaneous effect of crime on education. In column (6) we add the lagged state arrest rate as an exclusion in the crime equation.
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Table B.1: Pathways to Desistance - Descriptive Statistics by Location
Variable Philadelphia Phoenix
Black* 0.698 0.093
(0.460) (0.291)
Hispanic* 0.145 0.581
(0.353) (0.494)
White* 0.133 0.287
(0.340) (0.453)
Age at Labour Market Entry* 18.790 18.996
(1.229) (1.691)
High School Degree* 0.387 0.136
(0.488) (0.344)
GED* 0.298 0.423
(0.458) (0.495)
Income Crime Monthly Rate 0.113 0.101
(0.317) (0.301)
Legal Employment Monthly Rate 0.261 0.401
(0.439) (0.490)
Monthly Non-Employment Rate 0.361 0.210
(0.48) (0.408)
Monthly Incarceration Rate 0.290 0.331
(0.454) (0.471)
Monthly Legal Earnings 1,404.8 1,440.2
(607.9) (490.3)
Monthly Criminal Earnings 5,240.2 3,166.5
(5168.6) (5629.1)
Number of Individuals 248 279
Notes:
* Indicates variables that do not vary over time. Summary statistics for these variables are calculated using
only the survey at the time individuals stop attending school. For the rest of the variables, summary statistics
are calculated using all individual-month observations.
1. Standard deviations are reported below the mean in parenthesis.
2. The monthly crime rate is the fraction of individual-month pairs in which an income crime is committed.
The monthly legal employment rate, non-employment rate, and incarceration rate are calculated analogously.
3. Legal earnings and criminal earnings are monthly and are expressed in 2000 US dollars.
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Table C.1: Parameter Estimates - Sensitivity Analysis - Philadelphia
Parameter
Trimming Percentages in Criminal Earnings Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1% Bottom
1% Top
1% Bottom
5% Top
5% Bottom
5% Top
5% Bottom
1% Top
Legal Earnings Distribution: Mean 7.281 7.281 7.277 7.279
(0.037) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Legal Earnings Distribution: Variance 0.240 0.240 0.241 0.241
(0.025) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Criminal Earnings Distribution: Mean 8.327 8.244 8.327 8.356
(0.183) (0.149) (0.168) (0.181)
Criminal Earnings Distribution: Variance 1.401 1.237 0.989 1.258
(0.283) (0.149) (0.138) (0.194)
Jail: Release Rate 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Non-Employment: Job Arrival Rate 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.069
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Non-Employment: Crime Arrival Rate 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Non-Employment: Arrest Rate 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Legal Employment: Job Arrival Rate 0.082 0.082 0.083 0.082
(0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Legal Employment: Crime Arrival Rate 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.033
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Legal Employment: Job Destruction Rate 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Legal Employment: Arrest Rate 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Income Crime: Job Arrival Rate 0.027 0.025 0.026 0.027
(0.01) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Income Crime: Earnings Shock Rate 0.123 0.122 0.121 0.125
(0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Income Crime: Destruction Rate 0.101 0.101 0.099 0.097
(0.013) (0.009) (0.01) (0.009)
Income Crime: Arrest Rate 0.095 0.096 0.095 0.095
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Employment/Crime: Job Arrival Rate 0.061 0.060 0.063 0.059
(0.036) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
Employment/Crime: Crime Earnings Shock Rate 0.063 0.062 0.067 0.066
(0.031) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Employment/Crime: Crime Destruction Rate 0.130 0.131 0.133 0.123
(0.038) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Employment/Crime: Arrest Rate 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Employment/Crime: Job Destruction Rate 0.074 0.074 0.073 0.075
(0.027) (0.011) (0.01) (0.011)
Jail: Job Offer Probability 0.086 0.086 0.084 0.085
(0.022) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Jail: Crime Opportunity Probability 0.165 0.165 0.166 0.171
(0.029) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
Flow Utility of Jail 172.2 130.4 73.1 -54.8
(261.7) (100.1) (42.2) (-30.1)
Flow Utility of Leisure 956.1 972.2 1023.3 1095.6
(431.8) (284.4) (334.5) (289.2)
Flow Utility of Crime 674.6 751.2 577.4 702.3
(1005.6) (532.7) (771.4) (557.2)
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in parenthesis. These are computed by bootstrap with 100 replications.
2. Arrival rates are monthly.
3. In column (1), I estimate the model using a trimming percentage of 1% at the bottom and the top of the criminal earnings distribution.
In column (2), I use a trimming percentage of 1% in the bottom and 5% in the top for the criminal earnings distribution. In column (3), I
use a trimming percentage of 5% in the bottom and 1% in the top for the criminal earnings distribution. Finally, in column (4), I use a 5%
trimming percentage in the top and the bottom of the criminal earnings distribution.
4. The flow utility of crime equals (αc ∗ 2/3), which is the non-pecuniary value of crime obtained by an individual who is only participating
in income crime.
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Table C.2: Parameter Estimates - Sensitivity Analysis - Phoenix
Parameter
Trimming Percentages in Criminal Earnings Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1% Bottom
1% Top
1% Bottom
5% Top
5% Bottom
5% Top
5% Bottom
1% Top
Legal Earnings Distribution: Mean 7.339 7.340 7.339 7.342
(0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Legal Earnings Distribution: Variance 0.200 0.200 0.202 0.201
(0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Criminal Earnings Distribution: Mean 7.234 7.171 7.186 7.195
(0.301) (0.13) (0.145) (0.156)
Criminal Earnings Distribution: Variance 2.114 1.598 1.517 2.108
(0.636) (0.193) (0.211) (0.325)
Jail: Release Rate 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Non-Employment: Job Arrival Rate 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Non-Employment: Crime Arrival Rate 0.040 0.040 0.042 0.044
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Non-Employment: Arrest Rate 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.046
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Legal Employment: Job Arrival Rate 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.140
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Legal Employment: Crime Arrival Rate 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.031
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Legal Employment: Job Destruction Rate 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.053
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Legal Employment: Arrest Rate 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Income Crime: Job Arrival Rate 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.053
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Income Crime: Earnings Shock Rate 0.113 0.111 0.117 0.120
(0.025) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Income Crime: Destruction Rate 0.132 0.136 0.128 0.123
(0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Income Crime: Arrest Rate 0.109 0.109 0.110 0.109
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Employment/Crime: Job Arrival Rate 0.047 0.047 0.045 0.043
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Employment/Crime: Crime Earnings Shock Rate 0.102 0.103 0.102 0.099
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020)
Employment/Crime: Crime Destruction Rate 0.172 0.173 0.169 0.168
(0.034) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Employment/Crime: Arrest Rate 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Employment/Crime: Job Destruction Rate 0.071 0.071 0.073 0.075
(0.01) (0.011) (0.01) (0.011)
Jail: Job Offer Probability 0.234 0.236 0.236 0.237
(0.036) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Jail: Crime Opportunity Probability 0.208 0.206 0.218 0.225
(0.048) (0.026) (0.03) (0.031)
Flow Utility of Jail 373.6 553.7 613.8 206.4
(317.4) (425.3) (354.3) (113.4)
Flow Utility of Leisure 1433.8 1316.3 1262.9 1537.6
(326) (385.1) (412.8) (405.9)
Flow Utility of Crime 1539.3 1355.2 1194.4 1675.2
(581.1) (961.1) (1595.8) (1329.1)
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in parenthesis. These are computed by bootstrap with 100 replications.
2. Arrival rates are monthly.
3. In column (1), I estimate the model using a trimming percentage of 1% at the bottom and the top of the criminal earnings distribution.
In column (2), I use a trimming percentage of 1% in the bottom and 5% in the top for the criminal earnings distribution. In column (3), I
use a trimming percentage of 5% in the bottom and 1% in the top for the criminal earnings distribution. Finally, in column (4), I use a 5%
trimming percentage in the top and the bottom of the criminal earnings distribution.
4. The flow utility of crime equals (αc ∗ 2/3), which is the non-pecuniary value of crime obtained by an individual who is only participating
in income crime.
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